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Foreword
When Gregor Benton asked me to write a foreword to this collection ofChen
Duxiu's last articles and letters to introduce their author to Western readers,
I felt duty-bound to accept, as Chen's disciple, correspondent, and occasional
critic. However, my great age and poor health prevent me from writing
seriously about the subject. In any case, the translator has already provided a
detailed introduction to Chen's life, work, and thought, his prodigious role
in China's modem history, and the changing evaluation ofhim by succeeding
generations ofChinese Communists, as well as explaining in footnotes various
events and characters relevant to an understanding ofthe text. Moreover, the
book concludes with a series ofappendices that evaluate Chen's stature as a
thinker and a revolutionary. As a result, there is little left for me to say. Even
so, I would like to take the chance to write a few lines about the special
features of Chen's life and thinking.
The first collection of Chen's writings, published in 1922 by Shanghai's
Oriental Book Company, contained several dozen essays and a large number
of contemporary comments and letters written by him between 1915 and
1922. In a briefpreface to the collection he wrote:
These several dozen essays are not only not works of literature but even lack a
systematic exposition. They are simply a direct account ofmy various intuitions.
However, they are all my own intuitions, and in them I forthrightly speak my
mind. I parrot no one, nor do I strike sentimental poses. In that respect, they may
be worth publishing. The themes covered by these several dozen essays are
numerous and varied, thus demonstrating that literature is the product of social
change. In that respect, too, they may be worth publishing. 1
In just a few lines, Chen gives the reader an extremely accurate description
ofhis literary style and his character as a man. First, he tells us that he writes
straight from the heart about his intuitions, that he plagiarises no one, and that
he adopts no sentimental poses. Second, he points out that literature - which
should be understood not in the narrow but in the widest sense, as writing
ofall kinds - is the product of changes in society, so articles written by him
at different times tackle different themes.
1. Chen Duxiu, "Zixu" ("Author's preface"), Duxiu wcncun ("Collected writings of [Chen]
Duxiu"), Wuhu: Anhui renrnin chubanshe, 1987, pp. i-ii.
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These two characteristics epitomise the worth ofChen's writings throughout
his life, including in his last years. So the preface that Chen wrote for his "first
articles and letters" serves perfectly to introduce his "last articles and letters".
More than twenty years separated Chen's early collected writings from the
articles and letters collected in this present volume. In those twenty years,
Chen played a leading role in Chinese affairs. At the same time, his knowledge
- particularly ofMarxism - and his experience progressed enormously. Even
so, his essential nature - both as a thinker and as a doer - remained unchanged
throughout those years. He continued to be directed by intuition, to speak
straight from the heart, to avoid parroting the views of others, to refuse to
strike sentimental poses, and to think and act independently.
In that respect, his attitude was the same as that ofMarx, illustrated in the
preface to Das Kapitaf by a line from Dante: Segui if tuo corso, e fascia dir ie genti!
(Follow your course, and let the others talk.)
This independent attitude is common to all great men and women. How-
. ever, unless supplemented by another characteristic - the ability to change
when confronted by something good and admirable or when the thinker's
intuitions are seen to be incompatible with the real world - independence of
this sort can turn into something stubborn and immutable, a reactionary
posture left behind by the advances of the epoch. Many great people in all ages
and cultures are susceptible to this sort ofdegeneration when they grow old.
Chen Duxiu, however, was different. His refusal to tread that path can be
attributed to the second characteristic mentioned in his preface, namely, that
his writings are "the product ofsocial change", that they change along with
social thinking.
It was precisely on the grounds of this interpretation of Chen Duxiu's
character that I argued in my memoirs that the views set out in Chen's Last
Articles and Letters cannot be seen as final. Only his life was finite, not his
thinking. In the new world and in the new China, Chen's ideas and his
analysis would certainly have changed. Had he lived, what changes might his
thinking have undergone? To answer that question would make a rather
interesting study. I myself am convinced that he would have returned, on
fundamentals, to the positions of Lenin and Trotsky.
Wang Fanxi, February 26, 1998
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CHINA
China in 1930
Chronology
China and the Wodd Chen Duxiu
1879
Born on October 8 in Anqing, Anhui.
1883-1893
Conflict between China and France.
1894-1895
War between China and Japan, con-
cluded by the Treaty ofShimonoseki that
ceded Taiwan to Japan.
1895
Kang Youwei's reformist manifesto. Sun
Yat-sen's first Republican rising, at
Guangzhou, fails.
1897
Germany annexes parts of Shandong.
Publication of Kang Youwei's Confucius
as a Rifonner and Yan Fu's translation of
T. H. Huxley's Evolution and Ethics.
1898
Britain and Russia annexe parts of Shan-
dong. The Hundred Days ofReform end
in failure. Tan Sitong and five other
leading reformists are executed.
1899
France annexes parts of Guangdong.
1900
The Boxers occupy Beijing, attack Chris-
tian converts, and besiege the embassies.
An International Expedition attacks
China and enters Beijing.
1896
Passes the imperial examinations as a
xiucai. At the same time, sees the corrup-
tion of the old regime and inclines to-
ward the reformist ideas ofKang Youwei
et al.
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1901
The Boxer protocol includes an indem-
nity of 450 million taels. Li Hongzhang
dies. Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations is
translated by Yan Fu.
1904-1905
Japan wins the Russo-Japanese War.
1905
Sun Yat-sen founds the United League
.in Tokyo.
1906
Nationalist revolts in Jiangxi and Hunan
are suppressed.
1907
Seven Nationalist risings are defeated.
1910
Russia andJapan divide northeast China
into spheres of influence.
1911
On October 10, there is a successful
Republican insurrection at Wuhan. It
spreads throughout China.
1912
On January 1, Sun Yat-sen inaugurates
the Republic at Nanjing; in February, he
yields to Yuan Shikai, who moves the
capital to Beijing. Beijing University is
founded.
1901
Goes to Japan for the first time, and
organises the Chinese Youth Society
there.
1903
Takes part in China in the movement to
resist Russia and writes for Guomin ribao
in Shanghai. Founds the Anhui Patriotic
Society.
1904
Works as a journalist and educationalist
in Anhui, where he founds the journal
Anhui Common Speech Journal. Becomes
a revolutionary. Joins an anarchist assassi-
nation squad in Shanghai.
1907
Flees Anhui with other revolutionaries.
Returns to Japan.
1912
Becomes head of the provincial secretar-
iat ofAnhui's new revolutionary govern-
ment.
Chronology 5
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1913
A "Second Revolution" by Nationalists,
against Yuan Shikai, fails.
1914
Yuan Shikai dissolves parliament. Japan
occupies Germany's possessions in Shan-
dong.
1915
Japan puts pressure on China with its
Twenty-One Demands. Sun Yat-sen
denounces the Twenty-One Demands,
which Yuan Shikai accepts in modified
form, and calls for Yuan's overthrow. In
December, Yuan assumes the throne.
1916
Yuan Shikai dies. The warlord period
starts. Cai Yuanpei is appointed Vice-
Chancellor ofBeijing University.
1917
Writing in New Youth, Hu Shi advocates
literary reform.
1918
Li Dazhao publishes "Victory ofBolshe-
vism" in New Youth.
1919
The Paris Peace Conference gives Japan
Germany's possessions in China. Weekly
Critic publishes the "Communist Mani-
festo" in Chinese. The May Fourth
Movement breaks out in Beijing. The
Soviets' Karakhan Declaration renounces
Tsarist privileges in China. Sun Yat-sen's
Revolutionary Party becomes the Guo-
1913
Leaves the government and returns to
teaching. Arrested for the first time, in
Wuhu. Flees to Japan after the defeat of
the "Second Revolution".
1915
Founds Youth, to propagate science and
human rights, later formulated into the
famous slogan "Support Mr Science and
Mr Democracy".
1916
Youth is renamed New Youth.
1917
Named Dean of Beijing University's
School of Letters by Cai Yuanpei.
1918
Adds Hu Shi, Li Dazhao, and others to
New Youth's editorial board. Together
with Li Dazhao, founds Weekly Critic.
1919
Resigns his deanship. Joins the students
on the streets in the May Fourth Move-
ment. Arrested for the second time, in
Beijing. Imprisoned for three months.
Becomes a Marxist.
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mindang ("Nationalist Party"). The Soci-
ety for the Study ofSocialism is founded
at Beijing University.
1920
Voitinsky meets Chen Duxiu and others
to plan a Communist Party.
1921
The Communist Party is founded in
Shanghai, and holds its First Congress in
July. Sun Vat-sen forms a Nationalist
Government in Guangzhou.
1923
The Soviet Union supports Sun Vat-sen.
1924
The First United Front between Com-
munists and Nationalists begins.
1925
On March 12, Sun Vat-sen dies in
Beijing. The May Thirtieth Incident
leads to a wave ofstrikes and demonstra-
tions.
1920
Leaves Beijing for Shanghai. Meets
Voitinsky and forms a Communist nu-
cleus in May. In December, becomes
head of Chen Jiongming's Education
Department in Guangzhou.
1921
Returns to Shanghai and becomes Gen-
eral Secretary of the Communist Party.
Arrested for the third time, in October,
in Shanghai.
1922
Re-elected General Secretary at the
Party's Second Congress. At the Party's
West Lake Plenum, unsuccessfully op-
poses cooperating with the Guomindang.
Arrested for the fourth time, in August,
in Shanghai. In November, attends the
Fourth Comintern Congress, in Moscow.
1923
Re-elected General Secretary at the
Party's Third Congress.
1925
Re-elected General Secretary at the
Party's Fourth Congress. After Sun Yat-
sen's death, becomes even more vocal in
his opposition to Communist entry into
the Guomindang. In September, launches
Guide Weekly, which plays a big role in
the Revolution of 1925-1927.
Chronology 7
R
1926
In July, Chiang Kai-shek launches the
Northern Expedition to overthrow war-
lordism and reunite the country.
1927
Shanghai workers take control ofShang-
hai before the arrival ofthe Guomindang
armies. Chiang Kai-shek massacres the
Communists in Shanghai and sets up a
Nationalist Government in Nanjing. The
Communist leader Li Dazhao is executed
in Beijing. WangJingwei sets up another
Nationalist Government in Wuhan; later,
he too massacres the Communists. The
two Governments unite in Nanjing under
Chiang. The Communists rise unsuccess-
fully at Nanchang on August 1. In Octo-
ber, Mao Zedong retreats to Hunan's
Jinggang Mountains. In December, the
Guangzhou Commune is suppressed.
1928
Chiang Kai-shek organises a second ex-
pedition to the north. At the Sixth Con-
gress of the Chinese Communist Party,
in Moscow, Li Lisan takes real power
from Qu Qiubai.
1929
The Communists under Mao leave
Hunan and found a Soviet republic at
Ruijin in southernJiangxi. Liang Qichao
dies.
1930-1934
Chiang Kai-shek launches five encircle-
ment campaigns against the Communists.
1926
Continues to call for the Party's indepen-
dence, and criticises the harmful effects
on the Party ofthe Northern Expedition.
1927
After two unsuccessful risings by Shang-
hai's workers, sets up a special committee
to prepare a third rising, which succeeds,
on March 21-22, under Chen's direction.
Leaves Shanghai after Chiang Kai-shek
crushes the Communists, and goes to Wu-
han, where he is re-elected as Party Gen-
eral Secretary at the Fifth Congress. Re-
signs as Party leader after again trying to
end the collaboration, and finding it im-
possible to carry out Moscow's directives.
He is then made scapegoat for the Party's
defeat. His son Yannian is executed by the
Nationalists.
1928
Refuses to go to Moscow, on the
grounds that his ideas are too different
from the Party's. His second son, Qiao-
nian, is executed by the Nationalists..
1929
Begins reading Trotskyist documents.
Expelled from the Party on November
15.
1930
Begins to publish Proletarian, a Trotskyist
journal. Refuses to attend a Party meet-
ing called to review his expulsion.
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1931
The Japanese invade northeast China.
Wang Ming takes power from Li Lisan
in the Chinese Communist Party.
1932
The Japanese attack Shanghai; the Na-
tionalists' Nineteenth Route Army resists.
In the northeast, the Japanese found the
puppet state ofManchukuo.
1933
InJanuary, the Central Committee ofthe
Chinese Communist Party moves from
Shanghai to Ruijin.
1933-1935
The Japanese advance into north China.
1931
In May, the Chinese Left Opposition
holds its Unification Congress in Shang-
hai and makes Chen its General Secre-
tary.
1932
Arrested by the Guornindang on October
15, for the fifth (and last) time, in Shang-
hai.
1933
1934 Sentenced to thirteen years in prison.
In January, Guomindang troops defeat
the separatist government set up in Fujian
by the Nineteenth Route Army. In Oc-
tober, the beleaguered Communists are
forced to abandon Ruijin and to set out
on their Long March. Chiang Kai-shek
launches his New Life Movement.
1935
In January, Mao Zedong is elected
Chairman of the Politburo of the Com-
munist Party. The Long March reaches
northwest China and the Communists
establish a base there. In Moscow, the
first steps toward the Chinese Commu-
nists' Second United Front with the
Nationalists are taken, as part of Stalin's
new world strategy. On December 9,
students in Beijing demonstrate against
Japan; the movement spreads.
Chronology
1936
In December, when the Communists
move their capital to Yan'an, Chiang Kai-
shek is taken prisoner by the Nationalist
Zhang Xueliang at nearby Xi'an and
forced to promise to resist Japan. The
writer Lu Xun and the revolutionary
scholar Zhang Binglin die.
9
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1937
The Second United Front is launched.
Japan launches all-out war on China on
July 7, and captures Shanghai, Nanjing,
and other cities.
1938
Chiang Kai-shek moves his capital first to
Wuhan and then to Chongqing, in
southwest China. A brief war between
the Soviet Union and Japan on the bor-
der with Manchuria ends with the resto-
ration of the status quo. Wang Jingwei
defects to the Japanese.
1939
On September 3, World War Two
breaks out.
1940
Wang Jingwei sets up a puppet govern-
ment in Nanjing. Cai Yuanpei dies. Mao
Zedong publishes On New Democracy.
1937
Released from prison on August 23, after
the start of the war. In September, leaves
for Wuhan, where he tries to organise a·
democratic alliance against Japan and a
military resistance. In November, Wang
Ming and Kang Sheng return from Mos-
cow. In December, at a meeting of the
Party Politburo, Wang Ming starts up a
smear campaign against Chen and the
Chinese Trotskyists, whom he accuses of
being Japanese spies.
1938
Chen defends himself against this smear
campaign. On July 2, leaves Wuhan for
Sichuan, where he settles in Jiangjin,
some fifty miles from Chongqing.
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1941
Chiang Kai-shek destroys the headquar-
ters of the Communist New Fourth
Army in south Anhui. On June 22, Ger-
many invades the Soviet Union. On
December 7, the Japanese attack the US
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour and on
December 25 they occupy Hongkong.
1942
Japan launches a mopping-up campaign
against Communist bases in north China.
In February, Singapore falls; in March,
Rangoon. In Yan'an, Mao Zedong lays
down the Party line on literature and art.
1945
On May 7, Germany capitulates; on
August 14, Japan.
1942
Dies on May 27 of heart disease. Has
spent the previous four years under the
supervision ofGuomindang secret agents.
Has devoted most ofhis time to linguistic
research and to rethinking fundamental
questions about the future of China and
the world. His letters to some friends and
a few articles, translated in this volume,
were collected and published after his
death.
-Editor's Introduction
Chen Duxiu (1879-1942) is a surpassing presence in modern Chinese thought
and politics. At the start of the century, he helped prepare the ground for the
Revolution of1911 that overthrew the Manchus and brought in the Republic.
Between 1915 and 1919, he led the remarkable New Culture (or May Fourth)
Movement that electrified Chinese student youth and laid the intellectual
foundations for transforming China's politics and society. In 1921 he founded
the Chinese Communist Party; he was elected General Secretary at its first five
congresses. In 1929 he became a Trotskyist and in 1931 he helped found the
Chinese Left Opposition, which he then led. In 1932 he was arrested (for the
fifth and last time in his life!) and sent to prison on charges of seeking to
overthrow the government and replace it with a proletarian dictatorship.
Between his release from prison in 1937 and his death on May 27, 1942, he
wrote the letters and articles collected in this volume.
Chen was a seminal and latitudinarian thinker, broad enough to encompass
a multitude of contradictions. Some see in him the Lenin of the Chinese
Revolution, but he lacked Lenin's knowledge of and gift for theory. Others
view him as China's Plekhanov, because he inspired the rise ofCommunism
in his country and served as a bridge between Marx and Mao, just as Plekha-
nov bridged Marx and Lenin; or as China's Lassalle, on account ofhis practical
bent, his want of ideological polish, and his strong literary engagement.·
Anotherjudgment, by Chen's biographer Lee Feigon, is that Chen was more
the Moses than the Trotsky or Plekhanov ofthe Chinese Revolution, for after
introducing his people to the new doctrines he was left behind by them when
they reached the promised land.2 But Chen's friend Hu Shi, his fellow-leader
in the New Culture movement, thought ofhim as "an oppositionist for life"
to any established authority, and it is perhaps this epithet that fits him best.
"Chen Duxiu", wrote his pupil and follower Wang Fanxi, "was best known
as a revolutionary politician, but in fact he was a man ofenormous versatility.
He was also a poet, a writer, an educator, and a linguist. Above all, he was a
1. See Qiang Zhonghua et al., eels, Chen Duxiu beibu ziliao huibian ("A compilation of materials
concerning the times when Chen Duxiu was arrested"), Henan renmin chubanshe, 1982, for
a documentation of Chen's various arrests.
2. Lee Feigon, Chen Duxiu, p. 236. (See Note on the Texts and on Recent Studies of Chen
Duxiu for the full citation.)
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most audacious and independent-minded thinker. In his letter to Chen
Qichang and others ofNovember 21, 1937 [included in this volume], he said:
I have not the slightest compunction about inclining to the left or to the right,
I shall always strive to be extreme, I view with contempt the doctrine of the
golden mean, I absolutely detest parrotry, I refuse to utter commonplaces that
neither hurt nor itch, I want to be absolutely right and absolutely wrong in all
my utterances; the last thing I want is never to say anything wrong and at the
same time never to say anything right.
This unconventional and original spirit pervades all Chen's articles and
letters. "3
Although a giant ofmodem Chinese politics and letters and trigger ofone of
the twentieth century's great revolutions, for several decades after his conver-
sion to Trotskyism Chen Duxiu's name was blackened, his achievements were
concealed, and his ideas were damned by his former Party comrades, especially
after they took power in 1949. Chen Duxiu in China was subjected to the
same revilement as was Leon Trotsky at the hands of Stalin in the Soviet
Union. Today in China, Chen's unpersoning has been largely reversed and
most of the discredit heaped upon him has been removed. Young Chinese
now are in a position to evaluate him more or less according to his merits; his
writings have been published in new editions; friendly descriptions ofhis life
and cause have begun to appear in the learned and popular presses. Yet in the
West, Chen's name is barely known outside small circles, and the positions
that he developed between 1937 and 1942 are known even less. I shall
therefore preface my introduction to the writings ofthe late Chen with a brief
look at his early political career and the context in which it happened.
The Chinese Communist Party that Chen Duxiu founded in 1921 was
helped into the world by envoys ofthe Communist International (or Comin-
tern) like the Russian Grigori Voitinsky and the Dutchman Henk Sneevliet
(alias Maring), and owed much of its early success to Russian aid. But when
in 1927 disaster overtook the young Chinese Party, that disaster was due in
large part to Russian interference.
During the Revolution of 1925-1927, the Chinese Communist Party
worked on Comintern instructions for national independence and unification
3. Wang Fanxi, letter, July 13. 1993.
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in alliance with the Guomindang or Nationalist Party, an authoritarian political
organisation populist in rhetoric but tied in practice to defending the economic
interests of Chinese business groups, financial circles, and rural elites. The
tenus of this alliance, known as the first united front (to distinguish it from
the second united front formed in 1937), were in practice disadvantageous
to the Communist Party. They required its strict political subordination to
the Nationalist leaders and the submersion of important sections ofits mem-
bership into the Guomindang.
From the very start ofthis united front, Chinese Communist leaders opposed
entering the Guomindang; they kept up their opposition for as long as the first
united front lasted, and voiced it at regular intervals. 4 On this issue - which
after 1926 became, where China was concerned, the main issue in dispute
between Stalin and Trotsky - the dissenting Chinese Communist leaders were
Trotskyists avant la lettre.
InJuly 1926, the Nationalist general Chiang Kai-shek launched the North-
ern Expedition to overthrow warlord rule in China. But first, in March, he
staged a preemptive coup against his Communist "allies" in Guangzhou. Only
then did he feel confident enough to send his armies north. Reorganised with
Russian military and financial help and supported by a populace roused by
Chinese Communist agitators, they sliced easily through the warlord ranks.
In the spring of 1927, in a second and far bloodier coup, Chiang launched
a murderous assault on Chen Duxiu's Communists in Shanghai and drove
them from the city. The Party's surviving forces fled to Wuhan where, against
Chen's wish and on the instructions ofthe Russian Borodin, the alliance with.
the Guomindang continued, this time with its so-called "left wing" under
WangJingwei, who had split with Chiang Kai-shek in late 1926. Communists
from all over China fled to the new "revolutionary centre" in Wuhan. In mid
July, however, WangJingwei too turned against them and killed thousands
more Party members and supporters. Not long afterwards, both wings of the
Guomindang reunited in Nanjing under a government effectively controlled
by Chiang Kai-shek.
AroundJuly 13, 1927, after having over a period ofseveral years repeatedly
but unsuccessfully advocated the Party's withdrawal from the Guomindang,
Chen Duxiu resigned as its General Secretary.5 He was made a scapegoat by
4. On this point, see Gregor Benton, China's Urban Revolutionaries. (See Note on the Texts
and on Recent Studies of Chen Duxiu for the full citation.)
5. C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983, p. 144.
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the Comintern for the failure ofpolicies implemented before the summer of
1927 that he had actually (though never openly) opposed. On August 1, a
fortnight after his resignation, Communist armed forces raised the banner of
the Guomindang to attack a Guomindang army in Nanchang, where they
briefly seized power before being routed. Even then, the Comintern instructed
the Chinese Communists to remain within the Guomindang, though at the
same time it told them to withdraw demonstratively from the Wuhan Govern-
ment.6 It was not until after the Communist-led risings ofthe autumn of1927
that the Party finally hauled down the banner of the Guomindang.
The strategy ofCommunist immersion in the Guomindang was not the only
issue in the 1920s on which Chen Duxiu's political project differed radically
from that of the Comintern's Russian leaders. The role of democracy in the
revolution was another important point of difference between him and them
and remained so for the rest ofhis life, as the contents of this volume power-
fully attest. Democracy ran a poor course in the Chinese Revolution, but
Chen Duxiu, having found traditional strategies for social change wanting after
the degeneration ofChina's Republican Revolution of 1911, had fixed once
for all on socialism with democracy as the appropriate remedy for his country's
ills. "There are now two roads in the world," he wrote in October 1918: "one
is the road oflight which leads to democracy, science, and atheism; and the
other, the road of darkness leading to despotism, superstition, and divine
authority."7 "Science, modern democracy, and socialism are three main
inventions, precious beyond measure, of the genius ofmodern humankind,"
he repeated in September 1940, not long before his death.8
Chen Duxiu may have drawn his inspiration for the Party from the Bolshe-
viks, but his idea ofit was quite different from theirs. Like Lunacharsky, Chen
believed that "revolution is the work ofsaints". Unlike Stalin, he opposed the
creation of a strong Party chief, insisting rather that the General Secretary
should be elected by and responsible to the different committee heads; he even
let non-Marxists and anarchists join the Party. Under his leadership, different
6. C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries ifRevolution: Soviet Advisers and
Nationalist China, 1920-1927, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989, p. 424.
7. Quoted in Yu-Ju Chih, The Political Thought of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, PhD thesis, Indiana
University, 1965, p. 68.
8. See the letter to Xiliu in this volume.
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points ofview vied rather freely, and though the outcome of the discussion
was setded largely in Moscow, it was several years before the Chinese Party
was wholly transformed along Russian lines. Even Mao Zedong, who himself
presided after 1938 over a Party regimented from the centre, recognised that
under Chen Duxiu the Communist movement was "rather lively" and free
of dogmatism. 9 "In dealing with people and affairs within the Party, [Chen
Duxiu] was comparatively reasonable," concluded the Communist Liu
Ruilong. 10
The young Chen Duxiu shared with the Chinese anarchists a libertarian
suspicion of the state that partly explains his later anti-Stalinism. Other
connections, too, can be made between Chen and the anarchists. Before the
Revolution of 1911, when anarcho-socialist ideas were for a time higWy
popular among young Chinese revolutionaries, Chen's radical friends had
included several anarchists and nihilists.
By 1920, Chen had emerged as one of the anarchists' sternest left-wing
critics. Even so, various similarities remained between his politics and theirs.
He shared with thema commitment both to radical democracy and to interna-
tionalism and an opposition to militarism, even in its "revolutionary" guise (for
like the anarchist leader Li Shizeng, Chen believed that revolutions carried out
by armies would simply create new forms of oppression and lead to a self-
perpetuating militarist cycle). And like China's second generation ofanarchists
active after 1915, Chen was equally opposed to native capitalists and foreign
imperialists, and put his main emphasis on the revolutionary role of urban
culture and the proletariat (though not to the exclusion ofthe peasants).l1
Before he became a Communist, Chen's project, as formulated by his
journal Xin qingnian ("New Youth"), was to save China by learning from the
West. Just as Europe's early Enlighteners had once looked to China for models
of the rational society, so China's Enlighteners of1919 sought their light in
Western concepts of humanism, democracy, individualism, and scientific
9. Mao Zedong, "Zai Chengdu huiyishangde jianghua (1958 nian 3 yue), sanyue shiride jianghua"
("Speeches at the Chengdu conference (March 1958), speech ofMarch 10"), in Mao Zedong
sixiang wansui ("Long Live Mao Zedong Thought"), Reprint, Taibei: N. p., 1969, pp. 159-165,
at p. 160.
10. Liu Ruilong; "Dongjin, dongjin, zai dongjin!" ("Advance east, advance east, again advance
east!"), in "Mianhuai Liu Shaoqi" bianjizu, eds, Mianhuai Liu Shaoqi ("Commemorating Liu
Shaoqi"), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988, pp. 129-145, at p. 134.
11. See Peter Zarrow, Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1990, for an account of Chinese anarchism.
16 Introduction
method. 12 But they learned them in artificially compressed time, unlike the
philosophes, who had a century to prepare and spread their ideas. They assimi-
lated an impressive list of isms, but reached real depth in none.13 So even
democracy, though among Chen's first and last loves, was rather shallowly
rooted in his thinking, and no match for the "Bolshevisers".
The "Bolshevisation" ofthe Chinese Communist Party was set in train by the
youthful Peng Shuzhi in 1924, after he returned to China from a period of
study in the Soviet Union. It is symptomatic of a general disregard for
democracy by many of the Party's younger activists in the 1920s that even
anti-Stalinists like Peng Shuzhi - an early Communist convert to the Left
Opposition after the defeat of the Chinese Revolution in 1927 - were not
free from "Bolshevik" contempt for it. 14 The "Bolshevisation" ofthe Chinese
Party was helped by Moscow's requirement that it work as a disciplined,
highly secretive faction within the Guomindang between 1924 and 1927.
But though Peng Shuzhi and his fellow-"Bolshevlsers" imported authoritar-
ian habits into the Party in the' mid 1920s, it was not until after 1927, when
Chen Duxiu left the leadership, that these habits became general. The Party's
assimilation to the bureaucratic' Guomindang government in Wuhan in 1927
after Borodin's political victory over Chen Duxiu did nothing to help restore
Party democracy to good health. As a result of this assimilation, observed the
Trotskyist Zheng Chaolin, "the Communist Party was no longer a closely
united party but one that was rent by conspiracies and tricks, by acts ofsecret
collusion, by mutual attacks, and by power struggles, just like the Guomindang
we so despised". 15
Chen's exit from the Party speeded its drift toward bureaucratic centralism,
both because he had been the leader who most fervently espoused democracy
12. See Hung-yok Ip, "The Origins ofChinese Communism: A New Interpretation," Modem
China 20,1 (fanuary 1994), pp. 34-63, for a recent discussion ofthe democratic concerns ofChina's
first Communist leaders. Hung-yok Ip says on p. 52 ofher article that Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao's
"cosmopolitan-internationalist commitment to democracy ... strengthened their appreciation
ofsocialism, a doctrine which contained a marked cosmopolitan-internationalist message."
13. See Appendix 7.
14. See Gregor Benton, "Two Purged Leaders ofEarly Chinese Communism," China Quarterly
102 (1985), pp. 317-328.
15. An OppositionistfoT Life, p. 122. (See Note on the Texts and on Recent Studies of Chen
Duxiu for the full citation.)
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and because the Party's rejection ofhim coincided with its formal resolution
to ban factions and hence democratic discussion and debate. Moreover, Chen
was a man of independent stature who did not need to look to Moscow for
backing - something that could be said of none of the lesser leaders who
succeeded him over the next few years, before power in the Party eventually
fell to Mao Zedong in the late 1930s.
The "Bolshevisation" by Peng Shuzhi and his supporters around 1924 was
the start ofa process that took several years to finish. In the early 1930s, the
Chinese Communist Party was hit by a second, more engulfing wave of
"Bolshevisation" when Wang Ming took over its main leadership. The
transition from Peng Shuzhi (the Party's first Moscow-educated "Bolsheviser")
to Wang Ming, who received his entire political schooling in the Soviet Union
and was the archetype of a Stalinist plant in the Chinese Party, reflected
corresponding changes in the Comintern's role in the world Communist
movement over the same period - from meddler in it to master of it.
For the time being, the series of blows that Chiang Kai-shek rained down
upon the Chinese Communists in 1926 and 1927 put an end to their chance
of political power. However, the Chinese Communist leaders - taking their
cue from Moscow - refused (mainly for factional reasons connected with
Stalin's campaign against Trotsky, who in 1926 had denounced Stalin's China
policy) to recognise that the Chinese Revolution had been defeated. If they
were right, then the struggle was naturally free to rise to new levels, with
insurrections in the cities backed by peasant armies in the countryside. This
was the course on which the Chinese Communists embarked.
Chen Duxiu and dozens of senior and veteran Communist leaders con-
demned this new policy as "adventurist". In 1931, after their expulsion from
the official Party, these critics joined younger Trotskyists freshly returned from
Moscow in a Chinese section of Trotsky's International Left Opposition.
Chen's Trotskyists considered that a massive defeat had indeed been suffered
in 1927 and that the Chinese Revolution was not remotely near a "new high
tide". For them, the immediate task was to rebuild the shattered trade unions,
re-establish the Party in the towns, and forge new links to the workers.
Central to their programme was the struggle for an all-powerful National
(or Constituent) Assembly elected by universal secret ballot, since they
believed that only such a strategy could bring together China's disparate
economic and political struggles. Meanwhile, and until the revolution reached
a new "high tide", the call for socialism, proletarian dictatorship, and Soviets
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should be relegated to the realm of general propaganda. The fight for a
Constituent Assembly was the strategic aim that shaped the course ofChinese
Trotskyism in the first nine years ofits life.
Many observers were amazed when Chen Duxiu's Oppositionists espoused
democracy as their platform in 1931, for Trotskyism is generally considered
to be a violent and extremist variant of Communism, diametrically opposed
to the idea ofrepresentative and constitutional government. But it was above
all Trotsky's advocacy of the democratic slogan for China after 1927 that
attracted Chen, who had started his political career as a radical democrat, to
the Opposition.
As for the "dictatorship of the proletariat", Chen for a long time opposed
this slogan, and when - as a Trotskyist - he eventually accepted it, he did so
reluctantly, believing it to be too radical in the Chinese context, and still
preferred to talk ofthe "democratic dictatorship ofthe proletariat and the poor
peasantry". On the whole, Chen Duxiu and the Chinese Trotskyists stood
.historically for the democratic movement, unlike the leaders ofthe Communist
Party, who - especially after 1927 - opposed democracy altogether and for
several years accused the Trotskyist movement of "liquidationism" precisely
because of its democratic policy.
The need for democracy not just as a central plank in its public platform
but also as a main beam in the internal structure of the revolutionary party
itself was another important theme in the life of Chinese Trotskyism. The
official Party after 1927 was run as an elite dictatorship, modelled on the Soviet
Communist Party. Until Mao's rise to power in the late 1930s, this was a Party
plagued by factionalism, both self-inflicted and imported. All its leaders after
1927 used methods learned from Moscow, plus some that they invented
independently, to resolve conflict and crush minority opinions. Each new
candidate for leader contested Moscow's favours by tailoring his policies to
suit the Kremlin; so Party politics became increasingly irresponsible and
unaccountable.
In 1929, when Chen Duxiu was expelled from the Party, he reminded its
leaders that "democracy is a necessary instrument for any class that seeks to
win the majority to its side" and warned them that the suppression ofdissident
views could lead only to a regime ofbureaucratic centralism.16 But his former
16. Chen Duxiu, "Zhi Zhonggong zhongyang (guanyu Zhongguo geming wenti)" ("To the
Central Conunittee ofthe CCP [Chinese Communist Party] (on the question of the Chinese
Revolution)"), in Chen Duxiu shuxinji ("Chen Duxiu's letters"), ed. Shui Ru, Beijing: Xinhua
chubanshe, 1987, pp. 434-454, at p. 449.
d
Editor's Introduction 19
n
comrades dismissed as "bourgeois" the democratic, humanist, and universalist
values of May Fourth for which Chen still stood, and that continued their
erratic growth in the darkening circles ofChen's expelled Opposition.
The Left Opposition born under Chen Duxiu in 1931 was riper and better
founded than the Chinese Communist Party had been at the time of its
founding ten years earlier. The revolutionaries who had come together in 1921
were for the most part political novices who had only the vaguest notion
(drawn mainly from a sketchy knowledge of events in Russia) of what
constituted a socialist revolution. They had been closely guided in their
decisions by the foreigners Voitinsky and Sneevliet. The 1931 Opposition was
quite different in character. It was born of four different organisations, most
of whose members had behind them several years' first-hand experience of
revolutionary activity, and the even more valuable experience of having
"clearly realised their own mistakes". 17
Chen Duxiu was a creative and independent-minded thinker, not the sort
ofman to toe the Party line, but a sceptic and an innovator. He had come to
Marxism after a breathless rush through telescoped isms ofcenturies ofEuropean
thought. Though his revolutionary commitment was total, his grasp ofMarxism
was quite shaky. Wang Fanxi has compared him in this respect to Mao:
Both had their first love ofleaming in Confucianism; both built their ideological
foundations in the Chinese classics; both acquired their knowledge ofmodern
European thought, in particular Marxism-Leninism,... by building a rough
superstructure offoreign style on a solid Chinese foundation at a time when they
were physically as well as intellectually fully matured. 18
Unlike some of his more doctrinaire comrades, Chen was not afraid to
challenge accepted policies and beliefS, even those that bore Trotsky's personal
imprimatur. The Chinese and the Russian greatly admired and appreciated
one another; Trotsky even remarked that he "should learn Chinese" so as to
be able to read Chen's writings.19 But whereas for most Trotskyists in China,
17. Leon Trotsky's letter to Liu Renjing, August 22, 1930, in Shuang Shan, ed., Tuoluociji
dang'anzhong zhi Zhongguo tongzhide xin, 1929-1939 ("Letters in the Trotsky Archives to Chinese
Comrades, 1929-1939"), Hongkong: N. p., 1981, p. 77.
18. Wang Fan-hsi (Wang Fanxi), Memoirs, p. 269. (See Note on the Texts and on Recent Studies
of Chen Duxiu for the full citation.)
19. RenJianshu and Tang Baolin, Chen Duxiu zhuan, vol. 2, p. 87. (See Note on the Texts
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Trotsky was a fount ofpure wisdom, for Chen Duxiu - who was Trotsky's
age (the two men were born in the same year) and a veteran practical revolu-
tionary in his own right - Trotsky was an equal, whose proposals were open
to scrutiny and question.
Chen believed that the essence ofthe greatness ofrevolutionaries like Lenin
was their "refusal to be bound by ready-made Marxist formulae" and their
"insistence on adopting new political slogans and methods ofstruggle to meet
changing times and circumstances".2o Chen was never prepared to accept
uncritically the word of foreign Communists, for in general he had a poor
opinion of them (wrote Wang Fanxi), "all the more so after Moscow had
shamelessly heaped the whole of the blame for the defeat of the 1927 revolu-
tion on his shoulders". He had an even poorer view ofChinese "red compra-
dors" who "kowtowed to foreign comrades".21
Between 1936 and 1938 and again in late 1939 or early 1940, Chen Duxiu
and his Trotskyist comrades had a vigorous exchange ofviews on the issue
of democracy. Sometime in 1936 Chen, then in prison under Chiang Kai-
shek, smuggled an article on democracy to the Trotskyists in Shanghai, where
Wang Fanxi published it in Huohua ("Spark"), together with his own critical
comments. Three or four years later, Wang and others again discussed
democracy with Chen, by then in Sichuan, in letters that they sent him from
Shanghai. A selection ofChen's letters and replies, together with some articles
by him from this period, forms the main content of this book.
Chen first raised in a letter ofMay 15, 1934, his doubts about the Trotskyist
belief that the Soviet Union was a workers' state that revolutionaries must
defend against bourgeois aggressors. He wrote:
We should not just organize a new party, but also fight the illusion that the Stalin
regime can be refonned. We must replace the slogan "Defend the USSR" with
the slogan "Recreate the Soviet Union of October!"
This letter shows that Chen's opposition to defending the Stalinist state
preceded by several years the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 (after
which he began to express his opposition more forcefully). It also shows that
and on Recent Studies of Chen Duxiu for the full citation.)
20. Wang Fan-hsi, Memoirs, p. 209.
21. Wang Fan-hsi, Memoirs, p. 269.
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Chen did not scruple to set aside orthodox fonnulations ofTrotskyism when
he felt that they had outlived their use. But it would be wrong to represent
his proposal as a complete departure from Trotskyist theory. In the letter, he
made clear his continuing commitment to the Oppositionist cause and to "the
movement for world revolution". "Our answer to Stalinist falsifications," he
concluded, "is class struggle!,,22
In the mid to late 1930s, the Moscow show-trials and Stalin's alliance with
Hitler caused Chen to rethink even more deeply many of the basic views on
democracy advanced by Lenin and by Trotsky. Chen concluded that Lenin's
complete denial of the value of democracy was, at least in part, responsible
for Stalin's bureaucratic crimes and that dictatorship ofany sort, revolutionary
or counter-revolutionary, is incompatible with democracy. Whereas in
orthodox Leninist terms the dictatorship of the proletariat is simultaneously
- at least for the workers - the most extensive fonn ofdemocratic government,
Chen no longer bothered to distinguish the various democratic rights from
democracy as the bourgeois governing fonn, and saw "pure" democracy as
an indispensable part of the socialist society. After his move to Sichuan in
1938, it seemed to his comrades in Shanghai that he had gone back in his
declining years to his original attachment to this "pure" democracy: that at
the end of his life he had returned to his intellectual "first love".
For Wang Fanxi and Chen's other Trotskyist correspondents, democracy
was not abstract but bounded by class and time, whereas for Chen after 1937
it was a more or less transcendental concept embodied in universal institutions.
Even so, Wang did not dismiss from hand Chen's fonnulations, and instead.
strove in his writings to develop along Marxist lines the elements in them that
he found to be perceptive and valuable;23 just as Trotsky continued to admire
Chen, and even mentioned him as a possible member ofa special committee
of the Fourth International that he wished to fonn. 24 In their letters and articles
22. The letter from Chen Duxiu, to the International Secretariat of the Left Opposition, can
be found in English translation in Stanford University's Hoover Institution under the Subject
File "International Left Opposition and the Fourth International". Unfortunately, its Chinese
original is not available. Wang Fanxi translated the letter back into Chinese and introduced it
in "Chen Duxiu yuzhong zhi guoji zuopai fanduipai xin" ("Chen Duxiu's letter from gaol to
the International Left Opposition"), Xinmiao (Hongkong), no. 21 (May 15, 1992), pp. 68-71.
Wang points out that the original English translation, probably made by Trotskyists in Shanghai,
is not necessarily literal.
23. See Appendix 6.
24. SeeJean van Heijenoort, With Trotsky in Exile: From Prinkipo to Coyoacan, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 143. This special committee, elsewhere called the General
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of this period, Chen and his Trotskyist correspondents raised - decades in
advance of the mainstream of Communist dissent - issues that bear direcdy
on the invariably vexed relationship between socialist government and
democratic freedoms.
During the final years ofhis life, Chen wrote in the papers collected in this
volume about democracy and dictatorship, war and revolution, and the future
(in the light ofhis views on these questions) ofChina and the world. In these
posthumous papers, Chen repeated some of the arguments that he had
advanced in Huohua in 1936. He asserted that democracy is the content and
form ofeach stage ofhuman history, and must not be exclusively equated with
the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, in the modern world, proletarians were the
principal democrats. At the start ofthis new trend in his thinking, Chen simply
counterposed democracy and bureaucratism, but he later ended up by counter-
posing democracy and proletarian dictatorship in all its forms. He completely
denied the progressive import not only ofproletarian dictatorship but also of
. Bolshevism, which he described as the twin of Fascism and the father of
Stalinism. However, he rejected proletarian dictatorship not in favour of
capitalism but in the name ofMarxism.
At times, for example in a letter ofDecember 23, 1941, to Zheng Xuejia,
a former Trotskyist sympathiser who had later become associated with the
Guomindang, he even appeared to reject Marxism itself, as irrelevant not only
to China but even to Russia and Western Europe. On the whole, however,
his final views are not irreconcilable with Marxism as Karl Kautsky and others
understood it.25
InJune 1940 andJanuary 1941, the Peng Shuzhi faction ofTrotskyists in
Shanghai passed two resolutions in which they criticised Chen Duxiu for
Plekhanov-style "opportunism" and for failing to "defend the Soviet Union's
... socialist system ofproperty" or to call for world proletarian revolution. 26
According to Peng Shuzhi, the late Chen had not only abandoned his revolu-
tionary ideas but had lost his integrity.
Other Trotskyists, however, put a very different interpretation on Chen's
later evolution, and made a far more positive appraisal of him. Wang Fanxi,
for example, believed that though Chen's thinking
Council, was intended to be an honorary organisation; it never came into being.
25. For Chen's letter to Zheng Xuejia, see RenJianshu and Tang Baolin, Chen Duxiu zhuan,
vol. 2, p. 286.
26. Ren Jianshu and Tang Baolin, Chen Duxiu zhuan, vol. 2, pp. 287-288.
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in the final years of his life was already far from Trotskyism, ... had he lived
longer, he would almost certainly have '" returned to the Trotskyist camp, since
he not only had all the attributes ofa genuine revolutionary but also was a shrewd
and brilliant observer.27
According to Zheng Chaolin, at the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact Chen
got angry and went too far, "but it would be wrong to take that as proof that
he had broken with Trotskyism".28 Zheng goes on to quote an article that
Chen wrote on May 13, 1942, just a fortnight before his death, that in Zheng's
view shows that Chen "remained a Trotskyist to his dying day". The article
called on "oppressed toilers the world over" to unite against imperialism and
to "replace the old world ofinternational capitalism based on commodity deals
with a new world of international socialism". The main difference between
Chen and Trotsky (by then dead) was that by 1942 Chen no longer considered
the Soviet Union to be a "degenerated workers' state".
The Guomindang was not the sole scourge ofChen and the Chinese Trotsky-
ists. Revolutionaries in many countries have faced state terror in the course
of their revolutions, but most could find space in which to operate, either in
places of lesser government control or in occasional interludes of political
ferment or relaxation. But the Chinese Trotskyists faced an additional obstacle
that was virtually unique to them: their new revolutionary party was equally
hated both by the government and by a highly organised and influential .
opposition. It is probably impossible to find the same pattern anywhere else
in the world save Vietnam (where after 1945 the Trotskyists, despite their
relative strength, were likewise crushed).29
Though Chen Duxiu was prepared after 1937 to support the Guomindang
against theJapanese, he remained alert to Nationalist provocations, and, despite
his hostility to Stalinism, was careful to avoid assisting the Guomindang's
propaganda campaign against the Chinese Communist Party. When Guo-
mindang leaders like Hu Zongnan and Dai Li tried in 1939 to extract from
27. Wang Fan-hsi, Memoirs, p. 239.
28. See Appendix 8.
29. On the Vietnamese Trotskyists, see Ngo Van, Revolutionaries They Could Not Break: The
Fightfor the Fourth International in Indochina, 1930-1945, London: Index Books, 1995.
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Chen views that they could use as ammunition against the Communists, Chen
resolutely stuck to a position ofpolitical neutrality. 30
In 1935 the"democratic upsurge" that Chen had been predicting ever since
the late 1920s finally began in China. Yet it was not the Trotskyists (who were
at first mostly still in prison) but the Communists, with their "second united
front", freshly created in Moscow to chime in with Stalin's new defence and
foreign-policy initiatives, who were best placed to take advantage of the new
opening. "For years they had constantly misrepresented and caricatured our
democratic programme," wrote Wang Fanxi, "but suddenly they took up
positions identical with all the worst features ofthe caricatures they had made
ofus.,,31
The Chinese Communist Party's new tum foredoomed Chen's hopes of
a revolutionary-democratic alliance in 1938, for the Communists, having
occupied the space that Chen planned to enter, warned their new friends in
the democratic parties against dealing with Chen Duxiu. They even branded
their former leader a "national traitor" and accused him oftaking money from
the Japanese, just as Stalin had denounced Trotsky as a "Hitler agent".32 But
even though their attempt to tum Chen into a political pariah met with
general hostility in China's democratic circles, Chen's chances offinding allies
were by now quite slim, for with Stalinists and Trotskyists apparently calling
for the same thing, centrist politicians naturally sided with the bigger party.
The mission ofthe Chinese Communist Party in its infancy, shouldered in 1931
by the Chen Duxiu Opposition, was to undo the pattern ofthe Chinese past,
which seemed to Chen to be set in an endless cycle ofdynastic decay, peasant
30. Ren Jianshu and Tang Baolin, Chen Duxiu zhuan, vol. 2, pp. 289-290. Huang Yongsheng
and Wang Yafei, "Chen Duxiu zai Jiangjinde zuihou suiyue" ("Chen Duxiu's last years at
Jiangjin"), Gemingshi ziliao ("Materials on revolutionary history") no. 6 (1987), pp. 46-52, also
describe Chen's reluctance to enter into dealings with pro-Guomindang politicians after his
retreat to Jiangjin in Sichuan province in August 1938.
31. Wang Fan-hsi, Memoirs, p. 182.
32. For the original charge against Chen Duxiu, see Kang Sheng, "Chanchu Rikou zhentan
minzu gongdide Tuoluociji feibang" ("Root out the Trotskyist criminals, who are spies forJapan
and public enemies of the nation"),jiifang zhoukan, nos. 29 and 30 (January 28 and February
8, 1938). This charge is now universally recognised in China as a groundless slander. See, for
example, Sun Qiming, "Chen Duxiu shifou Hanjian wentide tantao" ("On whether or not
Chen Duxiu was a traitor"), Anhui daxue xuebao, no. 2 (1980).
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revolt, and renewal under a new despotic line. Chen's Communists in 1921
thought that they had found in the modern urban classes - the bourgeoisie, the
proletariat, the critical intelligentsia - a way to break this vicious circle. Their
unremitting commitment to this beliefexplains why Chen's Trotskyists insisted
- save for a briefinterval in 1938, under the exceptional circumstances ofthe
Japanese invasion - on sticking to the cities, and why they never once consid-
ered forsaking them in the long term for the villages.
They were Marxists in the classic mould. True, they understood the need
for agitation in the villages, but first they wanted to sink stout roots in China's
metropolitan littoral, for their members were too few to dissipate across the
vast Chinese countryside. Even after the Japanese invasion in 1937, Chen
Duxiu stuck firmly to his belief that there could be no revolution outside
urban culture. Unlike his younger comrades, he was deeply pessimistic about
the chances of revolution breaking out during the war, for China's industrial
base along the coast had been destroyed and unrest in the countryside could
not (he believed) make a proletarian revolution. "In numbers, in material
strength, and in spirit," he wrote to Trotsky on November 3, 1939, "[the
workers] have gone back to where they were thirty to forty years ago.'>33
The popular view is that Mao quickly saw through the bankruptcy of an
urban strategy after 1927 and turned to the villages, whereas Chen Duxiu, who
did not understand the peasants, was incapable ofMao's leap in imagination.
But in reality Mao arrived only gradually and empirically at his strategy of
encircling the cities with the villages, after he had been forced by circumstance
to move into the countryside, and for several years he continued to talk in
terms of the city leading the village. Nor is it true that Chen Duxiu failed to
understand the role ofthe peasantry in Chinese history. On the contrary, from
his own point ofview he understood it all too well. The Chinese Trotskyists,
far from ignoring the villages as a result of intellectual stiffness or torpidity,
actively resisted a turn to the countryside and insisted on striving for a new
way to redeem Chinese society and the Chinese nation, rather than follow
the old and fruitless one.
They failed, partly because the class of industrial workers on which they
tried to fasten was too small, too little spread (in just two or three big cities),
and too demoralised by defeat and terror to pay much attention to them. In
a word, they were prophets before their time, for which they paid the price.
33. Shuang Shan, ed., Tuoluociji dang'anzhong, p. 77.
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When the repression came, unlike the official Party they had no rural sanctuar-
ies to which they could retreat.
Chen Duxiu had always thought, perhaps fatalistically, that the peasantry
is incapable of making a modern revolution, and that only the active and
widespread participation of the workers can achieve one. He was wrong in
the short term, but today he and the Chinese Trotskyists would appear to have
been vindicated, for the absence of democracy, legality, representation, and
popular control now threaten the Party's very existence. Although the Chinese
Communist Party has shown itself since 1949 to be more differentiated,
flexible, and resourceful than the Trotskyists imagined at the time of the
revolution, its fatal and abiding flaw is its acquired antagonism to the modern,
urban constituency that gave birth to it.
Chen Duxiu and the Trotskyists' legacy for China is that they upheld the
standard ofurban revolution and socialist democracy and pointed to a way
of releasing Chinese society from the endless chain of repression, risings, and
repression. Because oftheir democratic critique ofChinese society and Stalinist
politics, they have become metaphors incarnate for a host of unresolved
problems in Chinese politics.
After 1949, many of the old polemics between the official Party and the
Opposition about the nature of the Chinese Revolution and the strategy and
tactics to pursue in it were relegated to the history books, but one issue that
had exercised Chen Duxiu and his followers in the 1930s - the relationship
between socialism and democracy - became a central and burning question
for young people in China, especially in the universities. The mass protests
and unofficial oppositions that have flowered every few years since 1949,
culminating in 1989's popular rising, are a retrospective justification of the
Trotskyists' critique ofMaoist politics.
The new literature on Chen Duxiu and the Trotskyists that has become
available in recent years has attracted a considerable measure ofattention and
scrutiny in mainland China. This interest is hardly surprising, for layer after
layer of the official leadership that slandered the Trotskyists in the 1930s and
eventually gaoled them in 195234 has been discredited in the public eye and
34. On the imprisonment ofthe Trotskyists between 1952 and 1979, see Zheng Chaolin, "Disanci
ruyu genggai" ("A brief account of my third spell in prison"), Xinmiao ("New Sprouts")
(Hongkong), August 1993, pp. 41-47; the same article appeared, but with many deletions, in
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the crisis of faith in Stalinism and Maoism is deep and general. At the same
time, many younger historians have taken seriously the regime's call for
truthful and factual scholarship. The new attitude among Chinese scholars
toward the legacy that Chen Duxiu bequeathed his country is epitomised in
the introduction by the historian Tang Baolin to a compilation, published in
September 1993, of passages from Chen's works:
Chen Duxiu changed often in the course ofhis life, but he stuck to certain ideas
for as long as he lived, at least (for example) where the five great issues ofprogress
(jinhua), democracy, science, patriotism, and socialism are concerned. Moreover,
the practice ofseveral decades has proved, and will continue to prove, that the
positions that he took on these questions are essentially in accordance with the
truth. 35
In the new, more liberal climate ofthe 1980s and early 1990s, even Chen's
Trotskyism has no longer been wholly taboo, and some scholars have begun
to study it objectively. Speaking at an academic symposium held in 1981 to
mark the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist
Party, the veteran Communist General Xiao Ke proposed a positive assessment
ofChen's leadership ofthe Party, and suggested that even his Trotskyist period
deserved a truthful appraisal. According to Xiao Ke,
Although it is true that Li Dazhao was a principal figure in the founding of
the Party, the prime place [in that process] belonged to Chen Duxiu.... In
my opinion, in the course of researching Chen Duxiu we cannot confine
ourselves merely to his days in the Party or before the founding ofthe Party,
but must also include the Trotsky-Chen liquidationist period. What were
the differences between China's Trotsky-Chen liquidationist faction and
foreign Trotskyists? How was their programme? What was their attitude to
Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang regime? What was their attitude to the
Communist Party? What was their attitude to imperialism and in particular
to Japanese imperialism? How did they acquit themselves in the gaols of the
Guomindang? What was [Chen's] political attitude between his release from
prison [in 1937] and his death? All these issues need to be researched.36
But Trotskyism remains a suspect ideology in China, and many Party
officials - especially more senior ones, whose view on Trotskyism was formed
by Wang Ming's 1938 campaign to discredit the Trotskyists as national
Hongkong's Kaifang. For an English translation, see An Oppositionist for Life, pp. 258-270.
35. Tang Baolin, ed., Chen Duxiu yucui ("A compilation ofChen Duxiu's utterances"), Beijing:
Huaxia chubanshe, 1993, p. 17.
36. See Appendix 9.
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traitors - are still deeply prejudiced against it. So younger scholars anxious to
rescue Chen Duxiu the champion of "Science and Democracy" have tried
to purge him of his Trotskyist commitment.
The Trotskyist Zheng Chaolin has summed up the range of suggested
formulas for this decontamination: Chen Duxiu was only influenced by
Trotskyism, he didn't join the Trotskyist organisation; he joined it but broke
with it after his arrest in 1932; he joined it but broke with it before it became
a cover for murderers and spies; he gave up his Trotskyist beliefs a few years
before he died. 37 But it is impossible to stop the biography of Chen Duxiu
short ofhis Trotskyism, so the new tolerance ofand even enthusiasm for him
has inevitably helped bring Chinese Trotskyism back into the public eye.
The rehabilitation of Chen Duxiu has extended even to his bones. At
Chen's funeral in Jiangjin in Sichuan province in 1942, his old friend Gao
Yuhan said in an oration that"Mr Duxiu is at home everywhere, and naturally
an adherent of the view that 'my bones may be buried no matter where among
. the green mountains"'.38 Such considerations did not prevent the authorities
from deciding in 1982 to repatriate Chen's physical remains to his birthplace
in Anqing, Anhui province, for reburial.
Ten years later, the provincial and municipal governments designated Chen's
tomb "a major tourist resource and site imbued with human and cultural
meaning" and accorded it official protection.39 By 1995, a sort ofChen-mania
seemed to be sweeping Anqing, and to have infected the official guardians of
Chen's remains. The local authorities announced plans to rebuild the tomb
as a lingyuan or "garden tomb", enclosed within a park, of the sort built in the
past for dead emperors or national heroes like the legendary General Yue Fei
(1103-1142) of the Southern Song; or, in recent times, for martyrs of the
Communist revolution. The new tomb is to be modelled on Yue Fei's; just
as Yue Fei was entombed (beside Hangzhou's West Lake) with one ofhis sons,
so Chen Duxiu is to be joined in death by his two martyred sons, Qiaonian
and Yannian.40
In the early 1980s, a conference on Chen Duxiu scheduled to be held at
Anqing was cancelled, and the journal Chen Duxiu yanjiu ("Chen Duxiu
37. Zheng Chaolin, "Chen Duxiu and the Trotskyists," appendix to Benton, China's Urban
Revolutionaries, pp. 124-202, at pp. 197-199. (For the full citation, see Note on the Texts.)
38. See Appendix 4.
39. This infonnation regarding Chen's tomb was reported in Zhongguo qingnian bao on October
26, 1993.
40. Zheng Chaolin, letter to Wang Fanxi.
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Studies"), though announced, did not, in fact, appear. 41 In March 1989,
however, a group of scholars from Beijing, Shanghai, and Anhui province
(where Chen Duxiu was born) met in the capital to discuss his life and works.
At the conference, and with the approval and support of the Association for
Party History and its leader ZhangJingru, a Society for Chen Duxiu Studies
was founded.
A second conference was held in May 1992 in Anqing to mark the fiftieth
anniversary ofChen's death. The conference decided among other things to
publish a bulletin or newsletter42 under the editorship of the historian Tang
Baolin. The Third Conference on Chen Duxiu Studies was held in October
1994, inJiangjin, Sichuan province, where Chen spent his last few years and
died. This conference coincided with the 115th anniversary of Chen's birth.
The Society for Chen Duxiu Studies was declared independent, both
financially and organisationally; its membership was voluntary. Though,
nominally, it had some connections to the Society of Contemporary Chinese
Culture, which is an official body, it was to be financed entirely on the basis
of its members' contributions.
Over the next few years, the membership of the Society for Chen Duxiu
Studies increased to one hundred (at the time of the third conference). The
third conference elected an executive committee of fourteen members;
branches were to be set up in Harbin, Changchun, Tianjin, Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou, Wuhu, Hefei, Anqing, Jiangjin, and Chongqing.
Forty delegates attended this third conference, at which 22 papers were
presented (eighteen by their authors, four by representatives of their authors) ..
These papers covered a wide variety of topics, ranging from Chen's views on
literature, religion, women, and other subjects to his role in China's politics
and revolutions.
But Chen's relationship to Trotskyism occupied the foremost place in the
discussion. An article by Tang Baolin portrayed Chen's acceptance of
Trotskyism as a false step, and asserted that Chen eventually corrected this
mistake by quitting Trotskyism. Another article by Xie Wei described Chen's
joining the Trotskyists as a logical development ofChen's thinking. Its author
insisted that Chen had remained a Trotskyist right through until his death.43
41. Benton "Two Purged Leaders," 318-319.
42. Called Chen Duxiu yanjiu dongtai ("Trends in research on Chen Duxiu").
43. These paragraphs on Chen Duxiu studies in China were written by Wang Fanxi.
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The students who occupied Tian'anmen Square in May andJune 1989 drew
their inspiration directly and explicitly from the May Fourth Movement of
1919, which Chen Duxiu led. They copied Chen's famous early slogan calling
for science and democracy and echoed - consciously or unconsciously - many
ofhis later anti-Stalinist proposals. "My biography of Chen Duxiu, founder
of the Chinese Communist party, seemed especially relevant to the events of
1989," wrote the historian Lee Feigon in his analysis of the background to
the Tian'anmen Square massacre.
In the late 1920s Chen was kicked out of the party as a "Trotskyist deviationist
and opportunist" for advocating many ofthe same ideas proposed by the students
in 1989. In the 1980s some ofthose interested in reform looked to Chen Duxiu's
ideas to demonstrate a tradition within the party for openness and democracy.44
But though the movement that culminated in the massacre ofJune 4 and some
present academic trends show that Chen's legacy still lives, it set back the
prospect - seriously mooted before the crisis - of a full rehabilitation of the
later Chen and his Trotskyist disciples, whose return to limbo symbolises the
present blockage of China's evolution toward greater freedom.
44. Lee Feigon, China Rising: The Meaning iifTiananmen. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1990, p. ix.
..
A Note on the Texts and on Recent
Studies on Chen Duxiu
In the summer of 1946, He Zhiyu took Chen Duxiu's last articles and letters
from Sichuan to Shanghai. As executor of Chen's will, he edited into a
pamphlet the manuscripts ofa number ofwhat he considered to be the more
important letters, together with four ofthe articles. None ofthese letters, and
none save the first part of one of the articles, had previously been published.
Probably in 1948,45 those Trotskyists (in Shanghai) who remained well-
disposed to Chen's memory produced a primitively printed edition of He
Zhiyu's pamphlet, to which they added the title Chen Duxiude zuihou lunwen
he shuxin ("Chen Duxiu's last articles and letters"). Today, this pamphlet is
not available outside China, but it is sometimes quoted by mainland historians,
so at least one copy of it must still be in existence somewhere in a Chinese
library or archive.
He Zhiyu sent a copy of the pamphlet to Dr Hu Shi, who read it aboard
a steamship in the Pacific Ocean in April 1949, while leaving China for exile
in the United States. Hu Shi then wrote his own introduction to the articles
and letters, and later sent the introduction and the pamphlet to friends of his
by then in Taiwan. These people published the collection in Taibei at the
Ziyou Zhongguo chubanshe ("Free China Press"), under the title Chen Duxiu
zuihou duiyu minzhu zhengzhide jianjie ~unwen he shuxin) ("Chen Duxiu's last
views on democracy (articles and letters)").46 (There was a second printing of
the Free China Press edition in Hongkong in June 1950.47) The Taiwan
edition dropped Chen Duxiu's letter to Chen Qichang and others, his letter
to Trotsky, a short note by him to He Zhiyu (addressed as Y), and one oftwo
letters to Pu Dezhi (Xiliu).
How do we know that the original edition published by the Trotskyists in
Shanghai contained these missing letters? Because Hu Shi quotes the letter to
Chen Qichang in his introduction written in 1949; and because both the letter
45. The text published in 1950 by Free China Press in Taiwan on the basis ofthe original edition
is dated January 28, 1948.
46. According to Richard Kagan, "The Chinese Trotskyist Movement and Ch'en Tu-hsiu:
Culture, Revolution, and Polity," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University ofPennsylvania,
1969, p. 168, the title was "changed for propaganda reasons". Kagan was unaware ofHe Zhiyu's
role in the pampWet's editing, which he attributed to Hu Shi.
47. This edition was acquired for me by Alex Buchman from Julia Tung at the Hoover Institution
on War, Revolution, and Peace (Stanford, California) .
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to Chen Qichang and the other three missing items appear in recent mainland
collections ofChen Duxiu's last writings (published and unpublished, includ-
ing texts not selected by He Zhiyu), where their source is given as the 1948
pampWet.
In 1967, the truncated version of the pampWet, together with a selection
of other writings by and about Chen Duxiu, was published in Taibei by
Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe under the title Shi'an zizhuan ("Shi'an's autobiog-
raphy"), the contents of which are (1) the two chapters of Chen's (i.e.,
Shi'an's) unfinished autobiography;48 (2) Hu Shi's selection of Chen's letters
and articles; (3) an obituary by Chen ofCai Yuanpei (retained in this present
volume as Appendix 3); (4) Hu Shi's 1949 introduction; and (5) an article
titled "Ji Duxiu" ("Recollections of[Chen] Duxiu") by Tao Xisheng.49
This English-language edition of Chen's last articles and letters is, as far as
can be ascertained, based on an exact reconstruction, made from texts scattered
across several sources (identified in footnotes), of the original 1948 edition.
Chen was famous for his lucid and elegant writing, but the available editions
ofthese texts are marred by muddled constructions and unintelligible sentences
many of which are probably due to poor type-setting and proof-reading.
During the preparation of the writings for translation, the real or correct
meaning ofambiguous sentences and misprints was, where possible, identified
(principally by Wang Fanxi). The corrections are not explained in this
translation; there would be little point in doing so, for each new edition has
added new mistakes (though it is true that some old errors, once committed,
have subsequently been copied and thus perpetuated). In any case, the
reconstructed Chinese text is available to anyone who needs it. Most of the
annotation to this present edition is new. Those few footnotes added (probably
by He Zhiyu) to the original 1948 edition are clearly identified as such.
He Zhiyu (Ho Chih-yii), who was responsible for the original publishing
of these papers, is the alias, adopted after He's release from prison in 1937, of
He Zishen (Ho Tzu-shen). Born at the end ofthe nineteenth or the start of
48. This work, which Chen wrote in prison, was first published in 1937 in Lin Yutang's Yuzhou
feng ("Cosmic wind"), nos. 51-53 (September-October); for an English translation, see Richard
C. Kagan, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Unfinished Autobiography," China Quarterly, no. 50 (1972), pp.
295-314.
49. ':Ji Duxiu" was first published in Taibei's Zhuanji wenxue ("Biographical literature"), vol.
5, nos. 3-4. Tao Xisheng, who studied at Beijing University, was initially close to the Communist
Party, but began working for the Guomindang in July 1927. During the war against Japan he
was for a time a member of the pro-Japanese WangJingwei faction, but he soon reverted to
supporting Chiang Kai-shek.
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the twentieth century, He joined the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing
in the early 1920s, while a student at Beijing National University. During the
Revolution of1925-1927, he was active in his native province ofHunan, first
as Party leader in Xiangtan and then as a member of the Party's Hunan
Provincial Committee. After the defeat of the revolution in the autumn of
1927, he became organiser (with Mao, a fellow Hunanese, as secretary) ofthe
Hunan Provincial Committee, and took over as secretary when Mao left
Changsha to lead the armed struggle. He was a delegate to the Party's Fifth
Congress and to its Sixth (Moscow) Congress. After his return to China from
Russia, he became a member of the Shandong Provincial Committee, was
arrested, escaped from prison, and fled to Shanghai. He became a Trotskyist
in 1929, following the conversion to Trotskyism of Chen Duxiu and other
old Party leaders. He was arrested as a Trotskyist by Chiang Kai-shek's political
police in May 1930. Sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, he was released
in August 1937, shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. During
the war years, he worked as a middle-school teacher in Jiangjin, Sichuan
province, where Chen Duxiu lived between 1938 and his death in 1942, and
he acted as an intermediary between Chen and the outside world. After Chen's
death, he volunteered to act as Chen's literary executor. He was arrested by
the Maoist secret police in 1952 as a member of the Internationalist Workers'
Party ofChina (representing a minority ofthe Chinese Trotskyist movement)
and sentenced to life imprisonment. According to his prison-mate Zheng
Chaolin,so he had collapsed in both body and spirit before he died ofa stroke
in prison in 1960.
By the late 1980s, research on Chen Duxiu had progressed rapidly in China:
no fewer than three book-length biographical studies on Chen Duxiu or
chronologies ofhis life were published in China between 1987 and 1989, and
a major new study was published in Taiwan. All these books discuss the
background to, and meaning of, Chen's last articles and letters. The three
mainland biographies ofChen are Wang Guangyuan, ed., Chen Duxiu nianpu
("A chronology of the life of Chen Duxiu"), Chongqing: Chongqing
50. Zheng Chaolin (Cheng Ch'ao-lin) (1901-), a writer and translator, joined the Chinese
Communist Party in Paris in 1922. He returned to China in 1924 to edit the Party organ Xiangdao
("Guide Weekly"). He was a member of the Party's Hubei Provincial Committee during the
Revolution of 1925-1927, and a participant in the Emergency Conference of August 7,1927.
He became a Trotskyist in 1929, and was a founder and leader of the Chinese Trotskyist
organisation. He served seven years in prison under Chiang Kai-shek. He was arrested by the
Maoist secret police in 1952 and kept in prison without trial until 1979. His memoirs were
published in China in 1986.
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chubanshe, 1987; Tang Baolin and Lin Maosheng, Chen Duxiu nianpu ("A
chronology of the life of Chen Duxiu"), Shanghai: Shanghai renmin
chubanshe, 1988; and RenJianshu and Tang Baolin, Chen Duxiu zhuan ("A
biography of Chen Duxiu"), 2 vols, Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe,
1989 (Ren wrote the first volume, subtitled Cong xiucai dao zong shuji ("From
scholar to General Secretary"), and Tang the second, subtitled Cong zong shuji
daoJanduipai ("From General Secretary to oppositionist")). The Taiwan study
is Zheng Xuejia, Chen Duxiu zhuan ("A biography ofChen Duxiu"), 2 vols,
Taibei: Shibao wenhua chuban qiye youxian gongsi, 1989. Later, in 1992,
Thomas Kuo's book on Chen (Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942) and the Chinese
Communist Movement, South Orange, NewJersey: Seton Hall University Press,
1975, based on his 1969 PhD thesis of the same title) was published in Chinese
translation by Taibei's Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi as Guo Chengtang
(Thomas Kuo), Chen Duxiu yu Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi yundong ("Chen Duxiu
and the Chinese Communist Movement"). An early (and probably the best
. available) Chinese-language chronology ofChen's life is Zhi Yuru (Chih Yu-
ju), Chen Duxiu nianpu ("A chronology of the life of Chen Duxiu"),
Hongkong: Longmen shudian, 1974.
An excellent Western study is Lee Feigon, Chen Duxiu, Founder if the
Chinese Communist Party, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. For
a history ofChinese Trotskyism, see Gregor Benton, China's Urban Revolution-
aries: Explorations in the History ifChinese Trotskyism, 1921-1952, New Jersey
and London: Humanities Press, 1996. (parts ofthe introduction to this volume
are identical with chapter 6 and one or two other sections of that study.) In
August 1994, Tang Baolin, a mainland Chinese specialist on Chen Duxiu and
Chinese Trotskyism working in the Institute of Modern History at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, published Zhongguo Tuopai
shi (A history ifChinese Trotskyism) in the series Zhongguo xiandaishi congshu
(Contemporary Chinese history library) under the general editorship ofZhang
Yufa, Taibei: Dongda tushu gongsi, August 1994. This book, though partly
based on primary sources, displays many of the same flaws and shortcomings
as much other mainland Chinese writing on Chen Duxiu and Trotskyism.
It resorts habitually to a double standard, one - harsh and cynical- for the
Trotskyists, who can do little right, and another - fawning and indulgent -
for the official Party, which can do nothing wrong.51
51. For a critical review ofTang Baolin's book, see the interview with Wang Fanxi appended
to my China's Urban Revolutionaries.
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PhD dissertations that discuss Chen's intellectual and political life include
Yu-Ju Chih (Zhi Yuru), The Political Thought ofCh'en Tu-hsiu, Indiana
University, 1965; Richard Kagan, The Chinese Trotskyist Movement and
Ch'en Tu-hsiu: Culture, Revolution, and Polity, University ofPennsylvania,
1969; and Thomas C. T. Kuo, Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942) and the Chinese
Communist Movement, University of Pittsburgh, 1969.
Two of Chen's Trotskyist comrades discuss his posthumous writings in
memoirs that have been published both in China and the West. These are
Wang Fan-hsi (Wang Fanxi) , Memoirs ifa Chinese Revolutionary, translated and
with an introduction by Gregor Benton, New York: University ofColumbia
Press, 1991 (a revised and enlarged edition of Chinese Revolutionary, Memoirs,
1919-1949, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); and An Oppositionistfor
Life: Memoirs ofthe Chinese Revolutionary Zheng Chaolin, edited and translated
by Gregor Benton, Atlantic HigWands, NJ: Humanities Press. (This book also
appeared in German as Zheng Chaolin, SiebzigJahre Rebell: Erinnerungen eines
chinesischen Oppositionellen ["Seventy years a rebel: Memoirs of a Chinese
oppositionist"], edited by Gregor Benton, Frankfurt-am-Main: ISP Verlag,
1991.) Wang's memoirs were first published in mimeographed form in
Hongkong in 1957 as Shuang Shan huiyilu ("Shuang Shan's memoirs"); they
were published in a properly printed edition in 1977 in Hongkong by Zhouji
hang (Chow's Company) as Wang Fanxi, Shuang Shan huiyilu, and were
pirated in Beijing by Xiandai shiliao biankanshe in 1981. In 1994, Shilin
shudian in Hongkong published an enlarged edition of this text. Zheng
Chaolin's memoirs were written in 1945, but not at the time published;
sometime in 1979 or 1980, several copies of the manuscript were mimeo-
graphed under the title Zheng Chaolin 1945 nian huiyilu ("Zheng Chaolin's
1945 memoirs") for distribution as reference material among Party historians.
In 1986 in Beijing, Xiandai shiliao biankanshe ("The association to edit and
publish materials on contemporary history") published a properly printed
version under the title Zheng Chaolin huiyilu ("Zheng Chaolin's memoirs"),
with an appendix on "Chen Duxiu and the Trotskyists" written by Zheng
in 1980.
This present volume would have been impossible without the advice and
guidance ofWang Fanxi, a pupil, follower, and correspondent ofChen Duxiu
who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and has been a leader of
the Chinese Trotskyist movement ever since the late 1920s. Wang is probably
the only living person besides Zheng Chaolin capable ofexplicating the precise
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meaning ofChen's last writings, which are written in a style that is frequendy
elliptical or arcane. Wang monitored my translation ofChen's writings, helped
correct typographical errors in the various texts from which the translations
were made, and clarified difficult or obscure passages and references. Where
necessary, he passed on requests for information to Zheng Chaolin (in
Shanghai). I am also grateful to my friend and colleague Wu Darning, who
produced the Glossary, and to Aad Blok, for overseeing the production ofthe
book.
This book uses the Hanyu Pinyin system ofromanising Chinese, except in
some citations (where Wang Fanxi, for example, is written as Wang Fan-hsi,
which is its Wade-Giles spelling) and in the case ofsome historical figures (for
example Chiang Kai-shek) whose names are better known in other transcrip-
tions. In biographical footnotes, the Wade-Giles transcription of Chinese
names is added in brackets if it differs from the Hanyu Pinyin transcription.
-
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Letter to Chen Qichang and Others
LETTER TO CHEN QICHANG AND OTHERS1
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Chen Duxiu wrote this letter three months after leaving prison on August 23,
1937. In prison, he hadfallen out irreparably with the Trotskyist Peng Shuzhi,
and his relations with other Trotskyist leaders (who had expelled himfor "oppor-
tunism" in 1935) were also poor. Chen had no wish to join with these people,
and indeed denounces them as Stalinists in this letter; but in 1937 and 1938 he
did maintain good relations in Wuhan with a small number ofhis old comrades.
Chen's political project in 1937 was quite the opposite if that of the Shanghai
Trotskyists: they refused to engage in practical activity and confined themselves
to commentingfrom the sidelines on the war againstJapan; he believed that, for
the duration ifthe war, the Trotskyists should put their main energy into building
a united front ifall democratic parties independent if the Guomindang and the
Chinese Communist Party, including patriotic soldiers, on the basis ofa broad
programme iffreedom and democracy. Chen was even prepared to cooperate with
the Chinese Communists, but he was shrewd enough to see that they would only
take him seriously ifhe represented real forces. In the event, nothing came ifhis
attempt to.foster a "democratic upsurge". Does Chen's assertion in this letter that
"I no longer belong to any party" represent a definitive break with the Trotskyists?
Not according to Zheng Chaolin, whose arguments are contained in AppendiX
8. Chen was given to making sweeping statements and categorical assertions that
in reality were eiftenfarfrom immutable. The question ifthe late Chen's Trotsky-
ism can best be judged on the basis ifthe other letters and articles in this volume,
which suggest an enduring interest in Trotsky's Fourth International, ifnot in its
Chinese section.
1. Source: Shui Ru, Chen Duxiu shuxinji, pp. 472-474. This letter is not included in the Taiwan
edition of Chen's last writings published by Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe.
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Dear [Luo] Shifan,2 [Chen] Qichang,3 and [Zhao]Ji,4
I have received your letters of October 14 and 17. I also received your letter
of October 16 together with Monkey'sSletter and his plan for the book (plus
the letter of October 20). The book he envisages will not be easy to write.
I can make no comment except to admire his perseverance in wanting to write
such a book, for I am ignorant of the subject. My replying to him along these
lines will dampen his ardour, but I'm afraid I can't reply in any other way. I
was both pleased and concerned to hear about Shifan's marriage:6 pleased
because the news was so unexpected, and concerned because I'm not sure how
he'll earn his living. [Pu] Dezh? has already been here for a week, in a couple
of days he'll probably be going to Hunan to be a schoolteacher. I don't want
to stay here for long, nor can I do so, but I've not yet been able to fix on
anywhere to go,8 there seem to be bad people everywhere. I understand
nothing about theory, and I have not the slightest compunction about
inclining to the left or to the right, I shall always strive to be extreme, I view
with contempt the doctrine ofthe golden mean,9 I absolutely detest parrotry,
2. Luo Shi£m was an old Communist who turned to Trotskyism in 1929 together with Chen
Duxiu. An activist among the workers, he was at one time close to the "Conciliationists" headed
by He Mengxiong. He was arrested together with Chen and sentenced to five years in gaol,
but was freed early due to the outbreak ofthe Sino-Japanese War. He died of illness in Hunan,
probably in 1939. He was arrested under the false name ofWang Zhaoqun.
3. Chen Qichang (Ch'en Ch'i-ch'ang) (1901-43), a Beijing student leader and a member of
the middle-ranking cadre of the Chinese Communist Party after 1925, turned to Trotskyism
in 1929, and became a leader ofthe Chinese Trotskyist movement. He was arrested and executed
by the Japanese gendarmerie.
4. ZhaoJi (Chao Chi) (1902-1994) was a veteran Communist who participated in the Northern
Expedition of1926-1927 as a political commissar. Zhao became a Trotskyist in Moscow in 1928.
He was active during the early stages of the Trotskyist movement in China.
5. The nickname ofSun Xi, whose other name was Sun Xuelu, a left-wing writer who joined
the Trotskyists and at around this time was planning to write a book on economics. After the
outbreak ofthe Sino-Japanese War inJuly 1937, Sun (a Sichuanese) wentto Yunnan with Zhao
Ji. After the Communists came to power in 1949, Sun, Zhao Ji, and Pu Dezhi (see below) were
arrested and interviewed in Kunming by Zhou Enlai, who urged them to "reform"; Pu did
so, and was freed immediately; Zhao and Sun stood firm, and were kept in gaol, Zhao until
1979 and Sun too probably until 1979; shortly after his release, Sun died.
6. Luo Shi£m married the sister ofZhao Ji's wife shortly after Luo's release from gaol in Nanjing
and his arrival in Shanghai.
7. Pu Dezhi (P'u Teh-chih) (1905-), who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926 and
was active in literature and the theatre, became a Trotskyist in Moscow in 1928. He was arrested
for the second time, together with Chen Duxiu, in 1932, and was released from prison in 1937.
8. Chen was probably worried about the Japanese military threat to Wuhan (which fell in October
1938).
9. The Doctrine qfthe Mean is one of the Four Books embodying Confucian teachings, and is
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I refuse to utter commonplaces that neither hurt nor itch, I want to be
absolutely right and absolutely wrong in all my utterances; the last thing I want
is never to say anything wrong and at the same time never to say anything
right. You're all Stalinists, you're Peng [Shuzhi]'slo friends, you're not my
steadfast confederates. Yes, Luo Han may be a bit muddleheaded,l1 but your
unbridled attack on him is a thousand times more muddleheaded. You
violently denounced the Stalinists and the Guomindang, and you particularly
attacked the Stalinists; though such attacks are not wrong in principle, tactically
they are extremely wrong. If you carry on making such mistakes, goodness
knows where you'll end up! Shifan calls other people religious fanatics, but
he doesn't seem to realise that he himself has been infected by religious
dogmatism! I've received Zhao Ji's letter of November 2. Although there's
a slight difference ofviews between Shifan and Zhao Ji on the one side and
Han Junl2 and Qichang on the other, they're basically identical, i.e., they fail
commonly accepted as the work of Confucius. It enjoins restraint, tolerance, equanimity, and
the pursuit ofthe golden mean: "Let the states ofequilibrium and harmony exist in perfection,
and a happy order will prevail throughout Heaven and Earth, while all things will be nourished
and prosper."
10. Peng Shuzhi (P'eng Shu-chili, also written P'eng Shu-tse) (1896-1983) returned to China
in 1925 from Moscow, where he had been a student leader, andjoined the Central Committee
ofthe Chinese Communist Party. He was chiefeditor ofthe Party organ during the 1925-1927
revolution. In November 1929, he was expelled together with Chen Duxiu for supporting
Trotskyism. In fact, none of those addressed in this letter was a Peng supporter; both before
and after the time of this letter, all were and remained Chen's friends and had not sided with
Peng, though on the question of collaboration with the Guomindang during the war against
Japan they disagreed with Chen. All of them were very angry about Luo Han's trip to Xi'an
referred to in the following sentence.
11. Luo Han (Lo Han) (1898-1941?) was expelled from France, where he had gone to study,
in 1921 and joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1922. He was active in the Guomindang
army until the counterrevolutionary March 20 Incident (1926). He became a Trotskyist in 1928
in Moscow and a leader ofthe Left Opposition of the Chinese Communist Party. He died in
Chongqing during a Japanese air-raid. Regarding the incident referred to in this letter, after
Chen Duxiu's release from gaol on August 8, 1937, Chen, in Nanjing, drafted some papers on
the anti-Japanese war. Luo Han, encouraged by the Communist leader Ye Jianying (1897-1986),
headed off in the direction ofYan'an, the Communists' wartime capital, to discuss Chen's
proposals with Mao Zedong and negotiate conditions for collaboration between the Trotskyists
- Chen Duxiu in particular - and the Maoists. Before Luo could reach Yan'an, Mao contacted
him indirectly in the nearby city ofXi'an to say that Chen could only work together with the
Communists ifhe admitted his past mistakes and renounced Trotskyism. Luo thereupon gave
up his attempt, which had angered Chen and was roundly criticised by the other Trotskyists.
On this question, see Appendix 1.
12. HanJun (Han Chiin) (?-1945) was a leader ofthe younger generation ofChinese Trotskyists.
He was active among Hongkong workers throughout the period of the Japanese occupation
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to grasp the meaning of this war. 13 [Zheng] Chaolin goes even further,14 but
basically he's the same as you, i.e., he indiscriminately applies theories con-
cerning the last inter-imperialist war to today, an excellent example offitting
horses' jaws to cows' heads. I still have some hopes of Qichang and Han Jun,
not because their view of the present situation approaches mine but because
they have a rather positive attitude to work; those who work actively among
the masses might eventually wake up to reality. About cooperating with the
Stalinists, my view is that there's nothing wrong with it in principle, but at
present it's out ofthe question. To cooperate, both sides must have something
to give; in addition, there must be some common activity that necessitates
both sides getting in touch - yet at present such conditions do not obtain.
Naturally it's crazy to talk of "cooperation"; Luo [Han] didn't mention this
matter to me, you have no cause to get oversensitive about it. The rumour-
mongering and vilification is clearly the work of scoundrels. 15 You're like
members of religious sects: you can't see the common enemy. As for Peng
'and Tall Man,16 I swear I'll never engage in any common activity with them
even if they agree with me, and what's more, our fundamental views are far
removed from one another. I've also received Xiang'sI7Ietter. And I received
your letters of October 29 and November 3, together with the letter in
English. ls There's no way of doing what he suggests, nor do I want to try to
of the colony until his death in 1945.
13. The overwhelming majority ofTrotskyists, Chen Qichang included, maintained a position
of support for the war but criticism of its leaders.
14. Zheng Chaolin opposed support for China's war against Japan on the grounds that it was
from the very beginning an integral part of the imminent world war.
15. The scoundrels in question perhaps included both the Stalinists and the Trotskyists, who
were attacking one another by rumour-mongering and vilification; they may also have been
those Trotskyists in Shanghai who attacked Luo Han without a full knowledge ofwhat Luo
Han had done when he tried to approach the Maoists with Chen's theses.
16. The nickname ofYin Kuan (Yin K'uan) (1897-1967), a veteran Communist who joined
the Party in France. Active in the Shandong Provincial Committee, the Anhui Provincial
Committee, and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang Regional Committee ofthe Chinese Communist Party
in 1925-27, he became a Trotskyist in 1929. He was twice arrested by the Guomindang for
his revolutionary activities, and was arrested by the Maoists in 1952.
17. It is not clear who Xiang was.
18. Most probably a letter from Frank Glass, alias Li Furen (Li Fu-jen) (1901-1987), who
conveyed to Chen Duxiu Trotsky's advice to him to leave the country for his own safety and
go to America, where he could rally support for the anti-Japanese cause. Frank Glass was a Briton
who arrived in Shanghai in 1930 and worked as a journalist on various English-language
newspapers in the city. Glass' last job was with the China Weekly Review, where he worked as
an assistant editor. The nominal chief editor and publisher of the China Weekly Review was J.
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find a way; I fear it would be a thankless task. Luo [Hanl's recent setback
should serve as a lesson. What the press said was mostly at variance with the
facts. I've not read the Shenbao interview, could you send me a copy?19 There
are too many instances of this sort, there's nothing you can do to stop them
or even to rectify them. The only thing one can do is to let matters run their
course, what puts my mind at ease is that I have written a large number of
articles that will be material witness in the future to what I have done.
Regarding the speeches and articles I made public recently here [in Wuhan],
I've widely and openly made plain that they are merely my personal opinions.
All I'm concerned about is my own independent thinking, I won't give up
my own ideas in order to accommodate to someone else's. They're merely
my personal opinion, they represent no one, I no longer belong to any party,
I'm subject to no one's orders or instigation, I make my own proposals and
personally take responsibility for them. 20 At present I have no idea who will
be my future friends. I'm not in the least afraid ofbeing isolated. I wish you
good health.
Zhong21
November 21, 1937
P. Powell, who was put in a concentration camp by the Japanese after the outbreak. ofthe Pacific
War in 1941. Glass was a leader ofthe Chinese Trotskyist movement between 1934 and 1938.
19. Having released Chen Duxiu from prison, the Guomindang issued and published a statement
saying that Chen had been released due to his "repentance", whereupon Chen sent a statement
to Shenbao in Shanghai repudiating this claim. Shenbao did not dare to publish Chen's counter-
statement. Perhaps the interview Chen mentions had to do with this matter.
20. According to Zheng Chaolin, Chen Duxiu's declaration after leaving gaol that he no longer
belonged to any party "was mere diplomatic verbiage. At that time he wanted to unite in the
war againstJapan democratic personages beyond the influence ofthe Guomindang and the CCP,
so he wanted to avoid getting entangled at the outset in the Trotskyist question; ... it is clear
from contemporary sources that he had by no means left the Chinese Trotskyist organization"
(Zheng Chaolin, "Chen Duxiu and the Trotskyists," p. 199).
21. The first syllable ofZhongfu, one of Chen Duxiu's other names.
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LETTER TO LEON TROTSKy22
This letter, which Hu Shi omittedfrom his selection ifChen's last writings, shows
Chen concerned to protect the good name ifTrotsky's Fourth International in
China against the activities ifthe Chinese Trotskyist "ultra-liftists", who at the
time were denouncing Chen.fOr wanting to "put national interests above party
interests" in the war againstJapan, and thus.fOr "betraying the organisation and
betraying himself'. Chen notes in his counterattack that the Trotskyists' passive
and even negative attitude toward the wargives credence to the Communist Party's
campaign to paint them as pro-Japanese traitors, a campaign ifwhich Chen himself
had been the principal victim. The letter correctly predicts that China will fail to
expel theJapanese, yet it seriously underestimates the Communist Party's prospects
under Mao, with his strategy ifguerrilla waifare waged independently from rural
bases. But though Chen believes that the Trotskyists will onlygrow when industry
(and thus the working class) revives, he insists that abstention from activity is no
option, and he urges the Trotskyists to act now, both underJapanese and Nation-
alist rule, in order to prepare for future political openings. The letter shows that
Chen was opposed not to the Chinese Trotskyist organisation as such but to its
then leaders; and not to basic Trotskyist theories but to the Chinese Trotskyists'
ultra-lift interpretation if them.
Before the start of agrarian China's war against industrial Japan, the
Guomindang government had no intention offighting. It was forced to resist
in haste, with a woeful lack ofpreparation, and in some fields with a complete
lack ofany preparation whatsoever. Moreover, after going to war, it reverted
to counterrevolutionary methods23 to carry out the tasks ofnational revolution,
so it is not surprising that it has suffered military defeats.
22. Source: Shui Ru, ed., Chen Duxiu shuxinji, pp. 477-480. This letter is not included in the
Free China Press edition or the Taiwan edition of the letters published in 1967 by Zhuanji
wenxue chubanshe.
23. After the £ill ofWuhan in October 1938, Chiang Kai-shek stepped up his campaign ofpolitical
repression against Conununists in Guomindang-controlled areas and his military campaign against
Conununist-controlled areas.
<
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Now that first Guangzhou and then Hankou have fallen, all the country's
large commercial and industrial cities are inJapanese hands. The Guomindang
government has proclaimed its military defence line to be west ofthe Beijing-
Hankou and Guangzhou-Hankou railways. Changsha and Xi'an will probably
fall toO. 24 If the Japanese take Changsha, they can occupy the whole of the
Guangdong-Hankou line. Ifthey take Xi'an, they will be in a position to sever
communications between China and the Soviet Union. So these two cities
are military targets that they are determined to capture. Although China's
armies did not collapse completely as a result of the fall ofHankou, the most
they could do was retreat to garrison Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Guang-
xi. Economically and culturally, all those provinces are more backward than
the lower reaches ofthe Yangtse. It will not be easy to mobilise them quickly
for the counteroffensive. If Chiang Kai-shek's government is unable to get
Anglo-French material aid through Yunnan,25 there is no guarantee that even
Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou can be held.
China today faces three possible prospects. (1) Through Anglo-French
mediation, Chiang Kai-shek recognises Japan's demands and submits. (2)
Chiang Kai-shek's government retreats to garrison Sichuan, Guizhou, and
Yunnan but in reality abandons the war. (3) Japan invades Yunnan; Chiang
Kai-shek flees abroad.26 If(1), then China's future circumstances will depend
on the degree of submission and the Guomindang government's domestic
policy. If (2), then Japan will find it hard to rule such an enormous expanse
of Chinese territory; hard but not impossible, for even though the state of
Japan's economy is daily worsening and Japan lacks the strength to open up
China, the large amount ofnatural resources in stock that it gets from China,
together with materiel and extensive new markets, will probably enable the
Japanese to scrape together enough resources to support the army they require
to garrison China. In addition, they have occupied some major strongpoints
and communications in China with new-style weapons and defence works.
So, barring big changes in Japan or internationally, China lacks the strength
to drive them out.
China's newborn proletariat, after the defeat of the last revolution and the
massacre brought on by the Chinese Communist Party's adventurist policies,
24. Xi'an never fell. As for Changsha, Chinese under the Guomindang General Xue Yue
successfully defended the city three times against the Japanese; Changsha (and the vital
Guangzhou-Hankou Railway) did not fall to the Japanese until early 1945.
25. From Burma, along the Yunnan-Burma Highway.
26. In effect, the second of Chen's three prospects was realised.
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has been greatly weakened, in addition to which most factories and transport
facilities throughout China have been destroyed in the present war. Numeri-
cally, materially, and spiritually, China's workers are back to where they were
thirty or forty years ago.
The membership ofthe Chinese Communist Party is far in excess ofours,27
but they're just armed forces with intellectuals and no working-class base at
all. We have fewer than fifty people in Shanghai and Hongkong, plus probably
one hundred-odd stragglers in other parts of the country.
Needless to say, we do not fool ourselves that we will grow quickly in this
war, but if we had pursued more or less right policies, we would not be in
our present feeble state. From the very start our group tended toward ultra-left
positions.
For example, some people think that the democratic revolution in China
is already over; some that the next revolution will be purely socialist in nature,
with no democratic component; some that the next revolution will be socialist
from the start; some that the call for a constituent assembll8 is void of class
content, and thus suspect; some that the call for a constituent assembly is a
slogan for periods of reaction and peaceful movements that cannot be used
for seizing state power, for which only the slogan of soviets29 is applicable;
some that the national-democratic struggle is a bourgeois task, that the
proletariat can participate in the movement but should not view it as its own
task, and that those comrades who propose that the Chinese proletariat should
take upon its own shoulders the resolution of national-democratic tasks are
27. In May 1937, the Chinese Communist Party had 50,000 members; by July 1940, 800,000.
28. In May 1931, at their Unification Conference, the Chinese Trotskyists decided to launch
a nationwide campaign for a constituent assembly, in order to "rally the revolutionary forces
against the military dictatorship, and to prepare the way for a new revolutionary upsurge" (Wang
Fan-hsi, Memoirs, p. 150). At first, some Chinese Trotskyists opposed the campaign for a
constituent assembly, on the grounds that it was not sufficiently revolutionary, and called instead
for the establishment ofsoviet power. After a short period ofdoubt and confusion, none ofthem
any longer opposed the campaign. The differences among the Chinese Trotskyists in this regard
concerned the role and perspective of the constituent assembly slogan and the struggle for its
realisation. Liu Renjing's position was that to fight for a constituent assembly was to fight for
a parliamentary perspective in China; for most Chinese Trotskyists, however, it was chiefly a
strategic means ofreassembling the defeated revolutionary forces and of leading them to fight
against and finally overthrow the Guomindang regime through democratic struggle. At the time,
only the Stalinists opposed the call for a constituent assembly.
29. Soviet power, unlike other forms ofstate power, is based on mass participation by the workers,
peasants, and soldiers in a vast pyramid ofsoviets (i.e., councils) from the local to the national
level. The goal ofthe soviet was to establish a dictatorship ofthe toiling over the possessing classes.
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imbued with the consciousness ofthe left-wing ofthe bourgeoisie; some that,
whatever the period, the incident, or the circumstances, to agree with the
parties ofother classes on joint action against foreign imperialists or domestic
dictators is opportunism. These ultra-left tendencies have played a big part in
propaganda and education within the organisation and have consequently
determined its entire attitude toward the Sino-Japanese War. There is no one
capable ofrectifying this mistake; whoever tries to do so is denounced as an
opportunist. As for the war, ultra-leftists of this sort say that they willjoin the
resistance but at the same time they oppose rating its significance too highly.
They believe that only the war against Guomindang rule is revolutionary, that
the war against Japanese imperialism cannot be counted as such; some sneer
at the word "patriotism", and even consider that this war is between Chiang
Kai-shek and the Mikado;30 some think that if the workers join the war, they
will be acting as cannon-fodder for the bourgeoisie, and that to try to negotiate
with the Communist Party or the Guomindang for joint work against Japan
means degeneration and capitulation; in the eyes of the masses, the "Trotsky-
ists", instead ofresisting the Japanese, are filling their publications with articles
bitterly denouncing the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang. The
result is that the Stalinists' propaganda about the "Trotskyist traitors" finds an
echo in all layers of the population, and even those who sympathise with us
are at a loss to understand precisely who it is that the "Trotskyists" at present
see as the main enemy. Ever since the start of the war, the "Trotskyists" have
continued to act in this same way. Not only is it impossible for them to win
support, but it's impossible for them even to approach other people; as a result,
their vision grows ever narrower, even to the point where some ofthem have
invented the theory that the fewer the social relations a member of a revolu-
tionary party has, the better.
A small closed-door ultra-left organisation ofthis sort (with only a very few
exceptions among its members) obviously stands no chance ofwinning new
adherents; and even ifit did win new members, it would be an obstacle to the
further development of the Chinese Revolution.
The Stalinists failed to understand the new situation in China after the defeat
of the last revolution, so they fell into many errors;3! the changes that would
30. Here Chen is caricaturing Zheng Chaolin's position.
31. In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek launched a murderous and highly effective coup against the Chinese
Communists, who had up to then been in a close alliance with the Guomindang, in accordance
with directives from Stalin in Moscow. To preserve his political bee, Stalin refused to admit
that this defeat had happened, and launched the Chinese Communists on a new, insurrectionary
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happen if the present [resistance war] were defeated would be many times
more serious and give even less cause for optimism. Today, if we fail to
develop a profound understanding of possible future political developments
and of the real strength of the Chinese proletariat and the condition of its
political party,32 and ifwe fail to determine on the basis ofsuch an understand-
ing the proper order in which feasible policies can be implemented, we are
at best garret scribblers indulging in self-advertisement and self-consolation.
Mter the fall ofHankou, further large-scale warfare is unlikely. The frag-
mentary resistance led by the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang
in the villages and small towns will probably spread everywhere within a short
period of time. In terms ofmodem warfare, that struggle is no more than an
ebb wave, it cannot form into a centralised force capable ofbeating back the
enemy. If the Guomindang government goes the way of the Czechs by
submitting to the japanese and ceding a large part ofits territory to them, and
with Anglo-American help retains several provinces in the Yangtse valley, it
is quite likely under such conditions of rule that it would revert to its anti-
Communist stance.33 In that case, not only we but even the Communists
would stand no chance ofretaining even a semilegal status unless they reorgan-
ised and changed their party's name.
We should beware of perpetuating the illusion that we can only restart our
activities after the recovery ofterritories now occupied by the japanese. Even
today, while japan continues to occupy parts of our country, we should
prepare forthwith to start work afresh, within the narrow space that remains
open to us, though to develop our forces we must wait for a while; only when
industry begins to recover, after the war (whether under foreign or Chinese
rule), can our work develop relatively smoothly. When that time comes,
Marxist groups, whether underground or semi-public, will inevitably crop up
in a number ofplaces; without a big movement and a central force, it will be
difficult to unite them. Only a small group that, organisationally, has won the
support of a large numbers of workers and, politically, has gone all out to
engage in the democratic and national struggle, is qualified to be the central
force that recreates a proletarian party. The initial and fundamental job of
course that led to further defeats.
32. By the "political party ofthe proletariat", Chen probably means the Trotskyists rather than
the CCP.
33. After January 1941, the new (second) united front between Chiang Kai-shek and the
Communists collapsed in all but name, and the Guomindang resorted to even more systematic
repression of the Communists.
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striving to fonn organisational links to the workers and making propaganda
for the democratic and national struggle are the policies we should adopt in
both Japanese-occupied and Guornindang-occupied territories, the only
difference being that under the Japanese secrecy is even more essential. If the
ultra-leftists who today stay aloof from the masses and the real struggle fail to
realise that they were wrong to look down upon the national-democratic
struggle, if they fail to change their attitude in all respects and to knuckle under
to the hard work entailed in the policies I have just proposed, ifthey continue
to brag and pretend to be big leaders, to organise leadership bodies that lack
all substance, and to found petty kingdoms for themselves behind closed doors
and relying on the name ofthe Fourth International, they will achieve nothing
beyond the tarnishing of the Fourth International's prestige in China.34
November 3, 193835
Somewhere in Sichuan.
34. Trotsky brought the Fourth International into being in September 1938, to act as the voice
and spearhead ofthe international proletariat and to oppose the Stalinised Third International.
The Chinese Trotskyists considered themselves a national section of this world body.
35. Shui Ru, Chen Duxiu shuxin ji, p. 480, gives the date as "X month, 1939", but this is unlikely,
for Frank Glass was already in possession of this letter on January 19, 1939, when he forwarded
it to Trotsky (see Appendix 2); and during the war, a letter would have needed at least one month
to get from Sichuan (where Chen was) to Shanghai (where Glass was). According to Cahiers
Leon Trotsky (Grenoble, September 1983, no. IS, p. 108), whose editor has consulted a version
ofChen's letter in the archives of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, it
was written on November 3, 1938.
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LETTER TO XILIU AND OTHERS36
Chen's concern in this letter is to maintain the necessary distinction between
Fascism and democracy, which Trotskyists like Pu Dezhi tended to view as mere
variant modes cif bourgeois rule. Whereas Chen wants the Allies to difeat the
Fascists, Pu was prepared to see either side difeated, in thefirm expectation (based
on Lenin's theories about World War One) that a workers' rising would then
follow. In this regard, there was no distinction between Pu and the Chinese
Communists, who in thefirst stages cifthe war condemned both sides as predators.
Chen has not yetgone sofar as to equate Fascism and Stalinism, and he expresses
his approval cif Trotsky's old slogan cif "a united front cif the international
proletariat against Fascism".
In the past, the slogan of the Third International37 against Fascism was not
wrong. Where the Third International went wrong was in its pipedream of
allying with bourgeois governments on the basis of the absurd slogan of a
"popular front" and a "front against aggression" rather than organising a united
front of the international proletariat against Fascism.38 When the British and
French bourgeois governments declared war on the Hitlerite state, the leaders
of the Third International actually sided with Hitler while at the same time
proclaiming their opposition to an imperialist war and encouraging British and
36. Source: Zhuanji wenxue zazhi she, eds, Shi'an zizhuan ("Autobiography ofChen Duxiu"),
Taibei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1967, pp. 63-65. Xiliu is an alias ofpu Dezhi. The "others"
to whom this letter is addressed are probably the Trotskyists, including Zhao ]i, living at the
time in Yunnan.
37. The Third International (or Communist International, or Comintern) was set up by Lenin
and the Bolsheviks in 1919 as the "world party of revolution".
38. Between 1930 and 1933, Trotsky proposed a united front ofworking-class parties (Communist
and Social Democrat) against Fascism, while Stalin saw the Social Democrats not as potential
allies but as enemies. Subsequendy, Trotsky condemned the popular (or people's) front launched
by the Stalinists in 1934 as an unprincipled alliance between representatives of the proletariat
and ofthe middle classes; this alliance, by subordinating workers to the "anti-Fascist" bourgeoisie
in the capitalist countries, would hold back their revolutionary potential. The popular front,
which had no precedents in the history ofthe labour movement, was adopted to suit the needs
not of the labour movement but ofSoviet foreign policy.
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French workers to oppose such a war.39 More than forty members of the
French Communist Party were expelled for favouring a war against Hitler.
In effect their expulsion gave succour to Hitler in his campaign to defeat
Britain and France. Xinhua ribao ["New China Daily"],40 which appears in
Chongqing, has published numerous translations ofarticles by Lenin opposing
the war of 1914; day after day it makes a great show of denouncing this war
as a repeat performance of the last one, i.e., as a war of two imperialist states
for the right to enslave their own peoples and pillage the colonies. Dongxiang
yuebao ["Living Age"]41 followed suit, as their yesmen; on the point of this
theory, I can see no difference between the Chinese Trotskyists and the
Stalinists. Why was Lenin's theory about the 1914 war right?42 Because he was
not prepared to parrot the ready-made theories developed by Marx and Engels
to explain the Franco-Prussian war,43 and instead applied his own mind to
observing and analysing the circumstances and special nature ofthe imperialist
war ofhis day; his slogan was effective because Tsarist Russia was practically
vanquished, and moreover because ofRussia's huge size, so that Germany was
in no position to persecute it beyond the extortions visited on Russia under
39. In August 1939, in a stunning volte-face, the Kremlin signed a pact with the Gennan Nazis
and divided up Poland with them. This pact deceived and demoralised the anti-Fascist movement
and facilitated and even encouraged Hider's conquest ofEurope. Comintern manifestos of1939
and 1940 disguised this appeasement ofthe Nazis by calling on Communists to take advantage
of the war in order to bring about revolutions. But this seemingly orthodox Leninist line was
directed not against the Nazis but against the bourgeois democrats, who (together with the Social
Democrats) had by now taken over from Fascism as the main enemy in Stalin's eyes. AfterJune
22,1941, when Hider invaded the Soviet Union, Stalin switched his support back to the "anti-
Fascist bourgeoisie".
40. Xinhua ribao was the Chinese Communist Party's main newspaper during the war. Founded
in Hankou on January 11, 1938, it moved to Chongqing, Chiang Kai-shek's wartime capital,
in November 1938; it was closed down by the Guomindang on February 28, 1947.
41. Dongxiang, a monthly journal launched inJuly 1939, carried the English subtide Living Age;
Alexander Buchman, an American Trotskyist then working in Shanghai, was its nominal editor.
See Wang Fan-hsi, Memoirs, pp. 229-230.
42. Lenin argued that war is the inevitable product of the contradictions of the world capitalist
system. Practically alone among Europe's main socialist leaders, he stuck to the line of revolu-
tionary defeatism after the outbreak ofWorld War One, and called on the workers of each
country to work for the military defeat of their own government and to tum the imperialist
war into a civil war.
43. Soon after the Franco-Prussian War had broken out on July 19,1870, Marx and Engels
argued that if France (under Louis Napoleon) won, Germany and its independent workers'
movement would be "kaputt for years". They therefore came out in support of the Germans,
but on condition that the Gennan war remained defensive. Later, Marx condemned the Prussians
under Wilhelm I for turning the conflict into an offensive war.
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the provisions ofthe Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty;44 thus the October Revolu-
tion was preserved. Today, we, too, rather than borrow indiscriminately from
Lenin's theories about the 1914 war, should apply our own minds to observing
and analysing the circumstances and special nature of this imperialist war, for
all theories and slogans inhabit time and space and cannot be copied at will.
Incapable ofgrasping the actual circumstances and special nature of a major
event like the present European war, which they declare to be a mere repeat
performance of past history and deal with by repeating from memory the
experiences and theories of the last war, Marxists of this sort are plagiarists of
the old eight-legged essay schoo1.45 History does not happen twice, though
mistakes do. Some people have applied Lenin's theories and slogans about the
1914 war to [this] Sino-Japanese War, forgetting the special characteristics of
opposition to imperialism by an oppressed people.46 However left-wing these
people may sound, in practice they can only aid Japan. Those who apply to
this war Lenin's theories and slogans from past years lose sight of the special
nature ofanti-Fascism and can only aid Hitler, however left-wing they may
sound. Though Britain and France are not oppressed nations like Prussia was
[during the Franco-Prussian War], Hitler is nevertheless a Napoleon III riding
roughshod over Europe rather than a Wilhelm 11.47 As a result, the parties of
the proletariat in Britain and France as well as in Germany should adopt the
slogan "unite in struggle against the Fascist Hitler", not "defend the mother-
land". Today's weapons and communications are completely different from
in the past. Even if a civil war in Britain and France could be won, if it
happened before the overthrow of Hitler, the fate of the new revolutionary
state would under no circumstances be akin to that [of the Soviet state] after
signing the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty! You too have written to me to say:
"If Fascism wins, catastrophe will befall the human race, so we should do
everything in our power to prevent its victory." You are absolutely right. But
44. In 1918 the Soviet Government was forced to accept a treaty with the Central Powers by
which Russia lost the Ukraine, its Polish and Baltic territories, and Finland, places inhabited
by one-third ofits population. The treaty was annulled later in the year, after the Allied defeat
of Gennany.
45. In civil examinations in Imperial China, candidates were expected to write a literary
composition in eight parts. This "eight-legged essay", rigid in form and devoid of intellectual
content, became the symbol in China ofstale, stereotyped writing.
46. According to the Leninist view, the national struggle ofoppressed peoples against imperialism
was an integral part of the overall struggle of the proletariat for liberation.
47. Actually, Wilhelm I, King ofPrussia, who became emperor ofall Gennany on January 18,
1871.
...
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how can we prevent the victory ofFascism? As I see it, only ifHitler loses his
war against Britain and France and his defeat, like that ofNapoleon the Third,
provokes a national revolution, can Fascism be thwarted. To adopt a defeatist
strategy in Britain and France can only facilitate catastrophe. Victory would
definitely fall to Hitler, not to the governments ofBritain or France, nor to
the proletariats of Britain and France or to that of Germany. To equate as
imperialists both sides in the conflict and to say that the workers should resist
them equally is to make exactly the same mistake as equating Hitler and
Briining,48 Nazism and social democracy. A failure to distinguish between
opposites helped Hitler conquer Germany; a similar failure today may well
help Hitler conquer the world. Naturally the proletariat must prepare for
tomorrow, but what must it do today? Today it is already at war! In practice
and in theory, there should be no ambiguity. Either support Hitler, or resist
him. If you oppose Hitler, you should not at the same time overthrow his
enemies. Otherwise all talk of resisting Hitler and preventing the victory of
Fascism is empty. What do you think? I await your response.
March 1, 1940.
48. Heinrich Briining was a centrist party leader who became Gennan Chancellor in March
1930. Trotsky denounced Stalin for proposing Briining's downfall at a time when the alternative
was Hitler.
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LETTER TO XILIU AND OTHERS49
In this letter, Chen difines Fascism and Stalinism as one and the same thing, and
describes their overthrow as a precondition for world progress. Chen's commitment
to an internationalist politics drives him to subordinate every struggle to the
universal struggle between democracy and Fascism, even to the point where he is
ready to condemn the Indian nationalist leaders for rocking the anti-Fascist boat.
.... In my previous letter I did not exhaust the subject, so I shall elucidate my
ideas further as follows. I believe two things. (1) Until this war is concluded,
and even for a short while thereafter, there is no possibility ofrealising the mass
democratic revolution. (2) German Nazism and Russian GPUso politics (the
Italians and Japanese are mere ancillaries) are the modern inquisition. If
humankind is to advance, it must first overthrow this system, which is even
more barbarous than the medieval inquisition. Every struggle (including the
struggle against imperialism) must take second place to this struggle. Any
struggle that harms this struggle is reactionary. In light ofthese views, I believe
that not only the anti-war movement in Britain, France, and the United States
of America but also the movement for Indian independence is reactionary.
Once the national struggle is divorced from the interests ofthe world struggle,
it inevitably becomes reactionary. In reality, once India breaks away from
Britain, it will inevitably come underJapanese or Russian control, and Hitler
will win a decisive victory over Britain. If that's not reactionary, what is it?
This opinion will not only cause LiangenS1 to gasp with amazement: you too
49. Source: Zhuanji wenxue zazhi she, eds, Shi'an zizhuan, pp. 63-65.
50. GPU is one of the names of the Soviet secret or political police, successor to the Cheka
and forerunner of the NKVD and KGB. It was set up during the emergency years of the civil
war after 1917 to direct revolutionary terror against anti-Bolshevik enemies of the revolution;
in the course ofthe 1920s, it turned into the Stalinist dictatorship's permanent arm ofrepression.
51. I.e., Wang Fanxi (Wang Fan-hsi) (1907- ), who joined the Party in 1925 while a student
at Beijing University. He became a Trotskyist in Moscow in 1928. He returned to China in
1929 and worked for a while as an aide to Zhou Enlai. He worked as a Trotskyist with Chen
Duxiu in 1930-1931, after his expulsion from the Party. He was arrested for the first time in
1931 and again in 1937. He spent most ofthe intervening years in gaol. He briefly worked with
Chen for a second time in Wuhan in 1938. Wang was more than once Chen's opponent on
d
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will view it cautiously, for it sharply contradicts the fonnulae that we learned
previously. I would be most grateful ifyou could copy this letter to Liangen
and copy my previous letter to Mr X ....52
April 24, 1940
P.S. That the great struggle against Nazism and GPU politics is being carried
out not by the common people but by Britain and France, in the fonn of a
war against Gennany, is something of which revolutionaries of the world
should be ashamed. Ifnow, by high-sounding words, we allow Nazism to win
out, we should feel even more deeply ashamed and guilty.
political and theoretical questions, but on the whole he saw himself as Chen's pupil. He has
lived in exile since 1949. In the 1980s, his memoirs were published in China.
52. It is not clear who is meant by Mr X.
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LETTER TO XILIU53
In this letter, Chen argues that bourgeois democracy is more conducive to the
emergence ofsocialist democracy than is Fascism or Stalinism, and that therefore
revolutionaries cannot but side with democracy against Fascism and Stalinism.
Lenin had proposed a defeatist policyfor workers under capitalism everywhere, on
the grounds that defeat would trigger and permit workers' revolutions. But, says
Chen, Lenin was speaking before the birth ofFascism .
.... Regarding your views on the European war, I reply as follows. Basically
speaking, you have turned the view you previously held of democracy and
tlie Soviet Union on its head and inevitably fallen prisoner to current theories
and formulas, i.e., to Lenin's theories and formulas about the last war. You
have proved incapable ofusing your own brains to ponder these questions,
i.e., you have committed the first of the two mistakes I mentioned in my last
letter to you. Marx and Engels had never experienced the imperialism of
Lenin's day, so Lenin was unable to take over the ready-made theories that
Marx and Engels developed to deal with the Franco-Prussian War; [similarly,]
Lenin never experienced Fascism and GPU politics, so we are unable to take
over his theories about the last war. In the last world war, whoever lost, Britain
or Germany, would have made little difference to human destiny; today,
however, if Germany and Russia win, humankind will be cast for at least half
a century into an even greater darkness - only ifBritain, France, and America
win and preserve bourgeois democracy will the road be open to popular
democracy. Is it possible for us to consider that the victory of Fascism is
capable of speeding the realisation of popular democracy? Your sort of
thinking is a repeat of the absurd views propagated by the"dead dogs"s4 before
53. Source: Zhang Yongtong and Liu Chuanxue, eds, Houqide Chen Duxiu jiqi wenzhang xuanbian
("The late Chen Duxiu and selected articles by him"), Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe,
1980, pp. 189-191. The letter as reproduced in this source bears no date and is listed as one
of three letters to "Xiliu and others"; however, it is clear from the text that it was addressed
to Xiliu alone. This letter is not included in the Free China Press edition or the Taiwan edition
of the letters published in 1967 by Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe.
54. I.e., the Stalinists. Sigou ("Stalinist lackeys") sounds nearly the same in Chinese as the word
for "dead dogs" (sigou).
<
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Hitler's rise to power. Can we really believe today that the way to deal with
Fascism is to call for revolutions in Britain and France? If we view objective
conditions, there is nothing that will support such a reckless hypothesis, the
sole outcome ofwhich would be to aid Hitler and the "dead dogs". In the
past, many people55 rejected the constituent assembly and wanted only soviets.
I said to them, of course soviets are better than a constituent assembly, but
what's the best way ofachieving soviets? Now you tell me, "We cannot forget
popular democracy." But I'd like to ask you, "There's no use in simply not
forgetting it, the question is, how to achieve it?" Formal and limited democ-
racy aids the struggle for popular democracy; Fascism and GPU politics are
a brake on popular democracy. From China's point of view, if Britain and
France are defeated, China will have no choice but to come under the control
ofJapan and Russia; ifBritain and France win, the Fascist movement through-
out the world will collapse. Naturally, victory for Britain and France will lead
to the restoration of the old East-West order, and it is easy to imagine its
impact on China's domestic politics. [But] is there some better, more beautiful
dream that we can dream? In the past, the Third International's slogan
nationally was for a "people's front", whereas internationally it was for "peace
fronts"; it rarely called for a "democratic front", and even ifCommunist parties
in some countries had raised such a [democratic] slogan, I could not but
consider it improper, for the Soviet Union itself was not democratic and the
democratic countries themselves had not yet expressed their readiness to fight
against Hitler in a decisive war - at that time, to raise the [slogan ofa] demo-
cratic front as a gift with which to court the favours ofBritain and the USA
would simply be to play the role ofa brake on the massive popular struggles
in those democratic countries. It would have been just as wrong as the policy
ofrejecting the democratic front now, when all the democratic countries have
already opened fire against Hitler. Supporting democracy now cannot be
equated with supporting democracy in the last world war, for in those days
there was no Fascist problem. I have explained this in detail above [in this
letter], and the rest I explained, also in detail, in my last letter to you, you can
consult it. Please send this letter to XX and the previous letter to Old X, so
that I don't have to repeat myself in a new letter. You and I realised many
years ago that the dead dogs are arch-criminals on a world scale (this time my
opinions on these questions are not as OX56 said, they are not emotional and
55. This is most probably a reference to those ofChen's old comrades who doubted the validity
of the constituent assembly slogan before they decided to accept Trotskyism.
56. XX is probably Wang Fanxi; Old X is probably Zhao Ji. Chen usually got Pu Dezhi (Xiliu)
58 Documents
ill-considered), whoever overthrew such people, we would endorse. Have
you forgotten so quickly what we agreed?57 Today I say in all frankness: I will
kowtow before whoever overthrows the dead dogs and Hitler, I will willingly
be their slave....
to copy to Wang Fanxi Chen's letters to Pu. It is not clear who OX is; it too may be a reference
to Wang Fanxi.
57. In prison, Chen Duxiu had at first shared his cell with Peng Shuzhi, but after he broke off
his relations with Peng, the prison authorities gave special pennission to Pu Dezhi and Luo Shitm
(also prisoners) to spend two days a week in the same ward as Chen, so that these two younger
men could look after their elderly comrade. In prison, Chen convinced Pu of his opinion on
the question ofdemocracy, but after his release Pu was persuaded by the views ofWang Fanxi.
c
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LETTER TO LIANGEN58
59
Here, Chen states his theory that though over time democracy undergoes important
changes, such changes are unlike those in the economic system, in that they concern
not the fundamental content ofdemocracy but only the extent of its realisation.
Chen criticises Lenin and Trotsky for dismissing bourgeois democracy as a mere
form eifbourgeois political control andfor counterposing it to proletarian democracy;
and thus for paving the way not only for Stalinist dictatorship but also for the
Fascists, who copied the Bolshevik example. He sketches an economic theory eif
Fascism in an attempt to explain the nature ofits political system. Chen's difCnce
eif bourgeois democracy is not an end in itself but an intermediate stage - made
necessary by the ubiquitous crosscurrent eifdictatorship - in the strugglefor a more
extensive democracy.
.... I have seen that you [and other friends in Shanghai] unanimously [disagree
with my views], so in spite ofmy illness, I shall make a briefreply to you. The
roots ofyour error are as follows. First, you fail (like Lenin and Trotsky) to
understand the true value ofbourgeois democracy. You see democracy simply
as a mode ofbouigeois rule, as hypocrisy, as deception. You fail to understand
democracy's true content, which is: no institution apart from the courts has
the right of arrest; there may be no taxation without representation; the
government has no right to levy taxes unless they are agreed by parliament;
opposition parties are free to organise, speak, and publish; workers have the
right to strike; peasants have the right to till the land; there is freedom of
thought and worship; and so on. These rights and freedoms are what the
people wanted; they are the "bourgeois democracy" that people today enjoy
as a result ofmore than seven hundred years ofbloody struggle, they are what
Russia, Italy, and Germany want to overthrow. The only difference between
"proletarian democracy" and bourgeois democracy is in the extent of its
realisation; it is not that proletarian democracy has a different content. Ever
since October [1917], the vacant and abstract term "proletarian democracy"
has been used as a weapon to destroy actual bourgeois democracy, and it led
to the emergence oftoday's Soviet Union under Stalin - Italy and Germany
are only following suit. Now you too are employing this hollow phrase as a
58. Source: Zhuanji wenxue zazhi she, eds, Shi'an zizhuan, pp. 68-71.
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weapon with which to attack the bourgeois democracies of Britain and
America on Hitler's behalf Second, you fail to understand the different class
functions ofFascism and ofthe British, US, and French imperialists. (Imperial-
ism is the product ofan alliance between the financial oligarchy and the middle
classes; only up to a certain point does it tolerate the proletariat's organisation
and propaganda. Fascism is the fusion of the financial oligarchy with the
lumpenproletariat and the radical right-wing ofthe petty bourgeoisie; it wholly
eradicates the proletariat's organisation and propaganda.) You fail to see that
the economic system ofFascism, unlike that ofBritish and American imperial-
ism, rather than becoming with each passing day more and more international,
has reverted to becoming more and more national, to a process of self-con-
tained and self-supporting feudalisation; instead you think that the only
difference is in the political system. Political systems are propelled by class-
based economic motors, they're not bom ofnothing. Even ifwe only consider
the. political system as an abstraction, is the difference between the German,
Italian, and Russian GPU system and the British, American, and French
parliamentary system merely tiny? Third, you fail to understand the importance
of "intermediate struggles". Ifwe have our eyes only on the final battle and
argue that Fascism can be destroyed forever only in the course of that last
battle, that only then can the problem be resolved, then there is no point in
intermediate struggles such as the anti-Fascist movement, the strike movement,
the movement for the convocation ofa national assembly, and so on. Instead,
we can sit back and wait for the final struggle to drop from the sky. And
there's a fourth point. It is an utter illusion and sheer fantasy to assume that
after the defeat of Britain and France a revolution will arise to overthrow
bourgeois rule everywhere. (I refer you to my letter to XX.)59 These four
errors are all founded in one general error, which can be summed up as
"Closing your eyes to the actual course ofhistorical events, blindly resorting
to abstract formulae." Even the formulae ofthe natural sciences can sometimes
be demolished: those of the social sciences are far more fragile. History does
not repeat itself To consider old prescriptions as a sort ofpanacea and to apply
them to the complex and increasingly volatile events oftoday is like matching
horses' jaws to cows' heads.
Since the start ofthe war, Xinhua ribao in Chongqing has made a great point
on the basis ofLenin's theories about the last war ofdenouncing the hypocrisy
of the democratic states of the British and French bourgeoisies, of opposing
59. XX is probably Xiliu.
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inter-imperialist wars, and of labelling both sides as aggressive bandits; but
between the lines, it actually sides with Hitler. I have carefully studied your
letter and come to the conclusion that it is identical with what the dead dogs
are saying, not merely in its ideas but in its very words and phrases. Recently
I read the pamphlet Poxiao ["Daybreak"],60 which is of course based on the
thinking ofLeon Trotsky. It goes so far as to let Fascism off completely and
to concentrate its attack exclusively on Britain and America. Moreover, it
defends the Soviet attack on Finland.61 Voluntarily to make propaganda ofthis
sort for Stalin and Hitler is surely a clear enough statement ofposition. Having
taken such a position, how can you still claim that you are supporting neither
side? Ifyou join together the three political positions of "oppose the demo-
cratic states ofBritain and America", "don't attack Fascism", and "support the
Soviet Union", there is no reason why the Third International and the Fourth
should not merge. So from now on, your further opposition to Stalin will
simply be a contest for position between individuals; it will not involve
political principle. Apart from organs ofstate rule such as the army, the police,
and the courts, which are in Stalin's hands, is there some other Soviet Union
suspended in mid-air that we can support? If there is no prospect of you
changing your opinions, it is only a matter of time before you compromise
with the dead dogs. And if, in accordance with your wishes (at least as
expressed by the writer in Daybreak), the democratic states (including America)
are defeated and Trotsky can no longer stay in Mexico, it is hard to see any
way out for you other than coming to terms with the dead dogs!
July 31,1940.
P. S. I'd like you to answer two questions:
(1) How can the revolutionary parties in Britain and France under the
menace of Nazism assemble forces more easily: by employing slogans against
Nazism, or by employing slogans against their own governments?
(2) If a democratic force in Germany were to start a civil war against the
Nazis, would you propose overthrowing both it and the Nazis simultaneously
or would you ally with the Nazis to overthrow the democrats? Or would you
(like Yi Yin62) propose cold-shouldering both camps?
60: Published in October 1939. See Wang Fan-hsi, Memoirs, p. 230.
61. On November 30,1939, Soviet troops attacked Finland. On March 6,1940, Finland sued
for peace, and admitted Soviet garrisons onto its territory.
62. A pen-name of Zheng Chaolin.
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LETTER TO XILIU63
This letter argues that there will be no revolutions after the war, mainly because
ifthe destructive dfect ifStalinism on the world workers' movement and the likely
countermeasures ifthe bourgeoisie, which would sooner surrender power to ftreign
capitalists than to domestic revolutionaries; and that a de.featist policy in the
bourgeois-democratic countries can only help the Nazis. Chen expounds at greater
length his theory ifdemocracy, which - he explains - cannot be reduced to. the
mere existence ifa parliament; indeed, the history ifhumankind can be viewed
as the history - still in progress - ifdemocratisation, whose ultimate produd will
be not the class-based democracy if the bourgeoisie but mass democracy, i.e.,full
democracy, a concept apparently coterminousfor Chen with proletarian democracy.
The Bolsheviks'failure to understand and appreciate the rich content ifdemocracy
has led them to slight democracy and even to reject it root and branch. Their
attitude led ultimately to Stalin, who is aproduct, not the initiator, ofthe Stalinist
system. Chen goes on to reject the orthodox Trotskyist view ofthe Soviet Union
as a workers' state, albeit degenerated and bureaucratised, that revolutionaries must
support against the bourgeois states. (Chen hadfirst questioned in a letter dated
May 15, 1934, to the International Secretariat ifthe Left Opposition the theory
that the Soviet Union was a workers' state. 64) Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini are
the three main bulwarks ifreaction, to the destruction ifwhich all efforts should
be bent. And the best prospect for proletarian revolution lies in the de.feat if
Germany, though even there liberal forces will rise bifore socialist ones.
Dear Xiliu,
I enclosed with yesterday's letter a letter from [Zheng] Chaolin; I trust you've
already received it. I received your letter ofJuly 21 and that ofShouyi,65 and
I have read them both, but ill health prevented me from replying to them, and
still does. (It took me more than twenty days to finish the present letter; as you
63. Source: Zhuanji wenxue zazhi she, eds, Shi'an zizhuan, pp. 72-81.
64. See Chen's letter of May is, 1934, to the International Secretariat, kept in Stanford
University's Hoover Institution under the Subject File "International Left Opposition and the
Fourth International".
65. A pen-name ofWang Fanxi.
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can imagine, I'm not in the best ofspirits.) Please don't misinterpret my failure
to reply.
Your letter says: "His [Shouyi's] understanding ofdemocracy and his view
ofthe world situation is too optimistic, I'm afraid he's somewhat naive." Our
discussion revolves precisely around the following two questions. (1) Mter the
war, will there be a revolution in the defeated countries? (2) Should we
support democracy? You call him naive (actually, it's reactionary) on the one
hand and still claim that he's right on the other. Do you yourself realise that
your position is self-contradictory?
Regarding the first question, all I can do is answer no, especially where
Britain and America are concerned. On this point, [He] Zishen and Xizhi66
have insisted even more vigorously than I that there will be no revolutionary
situation in Britain and France, and for the following reasons. (1) The revolu-
tionary forces in these countries have already been eradicated by Stalin. (2)
The bourgeoisie in these countries has experienced [the revolutions of] 1871
and 1917; so in the event of defeat, they would sooner hand over their
weapons to the foreign enemy than allow an internal enemy to profit from
them. (3) Germany's armaments, military tactics, and methods of rule in the
occupied territories are different from those used in 1871 [in the Franco-
Prussian War] and in 1917. If the British and French governments fall,67 for
a while there is no possibility of sudden mutinies. (4) Germany has not yet
achieved world hegemony; once Germany is defeated, the war will be over.
If the Nazis fall, they are unlikely to be succeeded by another Fascist state.
(The situation in Britain and France would be quite different.) When the time
comes, the Social Democratic Party and the other liberal parties can raise their
heads again; although such a tum could only benefit the emergence of a
revolutionary movement, one could hardly say that Hitler's downfall would
lead immediately to a revolution in Germany, since there is no revolutionary
party there. For these reasons, our old formula about "revolutions breaking
out in the defeated countries in the wake of an imperialist war" has been
invalidated. Only those who cling to shibboleths and close their eyes to the
course ofhistory can dream of 1917 and claim that this war is a repeat perfor-
mance of the last one. Since there is no prospect of revolution in Britain or
France, what (other than helping Hitler win the war) is the point ofadopting
66. The pseudonym ofWuJiyan (WU Chi-yen) (1898-1940), a returned student from Moscow
and nephew of Chen Duxiu. Wu became a Trotskyist in 1929.
67. The French government had already fallen by this time.
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a defeatist position in those countries? History does not repeat itself, but
human error does. We used to think that the Bruning cabinet and Hider were
identical, and in so doing we helped the Nazis into power; today we equate
German Nazism and British and French democracy and have helped Hider
to subdue France, with its democratic traditions. I can argue further that if
people continue to despise democracy and worship dictatorship, then, as
Shouyi says, "Regardless of good and bad, humankind can choose only
between Fascist dictatorship and socialist dictatorship." In other words, the
only choice is between the political system ofRussia and that of Germany:
which means that even if the defeat ofBritain and France provoked a revolu-
tion, it would, like a victory for Hider, have the effect only of plunging the
world even deeper into darkness and degeneracy. One GPU-style Soviet
Russia is enough to stifle people: could you endure a whole series of new
GPU states in France, America, and Britain? So we had better have a consid-
ered debate about the second question, which is (as Shouyi put it): "The main
difference between us concerns democracy."
Regarding this second question, for the last six or seven years I have deeply
pondered the experience of Soviet Russia over the last two decades before
arriving at my present views. (1) Without a state in which the broad masses
of the people participate there can be no broad democracy: in the absence of
broad democracy, so-called popular state power or proletarian dictatorship will
inevitably drift toward a Stalin-style GPU system controlled by a tiny minority
ofpeople. Such a system is the necessary outcome ofsuch a situation; it is not
because Stalin is particularly vicious. (2) To replace bourgeois democracy with
a state in which the broad masses of the people participate is to go forward;
to replace British, French, or American democracy with German or Russian
dictatorship is to go backward. Those who (direcdy or indirecdy, knowingly
or unknowingly) assist in a retrogression are reactionary, however left-wing
they may sound. (3) Democracy is not merely an abstract term: it has a specific
content. The content of proletarian democracy is broadly similar to that of
bourgeois democracy; the only difference is that it is broader in the scope of
its implementation. (See my previous letter and the diagram in the latter part
of this letter.) (4) Though the content ofdemocracy includes the parliamentary
system, such a system does not exhaust democracy's content. Many people
have for years equated democracy with a parliamentary system, and in rejecting
the one have also rejected the other; precisely this is the chief cause of the
degeneration of Soviet Russia. Parliamentarism can expire, it can become a
<
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relic ofthe past, but the same is not true ofdemocracy; a soviet system without
democratic content remains a representative system that is democratic in form
only or even resembles the soviets in Russia; it will be inferior even to
bourgeois formal democracy. (5) Democracy is the standard beneath which
the oppressed peoples ofevery age - in ancient Greece and Rome, now and
tomorrow - resist the minority privileged class, it is not merely an historical
phenomenon bound to a particular age, a mere form of bourgeois rule
belonging to a period now past. If democratism is already past its time, gone
never to return, then politics and the state too are already past their time,
already dead and buried. To say that democracy is but a form of bourgeois
rule while the sole form of proletarian state power is dictatorship and can
under no circumstances be democratic is to justify Stalin's crimes and to render
superfluous Lenin's description ofdemocracy as "an antitoxin to bureaucracy".
Leon Trotsky's call to struggle for the restoration ofdemocracy in the soviets,
the trade unions, and the party also becomes a cry for the return of the past,
a call for common people to shed blood for ghosts. To say that proletarian
democracy and bourgeois democracy are different is to fail to grasp democ-
racy's basic content (habeus corpus, the open existence of an opposition,
freedom of thought and of the press, the right to strike and to vote, etc.),
which is the same whether it be proletarian or bourgeois. To say that there
is no relationship between Stalin's crimes and the system of proletarian
dictatorship is tantamount to saying that those crimes are not the product of
violations committed ever since October (these violations of democracy did
not start with Stalin) against the basic content of democracy by the Soviet
Union, but are the product instead of Stalin's viciousness - a wholly idealist
explanation. Stalin's crimes are a logical development of proletarian dictator-
ship. Are they not also the product of the power that has accrued since
October to the secret police, and ofa whole series ofanti-democratic dictator-
ships that forbid parties, factions, freedom of thought and of the press, and
freedom to strike and vote? Unless such democratic freedoms are restored,
anyone who succeeds Stalin could become "grand dictator". So to ascribe to
Stalin all the Soviet Union's evils rather than trace their source to the harmful
nature of the Soviet dictatorship is tantamount to saying that by toppling Stalin
all the Soviet Union's wrongs would be righted. Such prejudices, which
fetishise the individual and neglect the system, are unworthy of any fair-
minded politician. The experience of the Soviet Union over the last twenty
and particularly the last ten years should cause us to reflect. If we fail to trace
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the origin ofsuch defects to the system and to draw the appropriate lessons,
ifwe simply screw up our eyes and oppose Stalin, we will never see the truth.
With one Stalin gone, innumerable other Stalins will spring to life in Russia
and other countries. In Soviet Russia after October, it was clearly the dictator-
ship that produced Stalin rather than the other way round. If we take the
position that bourgeois democracy has already reached the point at which its
social momentum is spent, that there is no longer any need to struggle for
democracy, then we are saying that the proletarian state has no need for
democracy, a point ofview that spells ruin for all times! (6) The content of
modern democracy is far richer than that ofdemocracy in ancient Greece and
Rome, its reach far wider. Because the modern age is the age of bourgeois
rule, we call this democracy bourgeois. In reality, however, this system is not
wholly welcome to the bourgeoisie, but is the accomplishment of the tens of
millions ofcommon people who over the last five to six hundred years have
spilt their blood in struggle. Science, modern democracy, and socialism are
three main inventions, precious beyond measure, of the genius of modern
humankind; unfortunately, since the October Revolution democracy has been
rejected together with bourgeois rule; dictatorship has been substituted for
democracy, the basic content ofdemocracy has been repudiated, and so-called
"proletarian democracy" or "mass democracy" is nothing more than verbiage
void ofall real content, false colours under which to resist bourgeois democ-
racy. Having seized state power, the proletariat will have at its disposal large-
scale nationalised industry, armed forces, police, courts, and a soviet electoral
law. With such useful weapons to hand, it will be strong enough to suppress
bourgeois counterrevolution and will have no need to substitute dictatorship
for democracy. Dictatorship is just a sharp knife, what it today does to its
enemies it will tomorrow do to itself Lenin in his time was aware that
democracy is "an antitoxin to bureaucracy" but did not conscientiously apply
democratic norms, for example by abolishing the secret police, tolerating the
open existence of opposition parties, and allowing people to think, publish,
strike, and vote freely. Leon Trotsky only discovered after personally experi-
encing the dictator's knife that the party, the trade unions, and the soviets at
all levels need democracy and free elections, but by then it was too late! The
rest of the Bolsheviks, more ignorant, lauded dictatorship even more higWy
and cursed democracy as worse than dogshit. This preposterous idea swept
the world in the wake ofthe authority ofthe October Revolution. Mussolini
was the first to apply it and next came Hitler, while in the land of its birth -
..
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the Soviet Union - the dictatorship was intensified and all manner of crimes
were committed, whereupon the hangers-on and their spawn of the cult of
dictatorship spread across the entire planet, particularly in Europe, so that today
three of the five powers are dictatorships. (So it's untrue that the East needs
democracy whereas the West doesn't.) The first is Moscow, the second is
Berlin, and the third is Rome. 68 These three bulwarks ofreaction have turned
the present into a new middle ages, and they now plan to tum thinking
humans into unthinking mechanical beasts of burden who jump to the
dictators' whip; ifhumankind is powerless to overthrow these three bulwarks
of reaction, its fate is clear. So today all struggles throughout the world will
have meaning only ifthey unite to overthrow these three bulwarks ofreaction;
otherwise, whatever sonorous names they may go under (proletarian revolu-
tion, national revolution), from an objective point ofview they will unwit-
tingly help to consolidate and extend the power of the three bulwarks. Ifwe
recognise that the overthrow of these bulwarks is the main objective, first we
must concede that even the imperfect democracy of Britain, France, and
America is worth defending; second, we must repudiate the bankrupt theory
ofLiu Renjing,69 which holds that whatever the time and whatever the event,
the proletariat cannot act joindy with other classes. This theory clearly could
not be applied at the time of [Chiang Kai-shek's] Northern Expedition [of
1926-1927], nor can it be applied in the War of Resistance against Japan or
in today's world war; if applied, it could only playa reactionary role. [Chen
Qi]chang says: "Today, in the midst ofwar, the obvious distinction between
democracy and Fascism has been lost, or is about to be lost." I find this
sentence really baffiing! (1) From the point ofview ofthe political system, the
absolute distinction between democracy and Fascism will persist forever. (2)
If the author means by this statement that democracy in Britain, France, and
America is turning more and more into Fascism, then even if that opinion
were true, it would be absolutely wrong to take it as a reason to welcome
dictatorship and oppose democracy. (3) If Britain, France, and America go
Fascist, it will be partly because the Third International and the Fourth
68. Chen forgot to name Japan among the dictatorships.
69. Liu Renjing (LiuJen-ching) (1902-1987), a founding member ofthe Chinese Communist
Party and General Secretary of the Socialist League ofYouth, joined the Left Opposition in
Moscow and visited Trotsky in Prinkipo, Turkey, in 1929. After returning to China, he played
a part in organising the first groups of Chinese Trotskyists, and helped Harold Isaacs write his
book The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. He was arrested in 1934, and recanted in prison.
Mter 1949, he recanted again, this time to the Maoists. He died in a car accident in 1987.
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International helped Hider achieve complete victory: Hider's army will bring
Fascism to whichever territories it conquers; but for that army, the democratic
traditions ofBritain, France, and America could not so easily be crushed. To
equate the wartime strengthening of the cabinet with going Fascist is to fail
to understand the first thing about Fascism. (4) I would ask those people who
believe that the distinction between the democratic countries and Fascism has
already been lost to open their eyes and look at this table of comparisons.
(i) Democracy in Britain, America, and Pre-War France.
(ii) Fascism in Russia, Germany, and Italy. (The political system ofSoviet Russia
was the model for Germany and Italy, so these three countries can be
classified together.)
A (i) Parliamentary elections are contested by all parties (including opposition
parties). Though each constituency is monopolised by a [particular] party,
each party must publish an election programme and make election addresses
in order to cater to the people's demands, for the electorate is, through
suffrage, the final arbiter. Meetings are attended by lively discussion and
debate.
A (ii) Elections to the soviets or to the national assembly are fixed by the govern-
ment party. These bodies meet simply to raise their hands in assent, not to
debate.
B (i) No one may be deprived ofliberty or life without first being brought before
a court.
B (ii) The secret police may arrest and kill people at will.
C (i) Opposition parties, even the Communist Party, are openly permitted.
C (ii) The one-party state permits the existence of no other party.
D (i) People are more or less free to think, say, and publish what they want.
D (ii) There is an absolute prohibition on freedom of thought, speech, and the
press.
E (i) To strike is not in itself a crime.
E (ii) Strikes are outlawed, i.e., criminal.
c
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Judging from this table, tell me when in Britain and America the distinction
between the two systems was lost? And as for France, why was it lost? What
Communist, having studied this table, is still prepared to condemn bourgeois
democracy? Surely the age ofreligious superstition is of the past and it is time
we came to our senses! If, in the future, revolutionaries continue to believe
that "democracy belongs to the past; proletarian state power can take the form
only ofa dictatorship, never that ofa democracy", they will merely allow the
GPU to trample underfoot the whole ofhumankind; moreover, since such
a revolution cannot break out after the defeat ofBritain and France, in whose
ultimate interest is your proposal to adopt a defeatist slogan in those countries?
Stalin's first ingenious move was to replace the slogan against Fascism with
one against imperialism; his second step was to launch a sneak attack on
Britain, France, and America in order to defend Fascism. You are going the
same way: your second step is quite clear from Daybreak and from Shouyi's
letter to me] Shouyi and his friends' attitude toward the world war is based
on their view of the nature of the Soviet Union70 and their attitude to
democracy. My opinion is in all respects the opposite. Both positions are
consistent. You, on the other hand, agree with Shouyi only in respect ofyour
attitude to the world war; your attitude to the Soviet Union and democracy
is apparendy still close to mine, which I find truly incomprehensible. Please
copy this letter to Zhao Oil and to Shouyi and the others. I hope that you will
return to me the original, together with my earlier letters, for I plan at some
future date to publish them. I enclose [Chen Qi]chang's letter. Greetings and
good health,
Zhong
(September 1940)
70.. I.e., that although it was degenerate and bureaucratised, it was still fundamentally a workers'
state, in the sense that the legacy ofthe October Revolution had not been completely squandered
and that the state that had resulted from it could still either go forward to real socialism by means
ofa political revolution or backward to the restoration of capitalism; and that it must therefore
be defended against the bourgeois states.
- J2 ikE2L2kS&
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My BASIC VIEWS71
This article summarises in thesisJorm the positions that Chen developed in his
letters and articles bifore and qfter leaving prison: that the revolution is nowhere
imminent; that war will merely simplify the structure if imperialism, not destroy
it; that the bourgeoisie still has some progressive role to play; that Bolshevism has
paved the wayJor Stalinism; that democracy is a universal mode ojpolitics; and
that the dictatorship ojthe proletariat is equal to the dictatorship ojthe Communist
Party. Proletarian dictatorship is the very opposite ojproletarian democracy, and
thus oJsocialism, which is the economic complement ifJuli democracy. Capitalism,
in contrast, is the economic complement oj limited, i.e., bourgeois, democracy.
Chen adds that colonial peoples cannot hope to win national liberation in the
~bsence ifsocial revolutions in the metropolitan countries.
(1) Revolutionary situations do not arise at any time and any place. It is
preposterous to talk ofa period ofreaction as ifit were one ofrevolution; i.e.,
to pretend that the ruling class is on the road to collapse when it is on the road
to stabilisation after winning victory; to pretend that the middle classes are
beginning to vacillate in their support for the ruling class when in reality they
are vacillating in their support for the revolution, and starting to abandon its
ranks; and to pretend that the revolutionary mood is rising when it has sunk
into depression in the wake ofa defeat. We must forget this nonsense about
"the poorer people are, the more revolutionary they become". True, the law
ofphysics that "every force has a reaction that is equal and opposite to it" can
also be applied to society, but only on condition that the oppressed are
sufficiently resilient.
(2) The proletarian masses are not at all times disposed to revolution,
especially not in the wake ofcrushing defeats or at times ofsocial or economic
catastrophe.
(3) Without the numerical strength to match its social importance and
without economic and political organisation, the proletariat is not so very
different from other strata of the people. In particular the experience over the
71. Source: Zhuanji wenxue zazhi she, eds, Shi'an zizhuan, pp. 82-88.
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last dozen or so years ofbureaucratic rule in Soviet Russia and the experience
of the Sino-Japanese War and of the present imperialist world war should
caution us against overestimating the present strength ofthe proletariat in the
world and lighdy predicting the "imminent end ofcapitalism". Unless some
world-shaking force intervenes, this world war will under no circumstances
mark the end of capitalism and imperialism but will mark instead the second
stage of its development, namely, from a plurality of imperialist states to the
beginnings of a simple opposition between two imperialist blocs.
(4) We should stricdy distinguish between the arbitrary"concentration" and
"unity" of the petty bourgeoisie and the voluntary "concentration" and
"unity" of the proletariat.
(5) We should stricdy distinguish between the empty radicalism ofthe petit
bourgeoisie and the straightforward determination of the proletariat.
(6) Now is definitely not the day ofthe final struggle, either in the backward
countries or in the advanced countries ofEurope and America. Those who
arbitrarily proclaim that the bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie are no longer
in the slightest way progressive and have already absconded lock, stock, and
barrel to the camp of reaction will simply capitulate in confusion when it
becomes apparent that the bourgeois classes are still capable of playing a
progressive role.
(7) We must grasp without prejudice the lessons ofthe last two decades and
more ofSoviet Russia. We must reevaluate in a spirit ofscientific detachment,
free from all religious passion, the Bolsheviks' theories and their qualities as
leaders. It is quite wrong to blame every crime on Stalin, for example in
relation to the question of democracy under the proletarian state.
(8) Democracy is the banner under which in every age, ever since humans
first developed political organisation, right down until the withering away of
politics (in Greece, in Rome, today, tomorrow), the majority class opposes
the privileges of the minority. "Proletarian democracy" is no empty phrase.
Its specific content, like that of bourgeois democracy, demands for every
citizen the freedom to assemble, form associations, speak, publish, and strike;
and above all the freedom to form a party of opposition. Without such
freedoms, neither parliament nor soviet is worth a fig.
(9) Democracy (from a political point of view) and socialism (from an
economic point ofview) are complements and not opposites. Democracy is
not indissolubly bound to capitalism and the bourgeoisie. If, in opposing the
bourgeoisie and capitalism, the political party of the proletariat opposes
LiKbE
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democracy as well, then even if so-called "proletarian revolution" were to
break out in a number ofcountries, without democracy to act as an antitoxin
to bureaucracy, they will be nothing more than Stalin-style bureaucratic states,
brutal, corrupt, hypocritical, fraudulent, rotten, degenerate, and incapable of
engendering any form of socialism. There is no such thing as "proletarian
dictatorship" but only dictatorship of the party, which ends up as dictatorship
of the leaders. All dictatorships are inseparable from brutality, fraudulence,
corruption, and bureaucratic politics.
(10) Yes, the present world war is a war for world hegemony between two
imperialist blocs. Yes, the so-called "war for democracy and freedom" is a
facade. That does not mean, however, that there is not still a certain measure
of democracy and freedom in Britain and America. In those two countries
opposition parties, trade unions, and strikes are a reality and not a mere
promise. Only a lackey of the Nazi fifth column would argue otherwise. It
is even more unthinkable that America would use against the Isolationists72
methods like those used by the Nazis against the Jews. Hitler's Nazis are out
to rule the world with the same barbaric and reactionary methods with which
they now rule Germany. In other words, they aim by means of a new and
even more terrible Inquisition to impose everywhere one doctrine, one party,
and one leader. They will not permit the slightest dissent, not even the
existence of indigenous Nazi or Fascist movements in the countries they
conquer. A Hitlerite victory will mean the stifling of all humankind, it will
transform humans everywhere from thinking people endowed with free
consciousness into unthinking mechanical beasts of burden void of free
consciousness; so ever since the start of this world war and in future, too,
progressive people of good intent in every country (including, of course,
Germany) should make the destruction of Hitler's Nazis the general goal of
a common offensive of all peoples; all other battles can only be deemed
progressive insofar as they serve that general end. For once Hitler's Nazis win,
all talk ofsocialism, democracy, and national liberation will be meaningless.
(11) In the present imperialist world war, to adopt a defeatist line in the
democratic countries, a policy ofturning the imperialist war into a revolution-
ary civil war, may sound left-wing but in reality it can only speed the Nazis'
victory. For example, if the British government were toppled in a revolution
by its own people, the British army, navy, and airforce would inevitably split
72. The Isolationists were Americans opposed to the US playing a central role in world politics;
they believed that US resources could be better spent on solving domestic problems.
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and become enfeebled, and the new revolutionary government would be in
no position to nurture strong forces quickly enough to prevent a Nazi invasion
ofEngland. (Some people might object that "the defeat ofone's own imperial-
ist government is a lesser evil", in which case the Czechs and the French are
indeed fortunate to be under Nazi occupation!) Ifyou neglect the time factor,
what might under other circumstances be true becomes preposterous. People
righdy observe that the Sino-Japanese War has changed in nature as a result
of the imperialist world war, but even so it would be wrong because of that
to propose a defeatist policy in China and to work for the destruction of
(Chiang Kai-shek's] Chongqing government. Under the conditions oftoday,
such a policy would only hasten the victory of the Axis?3 - any other view
is an illusion. For the same reason, we don't propose adopting a defeatist
position in the Soviet Union, even though we have no reason to think that
in the matter ofhuman freedom Stalin's followers are any better than Hider's.
(12) There is no reason to believe that preparing the revolution, i.e., uniting
the masses, would be even more difficult in a state endowed with a certain
measure of democracy than under the centralised rule of the Nazis; or that a
Nazi victory would be more useful to the German revolutionary movement
than a Nazi defeat. No one can foresee how long Nazi hegemony will last in
Europe. To predict the inevitable collapse ofNazism in the wake ofits victory
and to use such a prediction as a justification for helping Hider win whatever
the cost in human sacrifice is a strategy of farce. It is on the same level as
Stalin's policy at the time ofthe German coup of "letting Hider take power",
"he will soon lose power". In today's Europe, as in China during the Warring
States period [475-221 Be] and Europe at the start of the modem era,
economic development requires unity, and since there is no revolutionary
unity, objective conditions may allow the Nazis to realise their reactionary
unity. But such reactionary unity will not be able to shake off capitalism's
economic constraints on productivity (the system of private property) in the
way that feudal constraints on productivity (serfdom and the guild system)
were shaken offduring Europe's monarchical period; it will lack this progres-
sive function. From a political point ofview, the destruction of democracy
and the restoration (for however short a time) of medieval reaction will be
a terrible disaster for humankind and an incalculable loss.
73. In September 1940, Germany, Italy, and]apan signed the Tripartite Pact, which brought
the Axis into being; the signatories promised to go to war against any nation attacking one of
their number, save those already at war when the pact was signed.
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(13) Only in countries inclined toward progress are war and revolution the
product of the development ofproduction and can become in their tum a
cause ofits further development; in declining countries, war and revolution
weaken production even further, cause the national character and morals to
become even more degenerate, grotesque, corrupt, wasteful, and unjust, and
tum the political system into a reactionary military dictatorship.
(14) Only when two nations are equal in respect ofweaponry and military
techniques do the number ofthe armed forces, the degree ofpopular support,
and the morale ofthe combatants count decisively toward who wins and who
loses an international war. Even in civil wars the invention in the nineteenth
century ofnew weapons obliged Engels to take a second look at the value of
barricade fighting;74 the invention of new weapons and techniques in the
twentieth century will reduce even further the possibility ofmass risings and
barricades, unless splits occur in the ruling camp.
(15) Colonies or semi-colonies are a sine qua non of imperialism, as private
ownership ofproperty is of capitalism. It would be illusory to think that the
system ofprivate ownership ofproperty will collapse without the collapse of
capitalism, just as it would be illusory to expect the war for national independ-
ence in the colonies to win victory without first linking up with social
revolution in the imperialist countries (the metropolitan states and their
enemies). Today, with the Anglo-American and the German imperialists
locked in a struggle to enslave the entire planet, an isolated national [liberation]
war, no matter which class leads it, will either collapse altogether or will simply
work a change (possibly for the worse) of master; even were the oppressed
people to acquire a more enlightened master, one prepared to help stimulate
political and economic development, it would work no fundamental change
in its original slave status as a colony or semi-colony.
November 28, 1940
74. In his preface to the new Gennan edition, published in 1895, ofKarl Marx, The Class Strnggles
in Frana, Engels noted that after 1848, "rebellion in the old style, the street fight with barricades,
which up to 1848 gave everywhere the final decision, was to a considerable extent obsolete".
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In this letter, Chen seems to wish to reassure He Zhiyu that his letter to Hu
Qiuyuan and Sun ]iyi (the next text in this volume) did not represent a break
with Marxism.
Dear Y,
I enclose my letter to Hand S,76 please forward it when you next correspond
with them.... H and his ilk hope that I will quit the Marxist fold (so does Tao
Menghe77), there's nothing strange about that, it's what they've always wished
for. Our best policy is to discuss real issues (both historical and contemporary)
with them so that they have no refuge. In order to avoid possible confusion,
it's best not to enter the sphere of abstract theories and isms. Tao Menghe
understood it rather well, while [Deng] Zhongchun78 simply misunderstood....
I hope you are in good health.
Duxiu
January 19 [1941]
75. Source: Shui Ru, ed. Chen Duxiu shuxin ji, p. 513. This letter is not included in the Free
China Press edition or in the Taiwan edition published by Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe. Y is
He Zhiyu.
76. See the next letter.
77. Tao Menghe (Tao Meng-ho) was a non-Marxist professor ofsociology at Beijing University
and a contributor to Chen Duxiu's Xin qingnian ("New Youth").
78. Deng Zhongchun, a medical doctor, was one ofChen's non-political admirers; Deng helped
Chen greatly after Chen had moved to Jiangjin.
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LETTER TO HAND S79
In this letter, Chen infOrms his non-Trotskyist friends ifhis new view ofLenin
and Trotsky, and appears to abandon Marxist theory for a pragmatic approach
to political questions. See too his letter (not included in this volume) ifDecember
23, 1941, to Zheng Xuejia, aformer Trotskyist sympathiser who had later
become associated with the Guomindang, in which he rejects Marxism as irrelevant
not only to China but even to Russia and Western Europe. On the whole,
however, hisfinal views are not irreconcilable with Marxism as Karl Kautsky and
others understood it. 80
Dear Messrs Hand S,
Three years have passed since I and Mr H parted, and it is more than twenty
years since I last saw Mr S. When I think back on my Beijing days [spent with
Mr S], I cannot but feel nostalgic.
I have seen your letters to Y and your comments on my latest works, I thank
you warmly for them. In formulating my opinions, I prefer to base myself on
the historical and contemporary process ofevents rather than on vacuous isms,
and I am even more loath to quote as a foundation for my thinking what
others may have said in the past. This method of "measuring by saints'
words"81 is a weapon drawn from the armoury of religion, not of science.
In "My Basic Views", which I completed recently, I have also avoided
bringing in any sort ofism. My seventh thesis [in that essay] proposes reevalu-
79. Source: Zhuanji wenxue zazhi she, eds, Shi'an zizhuan, pp. 89-90. Hand S are Hu Qiuyuan
and Sun Jiyi. Hu Qiuyuan was among the Chinese students who returned to China sometime
in the early to mid-1930s, after studying in Japan. The majority of these returned students
supported the Chinese Communist Party, but a few (notably Hu and Zheng Xuejia) showed
some sympathy for Trotskyism and borrowed weapons from the Trotskyist armoury to attack
the Chinese Stalinists. The leaders ofthe Communist Party were extremely hostile to Hu, Zheng,
and the other members of their group, and attacked them in an effort to discredit Chen Duxiu
and the real Trotskyists. Hu and his mends very quickly became associated with the Guomindang.
Hu earned his living by writing for the Shenzhou Publishing Company.
80. For Chen's letter to Zheng Xuejia, see RenJianshu and Tang Baolin, Chen Duxiu zhuan,
vol. 2" p. 286.
81. A Buddhist term, meaning to take saints' words as the sole judgment and measure of truth
or £aJ.sehood, right or wrong.
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ating the Bolsheviks' theories and leaders (including both Lenin and Trotsky)
not by some Marxist measure but on the basis of the lessons ofmore than two
decades of Soviet history. If the Soviet Union had rational grounds for
existence (no matter whether it succeeds or fails), no one could repudiate it,
even ifits existence were not in conformity with Marxism. To confine oneself
to a definite "circle" is to be "sectarian". The so-called "orthodox" is the
equivalent of what the Confucianists of the Song dynasty called daotong. 82
None of these things were ever to my liking. That's why I came out against
Confucianism when I found it to be wrong, and against the Third Interna-
tional when I found its policies to be wrong. And I'll take the same stance
toward the Fourth, Fifth, and ...th Internationals. Shizhi83 has called me "an
oppositionist for life", and it's true, though not by my design; facts forced me
along this road. Figuratively speaking, ifmeat tastes good, no one cares about
which butcher sold it. But if it tastes bad and one still likes it simply because
it was sold by Lugaojian,84 that would be an exercise ofsuperstition. Supersti-
tion and prejudice cannot withstand the test of events or the passage of time;
I'll have nothing to do with either ofthem. That's all for now. Even from this
[short letter], I trust you can discern my attitude in searching for the truth.
If I write new articles, I'll certainly send them to you for comments. I've
a lot more to say, but unfortunately my poor health prevents me from writing.
Moreover, even if! do write, it's very hard to get things mimeographed. Best
wishes,
Duxiu Oanuary 19 [1941])
82. I.e., the legitimate legacy of Confucianism.
83. I.e., Hu Shi (Hu Shih) (1891-1962), a philosopher, writer, advocate of the vernacular
literature, and one of modem China's most influentia1liberal scholars. Hu taught at Beijing
Uni~ersityfrom1917 to 1927; between 1918 and 1920, he helped edit Chen Duxiu's Xin qingnian.
After May Fourth, 1919, Hu split from Chen Duxiu and was strongly criticised by the
Communists. He was a supporter of the Guomindang, and pro-American.
84. Suzhou's best-known cooked-pork shop, established several hundred years ago.
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A SKETCH OF THE POST-WAR WORLD85
Here, Chen is at his most pessimistic. He doubts if the democratic countries can
win the war, and predicts new world wars soon qfter the end of the present one;
there will be no lasting peace, no justice, and no equality, either within nations
or between them, whichever side emerges victorious. Imperialism will not weaken
but grow stronger and bipolar: the post-war world will be divided between the
hostile powers ofAmerica and Germany or ofAmerica and Britain; the two vidors
will attack one another and act as magnets for the lesser powers. Unless the
"leading" countries go socialist (which Chen thinks unlikely, though he clearly
hopes that it will happen), there will be no new independent states, for the Soviet
example has shown that imperialism will notfall merely because its weakest link
has snapped. Perhaps imperialism's resilience is in some ways agood thing,.fOr
economic unification is progressive even when achieved by counterrevolutionaryforce,
and will inevitably pave the way to socialism. The Chinese people should resist
imperialism, but they should at the same time learn from the West. They should
seek to expand their industry in order to create the conditions for chiming in with
future revolutions in the industrial countries. if the interests ofnation and world
democracy collide, the latter must take precedence.
History does not repeat itself, and this present war has already caused huge
changes throughout the world, or laid the basis for such changes. It is pointless
to try to depict the future with theories drawn from the past.
There are only three possible outcomes to this war: neither Britain and
America nor Germany and Japan will prevail, but both sides will talk peace;
Britain and America will win; Germany andJapan will win. Least likely is the
first outcome, so there is no need to speculate on it here. Of the second and
85. Source: Zhuanji wenxue zazhi she, eds, Shi'an zizhuan, pp. 91-103. During his last years
in Sichuan, Chen generally made his views known not in public but through letters. This "Sketch
of the Post-War World" is an exception. It was published in Dagang baa on March 21, 1942,
just two months before Chen's death. The Guomindang refused to allow it to be published in
Chengdu, apparently for fear of offending the Soviet Union, which Chen denounces in the
article, and suppressed its sequel ("Once Again on the World Situation", the next text in this
present volume). (See RenJianshu and Tang Baolin, Chen Duxiu zhuan, vol. 2, p. 298.)
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third outcomes, which is the more likely? To judge by present conditions,
it seems clear that Germany and Japan have the upper hand. The war has
already been going on for more than two years. Having now acquired the
support ofthe Soviet Union, for the last six months Britain has enjoyed a lull
in the war, yet even with its entire forces it cannot block the advance of the
numerically smaller German army in North Africa. It is hard to see how in
the near future Britain can defeat the main German army. If one accepts that
Britain's defeats in the various battle theatres have been due to the outnumber-
ing ofits army and its airforce, then within a year or eighteen months, after
the British and Americans have had a chance to expand their arms production,
there may well be a change in the overall situation. But today, although some
people are calling for a "wholesale reorientation of factory production", to
judge by the past and present behaviour ofgovemment officials - which was
characterised by inertia - and factory owners, who care only about their own
interests, it is doubtful whether Britain and America can succeed in beating
Germany and the neighbours under its control in the arms race. And even if
we do assume that at some future date they will be in a position to do so, are
we also to assume that for some mysterious reason Hider and his partners will
simply bide their time and refrain from launching offensives in that year to
eighteen months while Britain and America increase their armaments? Yes,
Germany's internal crisis surpasses that ofBritain and America, but it will only
reach explosive proportions once war-weariness sets in or the German army
is defeated. Germany's only weakness is its lack of oil. That is why Germany
cannot sustain a long war unless it succeeds in capturing the Caucasus or Iran.
For that reason, Germany needs a quick victory. The interest ofBritain and
America, on the other hand, lies in a protracted war. The main aim ofboth
sides is to fix the time for action in their favour. So in Germany's imminent
spring offensive, whether it happens in the Mediterranean or in European
Russia, whoever is victorious along the line between Malta, Gibraltar, the Suez
Canal, and Singapore or that between Moscow, the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq, Syria,
and Singapore will have won the key to overall victory in the war. If the Axis
powers win, Britain and America will be incapable ofsustaining a protracted
war. Throughout the history ofwarfare, space, numbers, and resources have
never been the main factor in deciding victory.
IfBritain and America win and the Axis powers are finished, new opposi-
tions will arise at the peace table or the international conference to deal with
the war's aftermath. It will not be easy for post-war Britain to clear up the
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situation in Europe, North Africa, the Near East, and the Middle East, and
for a while its strength will not stretch to the Far East. The Far East, including
Southeast Asia and Australasia, is likely to become an American sphere of
influence. Under such circumstances, the friendship of Soviet Russia will be
a prize for which Britain and America compete; their fate will hang on the
next world war.
IfHitler wins the war, Britain will be finished, and America too will for the
time being be forced to withdraw to safety behind the Atlantic and the Pacific.
Even ifHitler does win, his guns will continue to point West, for he lacks the
military might to extend directly into the region to the east of the Urals, Iran,
and India. Ifsuch a time comes, then regardless ofwhether America andJapan
hold peace talks, America and Germany will vie for the friendship ofJapan.
America will not necessarily continue to fight Japan, so until Hitler subjugates
America, he too is unlikely to risk offending Japan on account of the Far
Eastern question and driving his valued ally into the hands of the Americans,
thcr-eby severing the right prong ofhis two-pronged offensive against America
from the Atlantic and the Pacific. Hitler knows that if, with Britain's strength
in the Far East destroyed, he were to threaten Japan, there would be the
danger ofJapan and America cooperating, on condition that America with-
draws from the Far East. In that case, America and Germany's fate would hang
on the next world war.
It is still impossible to say how many more world wars there will be: all we
can say is that as long as the cause ofwar is not eliminated, wars will inevitably
happen, and that if Germany wins, the next war will come more quickly.
Evidently there will be no formal peace talks between America and Germany,
yet the actual fighting is bound to come to a temporary halt. And even though
Germany needs a respite from war so that it can set up its New Order, pluck
the fruits ofvictory, and (even more importantly) build sufficient numbers of
warships and cargo ships capable ofcrossing the Atlantic, once it had done so,
it would then restart the war against America, probably from South America.
Actually, every world war is nothing but a continuation ofthe previous world
war. We should under no circumstances allow ourselves to be befuddled by
high-sounding propaganda about "perpetual peace", "national self-determina-
tion", "the equality ofnations", and "the destruction ofthe capitalist system";
under no circumstances should we believe that after the war these ideals are
likely to be realised.
c1
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The European and American project to reform capitalism is nothing new;
however, it has resulted in the imposing emergence of the trusts alongside
joint-stock companies and cooperatives; with labour legislation extended to
half the world, in the so-called "socialist state" people have to restore the
system ofpiece work. If reforming the system is not easy, destroying capitalism
is even harder, and certainly not as effortless as some people imagine. When
this war is over, not only Britain and America but also the Axis powers will
inevitably try to reform the capitalist system, to make it more amenable to
their rule. No one should be taken in by Hider's denunciations of capitalism,
they are simply his private joke. The reform project ofall these states is simply
to reduce barriers within each bloc by means of tariff agreements and even
ofeconomic unions, to diminish the role ofcurrency by means ofbarter, and
to nationalise some private firms. While tariff barriers within each bloc go
down, those between the blocs will become intensified; not everything is
barterable, and those goods that can be bartered are still valued in terms of
currency, so it is still a sort of commodity transaction, not a form of division
of labour. Even in the nineteenth century some industries were nationalised;
wholesale nationalisation, i.e., so-called state capitalism, seems to be conceiv-
able in theory but not in practice. If the cliques that control the means of
production are not expropriated by revolution, there is no chance of them
voluntarily handing over their private property to the state. Some people
imagine that a "supra-class" government will peacefully expropriate private
property, but any such government would itselfbe expropriated in double-
quick time. So the three above-mentioned projects for reform are incapable
of shaking the fundament of the capitalist system. Ever since capitalism firSt
arose, its weals and woes have intensified in accordance with the logic of its
internal development. Since reforms are incapable ofdisturbing its foundations,
any measures to control it can only hasten the decline ofthe entire society and
economy; to imagine that you can draw on its weals and avoid its woes is
wishful thinking, it will get you nowhere. Private property and the commodity
system are the basis of capitalism, and the root source of all capitalism's evils.
The aim ofthe capitalist system ofproduction is to augment the private wealth
of those who own the productive means by selling its products as commodi-
ties, not in any direct way to satisfy the needs ofthe whole people. The more
the productive forces develop, the more the laws of supply and demand -
productive power and purchasing power - get out of kilter. The result is a
crisis of overproduction, falling prices, factory closures, unemployment, and
"i'
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economic panic. Mter a while, the productive forces are restored to strength,
and because they might now be even stronger than before, they lurch toward
an even deeper crisis; hence the periodic law of cyclical crises. Usually there
are two ways ofcoping with overproduction. One is the self-imposed reduc-
tion of the volume of production and even the destruction of products, a
foolish and ridiculous method; the other is to conquer colonies, win markets
overseas, and go to war, an insane and terrifYing method. Because ofthe need
to peddle surplus commodities on foreign markets and to stop foreigners
invading the domestic market, tariffbarriers are inevitably raised, armaments
are increased, preparations are made for war, and in some cases hostilities
begin. This chain of cause and effect inevitably binds present-day state
authorities. For since they are incapable ofdestroying the capitalist system and
instead allow it to lead them by the nose (any other response on their part
would be defeated), this sequence of events is unavoidable - it cannot be
changed by any ideology or moral principle. In an age when a number of
stro'ng states across the globe must vie for markets, prepare for war, and go
to war, when they do everything in their power to extend their spheres of
influence, when they are packed so tightly against one another that not a drop
of water could trickle down between them, what point is there in talking
about national self-determination or national liberation? At the end ofthe last
war, [Woodrow] Wilson's Fourteen Points shook the entire planet; the reason
they disappeared from the scene was not because [David] Lloyd George and
Georges Clemenceau hoodwinked Wilson but because Wilson hoodwinked
himselt;86 moreover, the deception led France to ruin,87 and England and
America were prevented from taking a strong stand toward Japan. After the
present war, those who flaunt pacifist illusions in the capitalist world will be
vanquished in the next war.
Will imperialist rule remain unchanged after the present war, no matter who
ends up victor? As long as capitalism exists, imperialism, which is capitalism's
natural product, will surely not reject itsel£ However, the actual form of
86. Wilson's Fourteen Points embodied the principles that he regarded as essential for ajust
and lasting peace after World War One and his wish for a world government that would prevent
future wars. The Fourteen Points included the right to self-detennination, which coincided
with the aspirations ofChina's nationalist movement at the time. At the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919, Wilson bargained away the Fourteen Points in deals with Lloyd George and Clemenceau,
his wartime allies, who favoured a policy ofpeace-for-revenge, and disappointed the Chinese,
thus triggering the events in China ofMay 4, 1919. People in China at the time felt that Wilson
was a naive and idealistic scholar, ignorant of real politics, who deceived even himself
87. I.e., France was defeated and occupied by Germany.
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imperialist rule will inevitably change. Take, for example, the change from
nation states to international blocs. Such changes by no means signal the end
of the imperialist system; on the contrary, they show that imperialism is
spreading and growing stronger. From now on, the pre-nineteenth century
movement toward nation states will decline in the wake of the spread of
imperialism, and the early twentieth-century opposition between seven or
eight imperialist powers will also end. The Axis powers have belatedly
completed the transition from nation state to imperialist state, Japan most
recendy ofall. The imperialists are vying to grab the markets of the colonial
and backward countries before anyone else gets hold ofthem. That is the sole
reason they are prepared to take such risks, even to the point of trying to
change the old imperialist world order by military means. This war will leave
only two leading nations capable ofcomplete independence and free from all
alien controls, and those two nations - America and Germany or Britain and
America - will be locked in opposition to one another. The peoples of all
other countries will be subordinate to one or other of the resulting blocs,
either as allies or as full-scale collaborators. Naturally Japan and Soviet Russia
also aspire to lead their own blocs, but their fate will depend in the last resort
on the level oftheir productive forces. As for the other colonial and backward
countries, the age in which they might have hoped through the national
struggle to form new independent states is already over. Within the blocs,
countries can be roughly grouped into four categories, according to their
strengths and weaknesses. The first category consists of relatively prestigious
"allies", as Japan is for example to Germany and Soviet Russia is to Britain
and America. The second consists of semi-colonies, for example Italy (in
relation to Germany) and Holland, Belgium, and France (in relation to Britain
and America); although these countries have their own governments, politi-
cally and (even more so) economically they are all more or less under the
control of the leading nations. The third consists ofdependent countries88 like
France and Belgium (in relation to Germany), Denmark and Italy (in relation
to Britain),89 and the Philippines (in relation to America); although they have
their own governments, they are incapable of independent diplomacy. The
fourth consists of the colonies, which lack even their own government and
are controlled by governors from the metropolitan countries. There are none
88. I translate beibaohuguo as "dependent countries"; literally, it suggests "protectorates", a tenn
that in this context carries the. wrong connotations.
89. This passage is confusing: Italy belonged to the Axis and was not invaded by the Allies until
July 1943; Denmark was occupied by the Nazis, like France and Belgium.
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worse offthan the colonies, unless it be the indigenous peoples ofthe Americas
or ofAustralia. Though not all the nations and peoples in the two main blocs
are alike in status, they have one thing in common, namely their political and
economic systems are to a greater or lesser degree remade on the model of the
leading nations. Systems that are absolutely contrary in character [to those of
the leading nations] are inconceivable: in the German bloc, they are all
modelled more or less closely on the Nazi system; in the Anglo-American
bloc, on the democratic system. And the socialist system? Such a system can
only be realised after the victory of the revolution in the leading countries,
only then can socialism influence all the countries ofthe bloc. The experience
ofthe Russian Revolution suggests that breaking the weakest link in the chain
ofworld imperialism cannot eventually lead to the disintegration ofimperial-
ism as a whole. As for Soviet Russia today, it is not entided to be a leading
country, not only because ofits low productivity but also because it has long
since abandoned socialism.
A't the start of this world war, some dreamers imagined that the chance had
come for small, weak nations to achieve their independence. In reality,
however, the colonies ofAsia traded Anglo-American for Japanese control;
and the colonies ofAfrica traded British for German and Italian control. Some
people even imagined that the war would speed socialist revolution, but, to
their great sorrow, things turned out differendy; when they now discover that
even the national struggle is labouring under constraints and that the Nazis
are probably about to take over nearly half the world, they will plunge from
their imaginary paradise into the deepest abysses, they will begin to believe
that history is destined to go downhill. In reality, the history ofhuman progress
continues along its usual disinterested track, bound neither for paradise nor
for the abysses of destruction; it bears not the slightest responsibility for the
disappointment and sorrow that results from the destruction of the illusory
hopes and joys of these people. Even if, by some tragic course of events,
victory in this war were to go to the Nazis and half the world's population
came under their domination, though politically this would result in a long
period ofcatastrophic suffocation, it would have the same economic conse-
quences as an Anglo-American victory. The Nazis would naturally be in no
position to shake off the restraints imposed on productivity by the capitalist
system, but a great step forward would be made within the capitalist system.
For example, due to the unification of various currencies, the lowering of
customs barriers, the concentration ofresources, and so on, the number ofthe
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world's smaller economic units would be gradually reduced, thus removing
some of the obstacles that have hitherto prevented economic development,
and society's productivity would be increased much more rapidly than before
the war. Objectively, this process would increase the material basis for
broadening the road toward a socialist world, and is nothing more than
capitalism's usual practice of creating progress by means ofits bloody crimes:
only a narrow-minded dogmatist would fail to see that. Human history is in
this sense no different from the planet earth: it continues relentlessly on its
path, whether at noontime or at midnight.
To be serious, genuine national liberation can only be realised in conjunc-
tion with socialist revolution in the imperialist countries. In a capitalist-
imperialist world, "national self-detennination" and "national liberation" for
the backward countries and the weak nations is an illusion. The national
struggle is even more likely to be restricted in an age like the present, when
two rival imperialist camps compete through wars to force the backward
countries and weak nations all over the world into war. Only a dreamer would
be startled by such a comment. Looked at from the point of view of the
progressive unification ofthe world economy, such constraints on the national
struggle are not necessarily wholly bad. In the absence ofrevolutionary unity,
even counterrevolutionary unity has a progressive significance, whether on
a world scale or within a single country. For example, Wu Peifu's unity was
better than the separatist warlord regimes, and Liu Xiang's was better than the
age of "protection areas".90 Moreover, to say that the national struggle will
probably be to a certain extent restricted does not mean that nations led
hitherto by other people will become as a flock ofsheep, incapable of initia:'"
tive. It simply means that the national struggle will meet with certain restric-
tions, the recognition of which is a precondition for effective action of the
following sorts. (1) To work hard for the democratisation of the political
system and the development of national industry, in order to increase the
nation's weight within the bloc to which it belongs. Today is no longer the
age of Li Hongzhang.91 One should stop dreaming the pleasant dream that
90. Liu Xiang (1890-1938) was the most powerful of the Sichuan warlords in the 1920s and
1930s; while he (sporadically) held supreme power in the province, numerous smaller warlords
each occupied and controlled a certain territory and designated it a "protection area".
91. Li Hongzhang (Li Hung-chang) (1823-1901) was a member of the faction that argued that
China would have to achieve pariry in industry and technology with the West ifit was to remain
independent and united under the monarchy. He and other members of his faction ran nearly
all China's modem state-owned industries between 1860 and 1895.
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[China] could become a rich, strong country at a single leap - that it could
become an independent nation state like those achieved in the eighteenth or
nineteenth centuries and become a first-class power in the twentieth century.
(2) To create the forces (industry and national organisation) necessary for
coordinating with the revolutionary struggle in the leading nations in order
to achieve true national liberation and progress. It is wrong to dream of
slamming the door shut, ofeliminating imperialist might from a single country
by the efforts ofa single people in order to achieve independence for a national
bourgeois state. (3) As for the struggle overseas, it should start out from the
point ofview ofthe interests not ofnationalism but of democracy, regardless
ofwhether this struggle is conducted against Axis or non-Axis powers, for the
despotisms of Germany, Italy, and Japan, rampaging across the world hand
in hand, have already broken through the last defences of the nations of the
various countries. We are no longer talking about the fate ofthis or that nation
but of the survival of freedom and democracy throughout the world. Ifwe
continue to fight our battles on national grounds, India's present enemy is
Britain, and China will at some future point be forced once again to wage
resistance, this time against America. (4) We must do all in our power to resist
imperialist aggression, which threatens our survival as a nation, but we should
not reject foreign culture. The conservative tendency to reject foreign culture
can have only one effect: to cause one's own national culture, now stagnating,
to decline. True, Chinese culture has its strong points, but taken too far,92 it
would look down on other branches of culture and even exclude from the
notion of culture those technical-material achievements upon which the
people's livelihood and national defence depend. As a result, there are people
who even go so far as to exclude from the notion of culture glorious Chinese
inventions such as printing and gunpowder, and instead reduce culture to art
and literature. The baleful effect of this misunderstanding of the meaning of
culture in the present Sino-Japanese War has been twofold. On the one hand,
it has gratuitously transformed rhymers and scribblers into "people ofculture".
This is scarcely different from Japan's ironical remark that China is a country
ofwords. On the other hand, by trying to resist warplanes, artillery, and tanks
with the chanting ofslogans and the singing ofsongs, it continues to promote
the old Boxer idea that magic incantations can stop bullets; this is the impasse
to which the lop-sided development of Chinese culture ultimately leads.
Zhang Zhidong's harmful idea about "using Chinese learning for essentials
92. I.e., by exaggerating and one-sidedly promoting the humanities.
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and Western learning for application" has already held us back for half a
century.93 By shouting about "our own culture" and "Oriental culture", we
will similarly harm future generations of our people.
Some may consider that this war is a war between the imperialists of the
Axis and the anti-Axis, with each side out to extend its own power and
influence; it is not a struggle for national liberation; there is no point in small
and weak peoples participating in it. This view is due to a failure to understand
that although small and weak peoples cannot achieve their liberation by relying
on imperialist assistance, they cannot resolve problems by their own efforts
either. Moreover, at the present stage in the history ofwar, "neutrality" has
become a thing of the past. If the people ofBurma say, "Better the devil we
know than the angel we don't know," we must reply: "We know ofno angels
in today's world, all we know is that the devil you know is ten times worse
than the devil you don't!,,94 Ifsome people in China say, "To help America
defeatJapan is like chasing a tiger away from the front door and letting a wolf
in at the back," we must reply: "If America wins the war, then we stand a
chance of restoring our old semi-colonial status if we work hard to renew
ourselves and stop conniving at corruption. But if the Axis wins the war, we
will surely become a colony from which before long even the puppet govern-
ment in Nanjing will be expunged!"
Some people may think that what I have written is too low-key: future
events will teach them otherwise.
February 10,1942.
93. Zhang Zhidong (Chang Chih-tung) (1837-1909) was a leading official who favoured reform,
but warned against changes that would threaten Confucian culture, a position summed up in
the slogan "Chinese values, Western means".
94. By "the devil you know", Chen means Japan. Some anti-colonialist Burmese leaders ofthe
Dobama Asiayone or Thakin Party fell forJapan's "Asia for the Asiatics" propaganda and assisted
the Japanese at the time of their overrunning ofBurma in 1942. They were soon alienated by
the behaviour of the Japanese occupiers.
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ONCE AGAIN ON THE WORLD SITUATION95
In this article, Chen insists that the probability ifa. victory by Germany andJapan
must not prevent the Chitiese peoplefrom workingfor a British-American victory,
ifonly to inspire the next generation ifyouth. To ensure collective security after
the war, democrats must work toward a worldfederation, not an Asianfederation
that would exclude the rich countries.
Some people say that the international situation as I described it in "A Sketch
of the Post-War World", namely the possible prospect of a world wholly
under imperialist rule, is too pessimistic. It seems to me that in assessing
objettive circumstances, important is whether or not you are realistic, not
whether or not you are pessimistic. Ever since the late nineteenth century,
finance capital has broken through national barriers and the world has been
an imperialist world. That's exactly what imperialism is about. This is not
something that relates to the future: the only thing that will happen in the
future is that today's seven or eight imperialist powers will fight each other
and consequently be reduced to two imperialist blocs. In the absence ofa great
revolution to shake the entire world, this state ofaffairs will continue and may
even become worse than we have estimated. For should victory in the war
go to Hitler, Britain will be finished, [Franklin D.] Roosevelt will fall to a
Hitler of the Americas, and the next world war (between Germany and
America) will be between two Fascist blocs rather than between democracy
and Nazism. Then what Roosevelt said will have been proved right: that
democracy and freedom will die out for several hundred years. In that case,
the course ofhuman progress could be plotted as follows.
Pre-Historic Antiquity
Clan democracy.
The Ancient World (Greece and Rome)
Democracy of the townspeople.
95. Source: Zhuanji wenxue zazhi, eds, Shi'an zizhuan, pp. 104-112.
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Autocracy of the great landlords, grand priests, and military leaders.
The Modern World
Bourgeois democracy.
The feudal lords and (in the last phase) absolute monarchy.
The Future World
From proletarian democracy onward to democracy of the whole people.
Fascist dictatorship.
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According to this chart, Fascism, like other previous systems ofdictatorship,
would develop universally and come to constitute an entire historical stage,
and democratic systems throughout history have always passed and will pass
through a period ofdark dictatorship. Ifpeople are content to sit back in their
easy chairs and dream their optimistic dreams and thereby to let Nazism grow,
we must be prepared to admit the possibility ofsuch an age of darkness.
Although there should not be too great a discrepancy between objective
evaluations and subjective efforts, they need not always head in the same
direction. For example, even though we may believe that Germany andJapan
are more likely to win the present war, that should not stop us in advance of
the outcome from proposing that we do everything in our power to help
Britain and America win; at the same time, our duty to work hard for the
victory of our democratic allies should not lead us to believe that the Axis
powers face inevitable defeat. We may pursue ideals, but we should not pursue
completely unrealistic illusions; we should strive to advance ideals that are not
absolutely unattainable, even though attaining them may still take many years,
but we should beware of consoling ourselves with pipedreams. It is by no
means a bad idea, when others set up comforting mirages and even abandon
all vigilance, to paint the bleakest possible picture of events in the real world,
in order to remind oneself of, and rouse others to, the need for even greater
efforts. Rather than close one's eyes to the possibility of a world where
imperialism reigns supreme, it is far better to stare hard at the tragic course
ofevents and to admit that the danger exists that Fascist imperialist dictatorship
might be universally established for an entire historic period. So in this present
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war we should do everything within our subjective might to rout Hitler and
his accomplices and to penalise them with the utmost severity; we should
inundate Fascist ideology with a great tide ofdemocracy and freedom, so that
after the war it is incapable of reviving under new guises in the victorious
countries and ofdiverting the modem history ofhuman progress along another
path, in other words, so that we are not forced to live through an entire period
ofFascist dictatorship and instead can pass directly into a world of extensive
democracy; even if that is beyond the realm of the possible, we must still do
everything we can, in the spirit of the old saying, "To do it even though we
know it is impossible, ,,96 to influence the next generation ofyoung people to
continue to fight to end Fascist reaction within the shortest period possible.
That is the only ideal that we can possibly now pursue. To imagine that the
present war can be transformed from an imperialist war into a war to over-
throw imperialism everywhere is in all respects illusory. That is why I have
braved the ridicule of old friends and backed the anti-Nazi alliance with
Britain and America. Worst of all is to substitute an optimistic assessment of
the objective world for subjective hard work; ifbefore the present war [prime
Minister Neville] Chamberlain, Voroshilov, and Knox97 had not chosen to
view the enemy through rose-coloured spectacles, as not warranting an attack,
and had instead made full military preparations rather than simply talking big,
the war today would be going far better. For today's enemy is not like the
stupid high officials of the Chancery of the Qing dynasty, who simply
capitulated before the foreigners' braggadocio, nor can he be deceived by the
passing [in parliament or Congress] ofan empty bill for increased armaments
or by the revelation of figures showing a rapid increase in arms production.
The age ofwinning victories through sheer intimidation and deception is now
past!
Litvinov's speech at a dinner party in the New York Club ofEconomists
on March 16 [1942] was right on several points: "In my opinion the time
factor is an unreliable and treacherous ally for both warring sides. Weare on
the one hand engaged in a prolonged war and on the other hand we are
preparing military provisions and reserve forces to an extent surpassing that
96. A Confucian saying.
97. Marshall Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov was Defence Commissar of the Soviet Union
before and at the outbreak ofWorld War Two. Colonel Frank Knox became US Secretary
of the Navy on June 19, 1940. Actually, before his appointment Knox was known in the US
as an internationalist, an opponent ofthe Neutrality Act, and a champion ofcompulsory universal
military conscription.
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of the enemy. Yes, we are on the right track in so doing; but such a plan can
only serve its purpose ifduring the same period the enemy does nothing. You
gentlemen know, however, that our enemies are not like that. They will build
on their existing achievements to continue their advance, to continue to
occupy territories, to gobble up new sources of raw materials, to enslave
hundreds ofmillions ofpeople, and even to acquire new allies. These advan-
tages will inevitably far outstrip the advantages that our side acquires in tenns
ofmilitary preparations during this one-sided ceasefire." "Ifwe console each
other with empty talk about the impossibility ofdefeat, we will be even further
from victory; this prospect causes us great anxiety.,,98 This is a salutary if
painful antidote to the frivolous optimism of those Americans and their allies
who believe that "final victory will inevitably be ours" and "the Axis powers
can only end in defeat". Let bygones be bygones, but we cannot afford to let
the opportunity slip time and time again. Ifwe wish to achieve final victory,
we must strictly guard against empty optimism. Compare, for instance, the
speech delivered at the same New York Club ofEconomists by [Viscount]
Halifax (identified by British public opinion after the Battle ofDunkirk as one
of the appeasers in the cabinet of Chamberlain) with that of Litvinov.99 [In
the light ofsuch attitudes], we must even more surely root out [excessively]
optimistic opinion, treat it as an enemy, and make doubly sure that we
substitute for it the following theses.
(1) Britain and America should not be suspicious of Russia, but should
provide large-scale aid to the Russian army so that it can hold on to Moscow.
They should not (to quote Litvinov) "deploy their best-equipped forces in
places where there is no fighting". Nor should they believe the nonsense about
Russia having already demonstrated in the course of the war that its forces
outstrip those ofBritain and America, that it is in a position to rout Hitler.
Least of all should they delude themselves into thinking that the successful
defence of Moscow is in only Russia's interests. Higher arms production is
vital for an Allied victory, and time is needed to produce arms. Halifax said
optimistically: "Militarily and industrially, America still has latent potential."
He forgets that we cannot magically transform that latent power overnight
into weapons. Hitler has postponed his spring offensive until the summer. His
target is probably still Moscow. Only ifMoscow can be defended for a year
98. This speech by Litvinov has been retranslated into English from Chinese.
99. Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov (1876-1951) was Soviet Ambassador to the USA from
November 1941 to August 1943.
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or eighteen months, so that Hider is unable to switch his forces to the south,
will America and Britain have enough time to increase the level of their arms
production above that of their enemies. Otherwise, the fall ofMoscow and
the routing of Russia's crack troops in accordance with Hider's plans will
enable Hider to take advantage ofhis victory to move his troops south toward
the Caucasus, Iran, and Iraq and to join forces with Japan at Suez in order to
blockade the Mediterranean. If by then Britain and America have still not
increased their arms production, the game will be as good as lost!
(2) Arms production cannot be raised by empty words. There are not at
present enough arms factories to match and outstrip the enemy in this regard,
nor is there enough time to build new ones. The only solution is "compulsory
reassignment", i.e., switching other factories as far as possible to producing
armaments. There can be no final victory until our arms production outstrips
that of the enemy. At this point I fear that some people will object that I am
a proponent of the theory that "weapons alone decide the outcome ofwar".
Actually, ever since the invention offlint arrowheads, victory or defeat in war
has depended increasingly on arms, to the point where today it is virtually true
to say that war is a competition ofarms. The heroic yet tragic defeat ofFrance
at Sedan and ofBritain at Dunkirk and in Malaya and Singapore proves the
truth ofthis axiom. Opponents of the theory that "weapons alone decide the
outcome ofwar"!OO are no less vociferous than others in demanding tanks and
planes of the Americans; they too prove my point.
(3) The experience ofthe League ofNations shows that both to win victory
in a war and to ensure collective security after it one must organise an interna-
tional bloc capable ofleadership and endowed with an economy and armed
forces that are strong enough [to carry out its decisions]. The passage from the
growth of nationalism to that of a new international collective is not only
inevitable but is a prerequisite of human progress, a prerequisite - we must
do all in our power to replace Fascism with a democratic bloc - of the
transition to a world federation. Uawaharlal] Nehru's proposal for an Asian
bloclO! without Britain and America sounds nice, but its only real effect would
be to prolong Asia's backwardness; and like the Burmese theory of "sooner
100. Evidently a reference to the Chinese Communists, in their wartime capital ofYan'an.
101. Nehru's strong pan-Asian feeling found expression at around this time in his call for an
Eastern Federation, in which India and China would be the senior partners. Nehru had earlier
argued that India should playa crucial role in the Afro-Asian world. Nehru's attitude toward
the war (when he was imprisoned by the British) was that if India were to participate
enthusiastically in the anti-Fascist struggle, it would first have to be granted freedom.
4
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the devil you know", it's a racialist prejudice that can only help boost Japan's
"Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere".102 We must dispel such noxious
illusions! For to imagine, in a world bent on war, that there might happen a
rising of armed masses independent of the two imperialist blocs is either an
illusion or conscious fraud. Nehru's proposal for Asian independence does not
share the same motive as Subhas [Chandra] Bose's103 call for Indian independ-
ence, but its effect will be the same: to give succour to Germany and Japan.
(4) Since we are participating in the anti-Nazi struggle led by the democratic
arsenal of America and in an Allied bloc battling to protect democracy and
freedom throughout the world, naturally we must make democracy and
freedom the central thought ofour compatriots so that all concentrate on the
same militant goal: China's economic backwardness, its [undemocratic]
tradition, and the war situation we are now in must not prevent us from
creating an ideal system of democracy and freedom. That fact is obvious, but
we must at the very le~t express the determination to carry on down the road
toward democracy and freedom. We should not be like those people who
oppose democracy and freedom root and branch, who denounce democracy
and freedom as cliches, and who say that those of us who favour democracy
and freedom are living anachronists; or who, a little less bluntly, oppose
Chinese-style "democracy and freedom" to the basic principle of democracy
that underlies the world's democratic countries; they share in common the
belief that democracy is no longer appropriate to the modem state, by which
they indisputably mean Germany, Italy, and Japan (with or without Russia),
definitely not Britain and America. By adopting such an attitude [toward
democracy and freedom], will the progressive Chinese in general fail ·to
understand to what end we make our War ofResistance against Japan a part
ofthe war against Germany, Italy, and Japan? Will they succeed in dissipating
China's determination to see this war through to the end? Will they manage
to assist our enemies' sinister and contemptuous denunciation ofAmerica for
"aiding non-democratic nations with democratic goods and materials"? And,
102. The "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere", an extension ofJapan's anti-Communist
"New Order in East Asia" proclaimed in November 1938, envisaged in 1940-1941 including
China, the mandated Pacific islands, all ofSoutheast Asia, and even Australia and New Zealand
in a self-sufficient economic system free from Western exploitation and underJapanese political
hegemony.
103. Subhas Chandra Bose (1897-1945) was a leader of the Indian Congress Party who broke
with the majority of the Congress leaders and tried to achieve India's independence with the
help ofJapanese imperialism. He led an Indian national force against the West during World
War Two.
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finally, will they succeed in causing our allies to distrust the sincerity of our
adherence to the democratic alliance? These are questions that we should
deeply ponder. Perhaps some people believe that the only conceivable future
is a Fascist world, and not just for a limited period of time; that democracy
and freedom will be dead forever. This is simply speculation, without any basis
in facts or history. It is simply an ideology; it cannot be designated either as
pessimistic or as optimistic.
April 19, 1942.
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In this article, Chen retreats somewhatfrom the reservations he seemed to express
in "Once Again on the World Situation" about the usifulness ofuniting oppressed
nations. Though he continues to insist that some imperialists are worse than others,
he also says that all movements ofoppressed peoples against imperialism must be
supported and oppressed workers and peoples everywhere must unite to that end,
in order to bring about world socialism. But only a revolution encompassing
"advanced" as well as "backward" countries can lead to the development ofthe
economies of the poor countries; in the absence ofworld revolution, imperialism
will helpfOrge the links that create such unity. National liberation willfollowfrom
world socialist revolution, just as the abolition ofunequal treaties in ChinafOllowed
on the October Revolution in the years bifore it degenerated. Struggles fOr national
liberation can no longer proceed in separation and isolation from one another: people
everywhere will have to becomefree together, in an international socialistfederation.
This argument is the late Chen's clearest and most trenchant restatement ofhis
commitment to Marxist internationalism and the Trotskyist theory ofpermanent
revolution, and ofhis undying hostility to capitalism and imperialism.
The oppressed nations are the product ofcapitalist imperialism. The oppresse~
toilers produce commodities for imperialism; the oppressed peoples of the
backward nations buy commodities from the imperialists and produce raw
materials for them. These are capitalist imperialism's two props.
It is only natural that oppressed peoples should resist oppression by capitalist
imperialism even to the point ofgoing to war against it. There can be no blame
in such conduct. Every progressive member ofthe nation should support such
struggles for national freedom, regardless ofwho leads them. For even a national
liberation struggle led by the bourgeoisie, even one led by the feudal nobility,
is progressive insofar as it strikes a blow at capitalist imperialism.
But what will be the future ofsuch a struggle if it stays confined within the
bounds of a national struggle?
(1) From a national angle, experience suggests that war is not only incapable
104. Source: Zhuanji wenxue zazhi she, eds, Shi'an zizhuan, pp. 113-120.
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In my opinion, therefore, in the present world ofcapitalist imperialism, no
small or weak nation is in a position to close itself off or to rely on its own
national resources to expel all imperialist invaders in order to realise an
independence of this sort. The only real way forward is to unite with the
oppressed toilers and the oppressed and backward peoples ofthe entire world
to overthrow imperialism everywhere, and in so doing to replace the old world
ofinternational capitalist commodity exchange with a new world of interna-
tional socialism based on a division of labour and mutual aid. When that
happens, the national question will solve itsel£
There are two conceivable objections to such an opinion. Some may ask
how a backward nation can speak ofsocialism, and how it can unite with the
toilers of other nations and with small or weak nations; others, whether
socialism implies national liberation.
Those who raise the first objection are blinkered by the old nationalist
viewpoint. They are unable to see the future trend toward ever-greater
internationalisation. It is, ofcourse, self-evident that the backward countries
themselves, given their economic state, are in no position to speak ofsocialism,
or even of capitalist development. Today the backward countries, whether
out to develop capitalism or socialism, can do so only in reliance on the
advanced countries. Only an obsessive nationalist would believe otherwise.
Over the last hundred years, capitalism's colonial policy has already breached
the Great Wall that surrounded backward nations everywhere. After this war,
the form ofimperialist rule will in all cases change from a policy ofcolonialism
to one of an even more concentrated and organic international bloc. Tal~s
about the so-called Adantic Charter, Pacific Charter,105 and the like mark the
start of that process toward a reconstitution into blocs. If, after the defeat of
the Nazis, Germany were to emerge as a socialist state leading an international
bloc, some advanced countries would before long fuse with the backward
countries in a socialist federation. Even in an international bloc led by capitalist
imperialist countries into which backward countries are absorbed and where
they are forced to cooperate in every respect with the leading countries, even
under that sort of unequal cooperation, the working people of the backward
countries and the leading countries would get the chance to unite with one
105. The Atlantic Charter was drawn up by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in
August 1941 as a joint statement ofprinciples for which to fight the war and on which to base
the peace; it was a first step toward founding the United Nations. The Pacific Charter was either
a projected Pacific version ofthe same thing, thought up in Chongqing or Washington, or Chen's
rhetorical invention.
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another, leading to a huge concentration ofthe oppressed, a force brought into
being by the imperialist robbers that will lead eventually to their own downfall.
No nationalist hero will be capable ofholding up this new trend toward the
formation of international blocs. As for the oppressed peoples, only if they
know how best to accommodate to this new trend will they have a future.
Those who raise the second sort of objection have been befuddled by the
theories of the Second International. 106 The project ofthe Second International
is to pursue a reform campaign within the confines ofbourgeois rule; being
one ofthe props ofimperialism, it has paid no attention to the question ofthe
liberation of the oppressed nations. A true socialist movement wishes to
overthrow international capitalist imperialism root and branch. That is why,
ever since the First International, "the liberation of the oppressed toiling
peoples" and "the liberation of the oppressed nations" have been the two
banners of this movement. I07 Once socialist revolution succeeds, as long as it
does not change colour in mid path it will be unable to coexist for long with
the" system of commodity and money. When such a time arrives, will there
still be oppressed peoples? This is not just a theory, but was the actual experi-
ence of Russia's October Revolution. The October Revolution was the
achievement of the overwhelming majority of the Russian people united
under the three great banners of the Communist Party: "liberate the toilers",
"liberate the peasants", and "liberate small nations". Mter the victory of the
revolution, each of these three slogans was realised: they were not just dud
cheques issued by the Russian Communists. What's more, the voluntary
abolition was proclaimed of all unequal treaties forced on other countries
during the Tsarist period. One by one the Communists announced the
relinquishment in oppressed countries ofTsarist privileges such as setdements
and consular jurisdiction. lOB As a result, working people and oppressed nations
106. The Second International (1889-1914), though never a uniform, centralised organisation
like the Third, was dominated by the figure ofKarl Kautsky, who transformed Social Democracy
into a movement of reform on which revolutionary slogans were mere ornaments. At first the
Second International opposed militarism and espoused internationalism, but when war came
in 1914, most socialist parties obeyed the call ofthe utherland; the Second International collapsed,
and Lenin decided that the time had come to found the Third.
107. "The problem ofthe liberation ofthe oppressed nations" was raised by Lenin and the Third
International. Marx' slogan was "Workers ofall countries, unite!" Lenin's was "Workers ofall
countries and oppressed nations of the world, unite!"
108. I.e., of extraterritoriality. On July 25,1919, the Soviet Government in Russia declared
the abolition ofthe unequal treaties signed between Tsarist Russia and China and the privileges
enjoyed by Russia in China (though in practice it hung on for a while to some of them).
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throughout the world came to see Moscow as a beacon for the oppressed
peoples ofthe world, and as the general headquarters ofthe world revolution-
ary movement. If some people, on the basis of recent Soviet policies toward
the Sino-Japanese War and, at the start of the conflict, toward Poland and
Hitler, are sceptical about the attitude ofsocialist countries to the liberation
struggle of oppressed peoples, that's because they are confused! There is a
world of difference between the Soviet Union of the early days, which we
support and others defame, and that ofthe latter period, which they flatter and
we deplore. The Soviet Union of the early period stood on the side ofworld
revolution; ofthe latter period, on that ofRussian national interest. Since then,
the Soviet leaders, in view ofthe setback ofthe revolution in Western Europe,
have turned their coats when midway toward their goal and switched their
main focus from world revolution to defending Russia's national interest; as
a result, perceptive people everywhere have gradually become sceptical and
finally disillusioned, so that by now, although people in their heart ofhearts
still cherish some measure ofhope for the Soviet Union, in reality they have
no choice but to admit that it is simply one among the world powers. Anyone
who continues to insist that the Soviet Union is a socialist country can only
do so by perverting the very meaning of socialism! Were Russia today still
abiding by its old position ofinternational socialism, then once war broke out
between China and Japan, it would have supported China with all its might,
i.e., not like Britain and America, who back China in a detached sort ofway,
but as if the responsibility for leading China's resistance against Japan were
Russia's own, by committing troops to take part in the war, by living or dying
together with the Chinese people. This would be the only truly internationalist
standpoint; no other standpoint would befit a truly leading nation! Had that
happened, Japan would have found it harder to occupy Shanghai and Nanjing.
IfMoscow had stopped appeasing Japan at the very start of the Sino-Japanese
War or, at the very least, after the outbreak ofclashes between the Red Anny
and the [Japanese-backed Chinese anny] at Zhanggufeng,I09 Wuhan would
not have fallen. And had China and Russia continued to resist shoulder to
109. In late July and early August 1938,Japanese troops provoked Soviet troops at Zhanggufeng
on the border between China, Korea, and the Soviet Union. The Japanese were defeated, and
sued for peace. On August 11, in Moscow, both sides agreed that a mixed commission of two
Soviets and two representatives ofJapan and the Japanese puppet regime of "Manchukuo" would
investigate and setde the border question in the region. The Zhanggufeng Incident at first gave
heart to some Chinese, who thought that a Soviet-Japanese War would break out and enable
China to go onto the counter-offensive against Japan.
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shoulder to this day, Japan would have been in no position to rampage through
Southeast Asia and to devastate a whole number ofsmall, weak nations such
as the Philippines, Malaya, Java, and Burma! When the Nazis invaded Poland,
if the Soviet Union had still stood on an international socialist position it
would not have compromised with Hitler and would not have described the
role of representative democracy and the great cause ofleading all oppressed
and invaded nations to fight against the Fascist offensive as pulling the chest-
nuts from the fire for someone else, and it would have been even less likely
to gang up with the Fascists to divide Poland! At that time, the British, French,
and Belgian allied army had not yet disintegrated, and Hitler had not yet
convinced himself that he was capable ofsimultaneously winning victory on
the Eastern and the Western fronts. Only after the defeat of isolated Poland
and the absence ofany further problems in the Eastern battle theatre did Hitler
have the strength to rout the British, French, and Belgians and to vanquish
a host ofsmall nations such as Norway, Holland, Denmark, Yugoslavia, and
Gre'ece.
These historical stories alone, which show how the different positions taken
by Russia in its earlier and later days brought different results, are quite enough
for us to understand the relationship between international socialism and the
oppressed nations.
Given that, in European terms, Russia is itselfafter all a relatively backward
nation, what will be the outcome ofits whole policy on the national problem?
In order to protect itself, Russia substituted a policy of compromising with
Fascism for one ofattacking it; as a result, the war in Russia began not when
Hitler was isolated in Europe but after Hitler had routed the European nations.
Hitler has occupied not only half of Poland and the three Baltic countries,
which had been offered to Russia as the price ofRussian compromise with
Fascism, but also most of European Russia. But for the help ofBritain and
America, even Moscow might by now have fallen. In the interests ofits own
security, Russia has all along avoided going to war against Japan, so that even
the Chinese Communist Party has been accused of "roving around without
fighting". 110 The result is, despite Russia's standby attitude, thatJapan will still
help Hitler attack Russia tomorrow, thus plunging the Russian people into
a state ofgreat insecurity. When that time comes, Russia will miss the support
of China, having sat back and watched while Japan crippled China. So any
110. This is a pun, directed by the Guomindang against the Communists, on you)i, "guerrilla
warfare", literally "to rove and attack".
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backward nation that confines its policy entirely to one of the pursuit of
national interest will inevitably become isolated and bereft of any future, for
a national policy is in reality a policy ofisolation. This goes for Soviet Russia
too.
May 13, 1942.111
111. Fourteen days before Chen's death.
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A fortnight befOre his death, Chen arranges for his article on "The Future of the
Oppressed Nations" to be sent to his non-politicalfriends, but not to the Trotsky-
ists in Shanghai, who (he says) will neither understand nor agree with it.
I've got the letter you posted when you returned to your school,1I3 thanks.
I hope that you will send me the copy ofJiangjin ribao ["Jiangjin Daily"] that
XX114 brought for you. I don't intend to send any articles for publication in
that newspaper. XXX will soon be leaving. XX has already left for India, I
mentioned this in my previous letter, I hope you've already received it. One
might say that the article I sent you115 is a recapitulation ofthe previous three
essays,116 or, rather, a word or two to clinch the arguments I advanced in them.
Please show the two widowsll7 this article. I leave it to you to decide whether
or not to send a copy to XXX. Ifyou do decide to do so, perhaps they can
then send it on to XXX. It's unnecessary to copy it to anyone else,118 since
copying is not easy and, even if they get a copy, they will not understand and
112. Source: Zhuanji wenxue zazhi she, eds, Shi'an zizhuan, pp. 121-122. Y is He Zhiyu.
113. He Zhiyu, who was at the time teaching in a middle school injiangjin, had paid Chen
a visit and then gone back to jiangjin.
114. The people referred to in this letter as XX and XXX are impossible to identify, save that they
were Chen's personal and non-political (or no longer political) friends. These people maintained
contact with Chen but were afraid to make this contact public, lest they be discriminated against
or persecuted, by either the Guomindang or the Communist Party. To hide their identity, the
original editor erased their names when he included this letter in the collection.
115. "The Future of the Oppressed Nations" (note by the original editors).
116. "My Basic Views", "A Sketch of the Post-War World", and "Once Again on the World
Situation" (note by the original editors).
117. A nickname, it is not known whose.
118. Obviously a reference to the Trotskyists, most ofwhom at the time were in Shanghai.
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agree with it. I no longer have a copy of the third article ("Once Again on
the Wodd Situation"), please return the original to me. I've got the letter you
posted when you arrived back at your school, thanks.
Good health,
Duxiu.
May 13, 1942.119
119. Chen Duxiu died on May 27,1942. As he himselfsaid, these articles and letters "are merely
my personal opinion, they represent no one else" (see his letter to [Chen] Qichang) and others
"will not understand and agree with it" (see his letter to Y). (Note by the original editors,January
28, 1948.)
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was a Trotskyist, Pu gave no credence to these rumours. I shall clarifY this
question by discussing a few facts.
I myself have never believed these rumours, and I always considered that
they were not worth discussing. In recent years, however, more and more
people have started doing research on Chen Duxiu, and nearly all of them
believe the rumours to be true. The time has therefore come to clarifY the
matter and save from further error those who now and in the future engage
in research on Chen and on this period in Chinese history.
No, between leaving gaol and dying, Chen never entertained the idea of
rejoining the Communist Party. The idea never once occurred to him after
he had embraced Trotsky's proposals and worked in the Trotskyist organisa-
tion.
Personally, I have not the slightest doubt of this. I do not need to consult
a single document or fact; I base my conclusion solely on his usual conversa-
tion~ with us [before we went to prison]. On September 29, 1937,5 the day
I was released from prison, I went to stay at his residence and had a talk with
him. Our talk proved to me that he had not changed; as a result, I am even
more firmly convinced of my opinion on this matter.
But I cannot expect to convince others to share my firm belief simply by
referring to conversations that Chen had with several of us before going to
gaol and to a talk he had with me on the first night after my release. Elsewhere,
I have already explained on the basis ofour conversation that evening that after
leaving prison in 1937 he had not the slightest intention of rejoining the
Communist Party.6 Here, today, I do not intend to base my argument on that
talk, because it can convince only me. Instead I shall provide more objective
evidence.
The best proof that Chen Duxiu expressed no wish to rejoin the Commu-
nist Party after leaving gaol in 1937 can be found in Chen's own words. In
Hankou in [March] 1938 he wrote an open letter to Xinhua ribao in which
he said: "According to Luo Han, they still hope I will rejoin the Party.,,7 In
other words, he himself did not hope to "rejoin the Party", but the Commu-
nist Party hoped that he would, and moreover had dropped Luo Han a hint
along these lines.
5. Writing in "Chen Duxiu and the Trotskyists," p. 183, Zheng Chaolin recalls that he was
freed from gaol on August (not September) 29, 1937.
6. See Zheng Chaolin, "Chen Duxiu and the Trotskyists," pp. 183-184.
7. Chen Duxiu, "Gei Xinhua ribaode xin" ("Letter to Xinhua ribao"), reprinted in Zhang Yongtong
and Liu Chuanxue, eds, Houqide Chen Duxiu, pp. 112-133.
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Let us see what light Luo Han's famous "open letter"8 throws on this
question. In August [1937], after the start of the battle for Shanghai, Luo Han
came to Nanjing. Chen Duxiu was still in gaol at the time, and Luo did not
visit him. He went directly to the Eighth Route Army office at Fuhougang
in search ofYeJianying.9 At the time of the Northern Expedition, Luo had
been "Party representative" (or"director of the political department") of the
Fourth Army of the [Guomindang's] National Revolutionary Armed Forces,
at the same time that Ye Jianying (if my memory serves me rightly) was its
chiefofstaff. The two men were naturally close to one another. Luo Han had
two aims in going to the Eighth Route Army office: first, to ask the Commu-
nist Party to do what it could to get the Guomindang to release political
prisoners, including Chen Duxiu and the other Trotskyists still in gaol; and,
second, to repeat the old proposal of 1932, when the Trotskyist organisation
had formally suggested bilateral cooperation with the Communist Party against
Japan. In 1932, the Communist Party had ignored the proposal, but now that
it was working together with the Guomindang against Japan, Luo Han, acting
in his personal capacity, revived the proposal. This shows that Luo Han's
proposal referred to the question ofthe Trotskyists and the Communist Party
working together against Japan, and not to the question of Chen Duxiu or
other Trotskyists "rejoining the Party". Luo Han spoke very clearly about this
to YeJianying in Nanjing and to Lin BoqulO in Xi'an, and Ye and Lin heard
very clearly what he had to say. Luo Han declared several times that he
represented only himselfand not the Trotskyist organisation or Chen Duxiu.
Lin Boqu said: "Since you are only setting out your own views, in a personal
capacity, and do not enter into discussions in a representative capacity, things
could as well be settled by radio communication."
Even so, [the Communist leaders in] Yan'an did not completely believe
what Luo Han said, and still thought that he was representing Chen Duxiu.
They therefore set three conditions for Chen's "capitulation". That is to say,
even though the two sides would be merely cooperating, Chen would still
have to repent his errors and oppose Trotskyism. It is also possible that Yan'an
actually thought that Chen Duxiu had sent Luo Han, to discuss not just
cooperation but "rejoining the Party". All these things passed through a series
8. On April 24-25, 1938, Luo Han published an open letter to Zhou Enlai and others in Zhengbao
("Upright Daily"). See Feigon, Chen Duxiu, p. 223, tn. 73.
9. The Eighth Route Army was fonned in 1937 on the basis ofthe old Red Army; YeJianying
was the Communist Party's representative in Nanjing.
10. Lin Boqu (1896-1960) was a veteran Party leader.
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oflips and finally reached the conclusion that Chen Duxiu would repent his
past errors and return to the Party ranks. (During a talk between Wang
Ruofeill and Luo Han, Wang said something about sections of the Third
International not admitting members ofthe Fourth International; this remark
was precisely a reference to this question of "rejoining the Party".) Chen
Duxiu did not repent, whereupon the rumour-mill again began to grind: Chen
Duxiu had been unable to accept the three conditions, so he had not been
allowed to rejoin the Party.
From what I have said above, we can see that all this talk about Chen Duxiu
wanting to rejoin the Party or go to Yan'an is Communist Party propaganda
without any basis in fact.
Some people might, of course, object that I base my argument solely on
letters ofChen Duxiu and Luo Han, that I have absolute faith in their veracity,
and that I completely ignore Communist Party documents that provide
evidence to the contrary.
Regarding such documents, I have access only to Ye Jianying, Bo Gu, and
Dong Biwu's letter to Xinhua ribao. 12 I don't' even have the other articles
published in Xinhua ribao on this question. So I can quote only from Ye, Bo,
and Dong's letter.
This letter was written in reply to Chen Duxiu's open letter to Xinhua ribao.
It says: "At the beginning of September, after his release from gaol, Chen
entrusted Luo Han to talk with us, and told us that he wanted to return to
work under Party leadership." This statement can, ofcourse, be interpreted
as meaning that "Chen wished to rejoin the Party". There is a difference
between this statement and what Luo Han said in his "open letter". Luo Han
declared that he was acting on his own account, whereas this letter says that
he was representing Chen Duxiu; Luo Han said that he had gone to negotiate
cooperation, this letter says that he transmitted Chen Duxiu's wish to return
11. Wang Ruofei (1896-1946) joined the Communist Party in 1922 and was a member of its
Central Committee until 1945. He died in a plane crash in 1946. While in Moscow in 1928
as a member ofthe Chinese delegation to the Comintern, he had secretly expressed sympathy
for the Trotskyist Opposition.
12. Bo Gu (1907-1946), the alias ofQin Bangxian, had been acting General Secretary of the
Chinese Communist Parry from 1932 to 1935. Dong Biwu (1886-1975) was a veteran
Communist, and became a Central Committee member after 1945. The two men were members
at the start ofthe war ofthe Party's Changjiang Bureau, set up to represent the Party and lead
its work in central and southern China. The letter by Ye, Bo, and Dong referred to here is
reprinted in Zhang and Liu, eds, Houqide Chen Duxiu, pp. 235-236. See Feigon, Chen Duxiu,
p. 223, £n. 73.
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to work under Party leadership. So who is right and who is wrong? I believe
Luo Han to be right, since he gives dates. He went to Nanjing to talk to Ye
]ianying in August [1937], before Chen Duxiu had left prison; he left Nanjing
for Xi'an on August 30, arrived in Xi'an on September 2, met Lin Boqu on
September 3, received Yan'an's three conditions on September 10, and
retumed to Nanjing on September 15, by which time Chen had already left
for Wuhan. In the week from August 23, when Chen left gaol, and August
30, Luo Han did not meet Chen Duxiu. This is understandable, since he did
not know where Chen lived. I was at Chen's house the whole ofAugust 29,
day and night; I did not meet Luo Han, nor did anyone else mention him.
Ye, Bo, and Dong's letter goes on to say:
After Luo had left Nanjing, Chen also sent Mr Li XX [i.e., Li Huaying]13 to hold
talks: Mr Chen had already broken decisively with the Trotskyists, and urgendy
wanted to meet us. We took the view that this would be difficult, since Chen
had not publicly set out his political position. Mr Li XX said: what Mr Chen
wants is precisely to explain his political position to us, so Bo Gu and Ye]ianying
met Mr Chen. We requested him to explain his attitude to the anti-Japanese
national united front and to leave the Trotskyists.... Afterwards, Chen again sent
someone to say that because Li XX had been at the meeting, Chen had found
it difficult to speak freely, so he asked to see [Ye] ]ianying a second time. At the
meeting, ]ianying asked Mr Chen publicly to express to the entire nation his
opinion on three points.... [Dong] Biwu too met Chen in Hankou to urge Mr
Chen to fulfil these three conditions.
These three meetings all ended inconclusively. Even more noteworthy, in the
course ofthem Chen Duxiu expressed no wish to "rejoin the Party". So apa.rt
from the opening sentence about Chen wanting to "return to work under
Party leadership", what other support does this letter provide for the claim
that Chen wanted to "rejoin the Party"? (As I have already explained, even
this sentence is unreliable: Luo Han had not met Chen in Nanjing, so there
was no way that he could have received a commission from him.)
What is more, the claim that Chen wanted to "return to work under Party
leadership" is open to another explanation: the "united front" entailed various
groups and parties working together with the Communist Party yet outside
the Party, but it also entailed these groups and parties "working under the
leadership ofthe Party". Ye, Bo, and Dong deliberately used this ambiguous
formulation in their letter, and for the following reason: neither Chen Duxiu
nor Luo Han had spoken of"rejoining the Party", so ifYe, Bo, and Dong had
13. The given name was added by Zheng Chaolin; it is not clear who Li Huaying was.
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said "Chen wants to come back into the Party and work under the leadership
ofthe Central Committee", their statement would have had no basis in fact.
If Zhang Guotao's memoirs are to be believed, Yan'an discussed Chen
Duxiu's case in terms of "cooperation" and not of "rejoining the Party" .14
Recalling the Politburo Conference of December 1937 in Yan'an, Zhang
notes a speech by Wang Ming:
We can cooperate against]apan with anyone except the Trotskyists. Internation-
ally, we can cooperate with bourgeois politicians, warlords, and even anti-
Communist executioners, but we cannot cooperate with the followers of
Trotsky. In China, we can cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek and his anti-Com-
munist special agents, but we cannot cooperate with Chen Duxiu.
Finally, I would like to mention the attitude of the Trotskyist cadres, who
were concentrated in Shanghai. At that time, Peng Shuzhi's supporters and his
opponents were equally dissatisfied with Chen Duxiu's activities in Wuhan.
But. they only opposed Chen's wish to cooperate with the Chinese Communist
Party and not his alleged wish to "rejoin the Party". They found it completely
inconceivable that Chen would wish to "rejoin the Party". On November 21,
1937, Chen wrote to Luo Shifan, Chen Qichang, and Zhao Ji:
About cooperating with the Stalinists, my view is that there's nothing wrong with
it in principle, but at present it's out of the question. To cooperate, both sides
must have something to give; in addition, there must be some common activity
that necessitates both sides getting in touch - yet at present such conditions do
not obtain. Naturally it's crazy to talk of "cooperation"; Luo [Han] didn't
mention this matter to me, you have no cause to get oversensitive about it. IS
In other words, Chen Duxiu was not opposed in principle to cooperating with
the Communist Party against Japan, but saw such cooperation as conditional
on our having a certain strength, and on the necessity ofconstant contacts with
the Communist Party arising from the anti-Japanese activities. At the time, that
condition was absent, so Chen opposed cooperating with the Communist
Party. So he would have been even less likely to want to "rejoin the Party".
If those"oversensitive" individuals had suspected that Chen was inclined to
"rejoin the Party", rest assured that they would have raised a great hue and cry.
14. Zhang Guotao (1897-1979), a founder of the Chinese Communist Party and one of its
principal leaders, left the Party in 1938 and retired from politics. His memoirs appeared in English
as Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise ofthe Chinese Communist Party, 2 vols, Lawrence, Kansas: University
Press ofKansas, 1971-1972. Wang Ming (1904-1974) was Stalin's chief supporter in the Party
leadership.
15. See the "Letter to Chen Qichang and Others" in this volume.
96 Documents
ofmaking a nation less backward but will even make it more so. Quite apart
from setting back political and academic thought, a protracted war will lead
to a blockading of the economy and to inflation. In the absence of social
sanctions, and given the weakness of our political organisation, it is easy for
corrupt officials, unscrupulous merchants, and landowners to use the sheer
chance created by national hardships to collect windfalls by engaging in the
hoarding and cornering of goods; and owing to their crimes, our resistance
fighters are dying in pools of blood at the front and our common toiling
people starving and suffering in the rear. Should you propose applying more
or less unpeaceful methods to change this state ofaffairs, people will scream
at you that you are exceeding the bounds ofnational struggle and sabotaging
the national front against the invader. And in fact these methods do exceed
the bounds ofnational struggle. Yet to let things go on as at present is precisely
to deal a fatal blow to the war ofnational liberation. At the same time, these
awful things cannot be done away with by resorting to propaganda and
persuasion or to decrees issued by the government. What is to be done?
(2) From an international point ofview, today, when the imperialists are
competing for colonies and the market in the backward countries is greatly
intensified, according to Gandhi one nation cannot gain freedom by depending
on aid from an [imperialist] power; and he is one hundred per cent right. Yet
nor can it without the assistance of one of the powers free itself from the
present oppression ofanother power. What's more, some powers will come
to your assistance whether or not you depend on them to do so; that too is
an incontrovertible fact. At this point Nehru has no way out. Perhaps there
is a slight difference between him and Gandhi, in the sense that he is not
suggesting that American aid be rejected. Should America enter India, we
know that its stance on the colonies is better than that not only of the Axis
powers but even ofBritain; the Philippines are a case in point, although they
cannot be considered an independent nation-state. For the Indians to exchange
British for Japanese rule on the grounds ofnational independence would be
an even greater disaster. However much Gandhi and Nehru stress in their
propaganda that the age when Indians will acquiesce in foreign oppression has
now passed, they must know in their heart ofhearts that they cannot simulta-
neously expel the British and repulse Japan and Germany. The outcome would
simply be to languish under the rule ofa new master and to [have to] continue
with the campaign of civil disobedience. Well, what is to be done?
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Chen Duxiu's letter proves even more conclusively that Luo Han's actions
in Nanjing and Xi'an were his own personal initiative. Mter he had met with
a rebuff and gone to see Chen, he "never talked about" the cooperation.
Whether we are dealing with big matters or small, we should always stick
to the historical truth. Anything that does not accord with historical truth
should be pushed aside, even though people repeat it as if with one voice.
Some may consider that it is a minor question, not worthy of detailed study,
whether or not Chen Duxiu expressed a wish to "return to Party work" after
his release from gaol. But in my opinion, from the point of view of the
struggle ofthe Chinese Trotskyists, ofChen Duxiu's character, and ofChen's
relationship with the Chinese Trotskyists, it is no minor matter, but one that
requires thorough clarification on the basis ofhistorical evidence.
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LETTER TO FRANK GLASS16
Leon Trotsky
Trotsky's letter to Frank Glass (Li Furen) in Shanghai is by way qfa reply to
Chen Duxiu's letter to Trotsky (the second document in this selection) qfNovem-
ber 3, 1938, which Glass hadforwarded on Chen's behalfonjanuary 19, 1939.
Trotsky had expressed worries about Chen's physical security as early as 1937,
and had become even more womed cifter April 1938, when Wang Ming and Kang
Sheng started up a campaign in China to slander Chen as a "paid agent of
japan". He was therifore keen to get Chen to America, where he would be both
s* and able (so Trotsky hoped) to play the same role in the Fourth International
as"thejapanese Katayama Sen had played in the Third. In a letter accompanying
Chen's, Glass, commenting on Trotsky's efforts to persuade Chen to seek
sanctuary in the United States, had said that Chen "does not believe as Crux
[Trotsky] did that he is in imminent personal danger from the Stalinists or the
Kuomintang [GuomindangJ" (since, as he says, the numbers and present influence
qfthe Fourth Internationalists in China "are not such as to invite strong attack". 17
According to one source, Chen did not rule out a sojourn in the United States,
and even tn'ed to obtain apassport; he desisted only because his health deteriorated
and, moreover, because it soon became clear to him that the Guomindang would
under no circumstances let him leave China. 18 But Wang Fanxi, Chen's collabo-
rator and correspondent in those years, believes this assertion to be untrue, Trotsky
died in Mexico, at the hands of an assassin, on August 20, 1940.
16. The original ofthis letter, written in English, is held in the China files ofthe "Exile Papers
ofLeon Trotsky", deposited at Harvard University and made accessible in 1980.
17. The full text ofFrank Glass' letter to Trotsky is translated into French in Cahiers Leon Trotsky
(Grenoble), September 1983, no, 15, pp. 113-118,
18. Peter Kuhfus, "Chen Duxiu and Leon Trotsky: New Light on Their Relationship," China
Quarterly, June 1985, no. 102, pp. 253-276, at pp. 273-274.
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March 11, 1939.
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Dear Friend,
It was with the greatest interest that I read your letter from Shanghai ofJanuary
19th and the statement [by Chen Duxiu] from Szechwan [Sichuan]. At last
we have the information we lacked until now. I am very glad that our old
friend remains a friend politically in spite ofsome possible divergences which
I cannot appreciate now with the necessary precision.
Of course, it is very difficult for me to form a definite opinion on the
politics ofour comrades or the degree of their ultra-leftism, and thus on the
correctness of the sharp condemnation on the part ofour old friend. However,
the essence ofhis statement seems to me to be correct, and I hope that on this
basis a permanent collaboration will be possible.
I continue to believe that the best thing for him would be his sojourn in
the (United] States for a period. Do you not believe that it would be feasible
even without the approval of the high authorities?
I cannot share his optimistic view that no danger threatens him now. Yes,
for a period our Chinese comrades are protected to a small degree by their
own weakness. However, we are becoming stronger and stronger internation-
ally. Our party19 has begun to playa serious role in the States. It is a tremen-
dous warning to the Stalinists and they will try to prevent a similar danger in
the other countries. They will begin with the most prominent figures of our
movement.
My warmest greetings and good wishes.
Comradely,
T[rotsky]
Coyoacan, D. F.
2-5
19. A reference to the Socialist Workers Party, at that time the American section of the Fourth
International.
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Appendix 3
My FEELINGS ON THE DEATH OF MR CAI]IEMIN20
Chen Duxiu
"Who since ancient times has not died?,,21 Life is short, and death counts for
litde, yet I cannot help but grieve the death of Cai Jiemin, not only because
of his contribution to the public weal, but also on account of the personal
relationship between us! Thoughts and feelings about society and politics over
the last forty years!
The first time I collaborated with Mr Cai was in the last years of the
Guangxu reign [1875-1908] of the Qing dynasty. In those days, Yang Du-
sheng, He Haiqiao, Zhang Xingyan,22 and others in Shanghai launched an
organisation committed to studying the use of explosives in a projected
campaign ofassassination. Xingyan wrote a letter inviting me to join, and once
I had reached Shanghai from Anhui, I did so. I stayed in Shanghai for more
than a month, and each day I experimented together with Yang Dusheng and
Zhong Xianchani3 in manufacturing explosives. Mr Cai too used to attend
frequendy in order to conduct experiments and get together for a chat. The
second time I collaborated with Mr Cai was from 1916 to 1918, at Beijing
20. Source: Zhuanji wenxue zazhi she, eds, Shi'an zizhuan, pp. 123-127. This obituary was added
by Hu Shi or his friends in Taiwan to the Free China Press edition ofChen Duxiu's last writings;
it is absent from the original Shanghai edition. CaiJiemin is another name ofCai Yuanpei (Ts'ai
Yiian-p'ei) (1868-1940), who was a member ofthe Shanghai group ofterrorist assassins (which
Chen Duxiu brieflyjoined) and a supporter ofRussian nihilism before he joined the Guomindang,
ofwhich he became a veteran leader. Cai was China's most outstanding liberal educationalist.
He sponsored the May Fourth (or New Culture Movement) around 1919 in his capacity (between
1916 and 1926) as Chancellor ofBeijing University. He founded and became President of the
Academia Sinica.
21. A line from a poem by Wen Tianxiang, a national hero and poet captured by the Mongol
army and finally put to death because he refused to serve the new Yuan dynasty. The following
line says, "Let my red heart glitter in history."
22. Zhang Xingyan (1872-1973) (another name ofZhang Shizhao) achieved tune as ajournalist,
writer, and politician. He was one ofChen Duxiu's old friends, but his politics were extremely
unstable. He changed from a radical into a conservative, and from a cabinet minister in a warlord's
government into an admirer and supporter ofMao Zedong.
23. A member of the Shanghai terrorist group.
I
A
Appendix 3 117
-
University. That period ofjoint activity lasted relatively long, and I got to
know him much better.
Generally speaking, Mr Cai was a benign and uncontentious person, a
lovable man who would offend no one. Sometimes, however, when his moral
integrity or some matter of principle was at stake or when he had already
resolved on a certain course of action, he became stubborn and unbending
and was no longer prepared to accommodate others, even though he contin-
ued to adopt a mild and gentle attitude. That was the first thing that caused
people to admire the old gentleman. Mter the Reform Movement of 1898,24
Mr Cai himself often inclined toward the new progressive movement, but
while he was President ofBeijing University, he employed all sorts ofpeople
whose scholarship he admired: not only [radicals like] Hu Shi, Qian Xuan-
tong,25 and Chen Duxiu, but conservatives like Chen Hanzhang and Huang
Kan26 and even people such as Gu Hongrnin~7 (who wanted to restore the
Qing) and Liu Shipei28 (who participated in the Hongxian movemenr~.Such
magnanimous toleration of dissident and alien viewpoints and respect for
academic freedom of thought is rare among Oriental people, who are accus-
24. The Reform Movement, inaugurated by Kang Youwei in 1895 and supported by Liang
Qichao, Tan Sitong, and other leading thinkers of the time, advocated the transformation of
Confucianism into a religious movement, to provide the basis for modernising the state and
the education system and for establishing representative institutions. It came to an abrupt end
in 1898, when the reactionary Empress Dowager, Cixi, carried out a coup against Kang and
his supporters.
25. Qian Xuantong (Ch'ien Hsiian-t'ung) (1887-1939) became an anti-Manchu revolutionary
in 1903 and later leaned to anarchism. He taught linguistics at Beijing University. During and
after the May Fourth period, he played an important role in reforming written Chinese and
in propagating the new culture in general. In some respects he went even further than Chen
Duxiu and Hu Shi. Later on, however, he devoted himselfentirely to the study ofancient Chinese
history.
26. Huang Kan (Huang K'an) (1886-1935) was a leading disciple ofZhang Binglin (1868-1936),
the famous classical scholar and revolutionary; in 1915 he recommended Qian Xuantong to
Beijing University.
27. Gu Hongming (Ku Hung-ming) (1857-1928), born ofChinese ancestors in Penang, Malaya,
was known as an "imitation Western man"; he was fluent in several European languages but
not in Chinese. He wore a queue and hated both foreign colonialism and Chinese republicanism.
28. Liu Shipei (Liu Shih-p'ei) (1884-1919) was an early Chinese advocate (in]apan) ofsocialism.
At first he was an anti-Manchu revolutionary. Later he became a conservative literary man and
favoured the restoration of the monarchy in China.
29. In August 1915, Yuan Shikai, president ofthe newly established Chinese Republic, launched
a movement to restore the monarchy, with himselfas emperor. He announced as his reign tide
"Grand Constitutional Era" (Hongxian), which was to begin with 1916. Within six months,
Yuan was discountenanced and dead; his Hongxian dynasty lasted a mere one hundred days.
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tomed to despotism and respect only what is orthodox. That is the second
thing that caused people to admire the old gentleman even more.
Now that Mr Cai is no longer with us, his friends, his students, and all those
who recall him should bear in mind these two virtues!
After Mr Cai passed away, an old fellow-student ofmine at Beijing Univer-
sity wrote asking me to compose an obituary for Cai, to be published in a
special issue dedicated to Cai's death, and added: "Ever since May Fourth,30
some people have recommended the casting aside of national essence and
morality. Perhaps in your essay you can show how that is wrong and indicate
the right path."
On this question, my opinion is as follows. All peoples worthy of the name
have their culture, or their national essence; in the great furnace of world
cultures, the culture ofeach people, insofar as it is ofvalue, i.e., insofar as it can
be called national"essence" rather than national"dregs", is not easy to melt
down. Even ifa people becomes extinct, its culture may live on. The question
is ~hether a national culture is preserved in the hands of the nation itsel£ Ifa
people becomes extinct, or even if it is not yet extinct, and its culture or
national essence is preserved by the people of another nation, that is truly
catastrophic. Only in this sense does "preserving the national essence" have
meaning. Ifsome people view national culture in isolation from world culture
and national essence in isolation from world learning, and with closed eyes extol
themselves and deprecate everything foreign, shutting the city gates to keep
out foreign science, even to the point of refusing to use foreign scientific
methods as a tool for sorting out Chinese knowledge, then all our learning will
have lost the advantage ofcomparative study; it will be impossible to choose
the best ofit and expound it comprehensively. Those who embrace as national
"essence" what are in effect national "dregs" and who advocate reading aloud
from the Confucian classics while remaining wholly ignorant of the textual
knowledge and real meaning contained in them are truly frightful!
30. In 1914, Japan seized Gennan-controlled territory in Shandong. In 1917, Britain, France,
and Italy secredy agreed to support Japan's claim to this territory, and in 1918 the Government
in Beijing secredy acquiesced in this decision; in 1919, the Paris Peace Conference agreed to
transfer Gennan rights in China to Japan. On May 4, 1919, three thousand students demonstrated
in Beijing against this "national betrayal", and in the course of the demonstration beat a pro-
Japanese official. There followed a nationwide movement of strikes, lecture-strikes, and anti-
Japanese boycotts. OnJune 28, the Beijing Government gave in to the protest movement and
refused to sign the Peace Treaty with Gennany. So the May Fourth Movement in its narrowest
sense had been brought to a successful end. In its broadest sense, May Fourth was a movement
ofcultural renewal and revolution thatlasted roughly from 1917 to 1921.
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In human society, besides law, morality is an indispensable cement. Those
who fundamentally deny morality, whatever class or party they belong to, are
shamelessly wicked and base-minded. However, morals, unlike truth, were
formed to meet social needs, and are bounded by time and space. What this
person sees as moral, that person may not; what people in the past saw as
moral, people today may not. For example, widow-burning was considered
moral in old India, but not in China, where widows were expected to live
chastely after the death of their husband. A widow who remarried was
considered immoral in China but not in the West, and even in China today
it is no longer considered as something extremely bad. To kill a person is the
most immoral thing of all, but in battle he who kills or wounds the greatest
number ofpeople is a hero. Stories about burying the living along with the
dead and cutting off pieces of one's own flesh31 as an act ofloyalty or filial
piety used to be told with approval. The idea, imported to China from the
West, of equal rights for men and women was naturally highly incompatible
with China's ancient morality, i. e., the ethical code of Confucianism; even
so, members oftoday's Chinese gentry no longer publicly defend to the death
the old system ofmorality. As a matter offact, to practise equal rights between
men and women, the virtue of self-restraint is necessary on the part of the
men. In short, morals change according to the age and the social system; they
are not immutable and frozen. Morality is a form ofself-discipline and not an
obligation that you simply impose on others. It requires that you practise what
you preach; it should not be empty verbiage designed for the purposes ofself-
glorification. The louder people shout about morality in a society, the mot;e
backward and degenerate that society will be. On the other hand, the personal
conduct of the great scientists of the West is no worse than that of the
sanctimonious priests and pastors, while that of the philologists32 of the Qing
dynasty was much better and more honest than the ethical intentions of
moralists like Tang Bin33 and Li Guangdi.34 As for Mr Cai, he proposed
replacing religion with aesthetic education. He opposed the worship of
31. A so-called "filial son" would cut small pieces of flesh from his arm or leg, mix them with
medicinal herbs, boil the mixture, and serve it to his ailing parents as a drink.
32. Puxue, a scholastic tendency devoted to philological research, mainly into the Chinese classics,
and spurning speculative philosophy supposedly based on those classics.
33. Tang Bin (T'ang Pin) (1627-1687) was an orthodox early-Qing Confucian.
34. Li Guangdi (Li Kuang-ti) (1642-1718) aspired to be known as a follower of the Song
philosophers, though he was accused of paying more attention in practice to his career than
to the Confucian dictate of filial piety.
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Confucius and he never preached morality, but his moral quality far surpassed
that of many of those who constantly go on about morality.
This is not just my personal opinion. I daresay that on these two questions
my position is more or less identical with that ofMr Cai and Mr Hu Shizhi.
Shizhi is still alive. If you don't believe that our views are more or less
identical, you can go and ask him. And anyone intimately acquainted with
Mr Cai's words and actions will know that what I have said about him is not
mere rubbish.
The May Fourth Movement was an inevitable product of the contemporary
development ofChinese society. Whether one views it as an achievement or
as cause for blame, it should not simply be attributed to those few people.
However, Mr Cai, Shizhi, and I were principally responsible in those days for
articulating intellectual opinion, and since the public has raised doubts about
important questions, in the absence ofShizhi (who is abroad),35 I - as the sole
survivor still resident in China - have no choice but to venture a few passing
cominents in this brief essay for the public of today and of tomorrow, and in
commemoration ofMr Cai!36
35. Hu Shi was Chinese Ambassador to the USA from 1938 to 1942.
36. The original text can be found in Central Daily News, Chongqing, March 24,1940 (note
by Hu Shi).
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ORATION AT THE FUNERAL
OF MR [CHEN] DUXIU37
Gao Yuhan38
Place: School in Jiangjin,39 Deng's villa.
Time: Noon, June 1, Year 31 of the Republic [1942].
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I would like to express on behalfof[my dead friend] Mr Duxiu and his family
and relatives sincere thanks to the venerable Mr Deng Chanqiu, a leader of
the Jiangjin gentry, and his respectable nephew Mr [Deng] Xiekang [for all
that they have done for Mr Duxiu]. At the same time, and in the same way,
let me thank Mr Sun Maochi, Chairman ofthe Board ofDirectors ofJiangjin's
Yucai Middle School, and other gentlemen. When news that Mr Chen had
fallen ill reached town, Mr Deng Xiekang, together with Mr Zhou Fuling and
me, went down to the village to pay Mr Chen a visit. After that, Mr Xiekang
discussed with me what to do with Mr Chen's remains; he resolutely assumed
responsibility, without waiting for anyone to ask him to do so. After returning
to Jiangjin, he rushed around attending to Mr Chen's affairs, leaving himself
little time to eat or sleep. He arranged the funeral vestments and the coffin
to everyone's perfect satisfaction. In the meantime, some difficulties that arose
concerning the procurement of the coffin were solved only after Mr Deng:s
tireless pleading and persuasion. The venerable Chan[qiu] is already more than
seventy years old and living in retirement at Baisha Village, but as soon as he
heard the sad news ofthe death ofMr Chen, he hurried to Jiangjin, and, after
setting foot ashore, rushed without resting to Mr Chen's death bed at Heshan-
ping to express his condolences. Regarding the grave, Mr Xiekang had already
37. Wang Shudi et al., eds, Chen Duxiu pinglun xuanbian ("Selected appraisals ofChen Duxiu"),
2 vols, Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1982, vol. 2, pp. 406-410. This memorial address
was originally published in Dagong bao, Chongqing, June 4, 1942.
38. Gao Yuhan (Kao Vii-han), an old friend ofChen's who had studied in Germany, was a writer
and author ofBaihua shuxin ("Letters in the vernacular"), a veteran revolutionary, and a political
instructor at the Wharnpoa (Huangpu) Military Academy. He is funous as the first Communist
openly to attack Chiang Kai-shek, as "the Southern Duan Qirui". (Duan Qirui was a leader
of the Beiyang warlords in the north.) Gao became a Trotskyist in 1929.
39. Jiangjin is a town near Chongqing, Sichuan province; Chen Duxiu lived in the countryside
outside Jiangjin between 1938 and his death in 1942.
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generously decided to turn his newly built villa - Kang Garden, situated at
the side ofPeach Tree Forest outside the Great West Gate - into Mr Chen's
graveyard, and the venerable Chan has readily assented. At the same time, Mr
Sun Maochi, Chairman of the Board ofDirectors ofYucai Middle School,
representing the Middle School, generously offered to reserve a suitable plot
ofland in the school grounds in which to bury Mr Chen's coffin and remains;
and to erect in the vicinity of the grave several buildings in which to display
items left behind by the deceased, in order to give people an impression of
what he was like while alive. These acts offriendship are born ofsimple and
unaffected sensibility of a kind that cannot be won by force; in the modern
age, such noble acts and feelings are as rare as the feather ofa phoenix or the
horn ofa unicorn, and would have been rare too even in antiquity. Now that
it has finally been settled that Mr Chen's grave will be in the grounds ofMr
Xiekang's villa, things have happened as ifpredetermined: Mr Chen lived for
four years in Jiangjin, during which time, the two Messrs Deng - uncle and
nepnew - of all the gentlemen in Jiangjin became his most intimate friends.
Mr Chen several times went walking with the venerable Chan in the Peach
Tree Forest; last spring, Mr and Mrs Chen, together with Mr [Zhou] Fuling
and me, came to inspect the blossom and to gaze down at the great Yangtse
River; we were captivated by both trees and water - so great was our delight
that we lingered on, forgetting to return. Who could have guessed that the
place where Mr Chen came to delight his eyes would also be the place where
he closed them in eternal sleep? Were Mr Chen conscious in his grave, he
would experience complete satisfaction. And the noble and generous example
of uncle and nephew Deng will last forever!
But it is my belief, shared, I am sure, by all, that Mr Chen, by lying here,
will at the very least not sully the worthy owner's pure soil, or fail to live up
to the majesty ofthe mountains and rivers of this place. Mr Duxiu is at home
everywhere, and naturally an adherent of the view that "my bones may be
buried no matter where among the green mountains". Now that he sleeps
peacefully here, it can truly be said that he rests in the right place. Considering
the [grandiose] outlook he ever held, the [miserable] conditions he was
recently forced to live in, and his perspective on the [present national and
international] situation, we might console ourselves with the thought that he
left the world at the proper time. In the moment before he passed away, I am
sure that his conscience was completely clear. At this point, friends present
will naturally turn their thoughts to the question ofhow to appraise Mr Chen's
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life. In regard to his learning, his cause [as a revolutionary], and his entire
personality, and on the basis of his posthumous works and the inerasable
imprint that he has left on the history of Chinese politics, culture, thought,
and social movements over nearly forty years, people in the future will
certainly make a fair appraisal ofhim. As for me, I want to raise three points
that, as a crude sketch, will perhaps help Mr Duxiu's mourners here today
understand what made him the man he was.
First, I wish to look at Mr Duxiu's position in the history of culture and
thought. We must absolutely avoid [approaching any historical figure by
distorting - not to say fabricating - his or her achievements, by either]
exaggerating or belittling [them]. However, one thing is undeniable, namely,
that during the May Fourth period it was he who solemnly raised the two
slogans:
Support Mr De (Democracy);
Support Mr Sai (Science).
In those days, when Liang Qichao,40 ZhangJunmai [Carsun Chang],41 and
others were zealously advocating metaphysics and the Beiyang warlord
govemment42 was fighting its last struggles, Mr Duxiu's sharp eyes had already
seen what China's people and China's cultural and intellectual world urgently
required; i.e., he had already fully realised that ifChina was to free itselffrom
the two heavy weights ofwarlordism and colonialism and to build an inde-
pendent and free nation, politically it required democracy, while culturally
he urgently called for science so that the country could be industrialised. Ever
since, everything that we have struggled for, including the war of resistance
that the government is urging us to wage, take as their guiding principle these
two slogans. So Mr Duxiu's position in the history ofculture and of thought
is not difficult to understand.
40. Liang Qichao (Liang Ch'i-ch'ao) (1873-1929), ajoumalist, historian, and constitutional
monarchist, became leader ofthe so-called Study Clique after the down£ill ofthe Qing dynasty.
In 1919, during the May Fourth Movement, he questioned "the dream of the omnipotence
ofscience". In 1923, he supported the conservative view that China should value its own spiritual
civilisation.
41. Carsun Chang, a student of Henri Bergson and RudolfEucken and founder (in 1934) of
the Chinese National Socialist Party (which became the Democratic Socialist Party in 1946),
felt that after May Fourth, too many Chinese believed that science could solve all problems.
He argued in 1923 that science, being applicable only to dead matter, "is not able to solve the
problem ofa view oflife", and he questioned the value of a material civilisation achieved by
science.
42. During the warlord era (1916-1928), Beijing was in the hands ofa succession ofrival militarist
cliques.
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Second, I wish to look at Mr Duxiu's position in China's new literary
movement. Naturally, the new literary movement was part of the cultural
movement, but since the present generation ofChinese young people has not
yet completely understood the emergence and development ofthis movement
and its enormous influence on new China, it is worth dwelling on it for a
moment. Everyone knows that Messrs Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi were pioneer
advocates of the new literary movement, but it is not generally known that
Mr Duxiu championed the new literature43 long before the May Fourth
Movement, and even long before the 1911 Revolution.44 While running the
Anhui baihua baa ["Anhui vernacular magazine"] in Wuhu,45 he already made
clear his determination to reform Chinese literature. So literary reform was
the precursor of the cultural movement, the political movement, and the social
movement. At the time ofGermany's fifteenth-century religious movement
(actually, a minor part ofEurope's great social and political movement, which
borrowed the outer clothing of religion), Martin Luther's translation of the
Bible into spoken German paved the way for Germany's new literary move-
ment. The same thing happened after the importation into China ofBuddhist
culture in the Wei [220-265] and Jin [265-420] dynasties, when a group of
intelligent monks headed by Kumarajiva46 pioneered translation literature and,
by their unprecedented endeavour, cleared away the fog ofthe classical written
language. In the May Fourth Movement, Mr Duxiu and others resolutely took
upon themselves the task of reforming written Chinese, and thereby simply
met the new demands that had arisen in China at that time. Although some
people in those days considered it somewhat extreme to wield one's pen
furiously and declare war on the old literature, actually and ideologically this
sort of reform was a movement for revolution. When revolutionaries storm
the imperial palace to destroy the ancien regime, audacity and ruthlessness are
indispensable. Of course, one must not forget in discussing China's new
literary movement the pioneering achievements ofMr Liang Rengong,47 who
43. Actually, the main project of the literary movement was to create new foons of written
Chinese rather than a new literature as such.
44. The revolution under Sun Vat-sen that overthrew the Qing dynasty and inaugurated the
Chinese Republic.
45. The actual name of this journal was Anhui suhua baa (also meaning "Anhui Vernacular
Magazine"), not Anhui baihua baa; it was published in 1904.
46. Kumarajiva, born in Central Asia to an Indian father, was captured by a Chinese expedition
around 382 and taken to China, where he headed a major project to translate Buddhist scriptures
into Chinese.
47. I.e., Liang Qichao.
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after the Reform Movement of 1898 courageously wrote articles using
Europeanised sentence constructions, strove to import the whole range of
Japanese and Western scientific and cultural names and technical terms, and
transplanted Japanese and Western style into Chinese literature; in the initial
stages ofChina's new literary movement, he played an undeniably enlighten-
ing and pioneering role. But only Chen Duxiu and Hu Shizhi laid the
foundations on a grand scale for the founding of a new literary universe.
Moreover, Hu Shizhi received his professorial appointment at Beijing Univer-
sity due to the strenuous efforts of Chen Duxiu. That gives us some idea of
Mr Duxiu's position in China's new literary movement.
Third, I wish to look at Mr Duxiu the man. It is well-known that thinkers
or writers who want in the course of their life's struggle to maintain an
absolute balance between academic creation and moral integrity must have
the determination and courage to sacrifice themselves for the truth, a spirit
that manifests itself above all in the ability to endure poverty and hardship.
Thirty years ago, Mr Duxiu, baggage and umbrella slung across his shoulder,
scoured north and south of the rivers Yangtse and Huai in search of revolu-
tionary comrades to prepare to overthrow the Qing and establish a republic.
Wang Mengzou,48 an old and lifelong friend of Mr Duxiu, had opened a
bookshop in Wuhu and secretly maintained relations with the revolutionaries.
One day, Mr Duxiu turned up, bag in one hand and umbrella in the other.
Mr Wang said, "All I have to eat here are two meals ofgruel a day, life's really
hard." "Two meals ofgruel a day? That's great," replied Mr Duxiu, drily. So
he stayed on, and spent every day in the room above the bookshop editin~
the Anhui Vernacular Magazine and making propaganda for the revolution; that
was in the thirtieth year [i.e., 1904] of the Guangxu reign [1875-1908]. After
the defeat of the second revolution (against Yuan [Shikai]),49 Mr Bo Liewu50
withdrew from Anqing,51 so Mr Duxiu fled to Shanghai, where he lived in
Yuyang Terrace, in the French Settlement; there he edited the early Qingnian
["Youth"] (the forerunner of Xin qingnian). He was still eating two meals of
gruel a day, but he never once tried to borrow money from his friends; for
48. Wang Mengzou (Wang Meng-tsou) (1877-1953) was a publisher and a supporter ofall
progressive movements ir. China since the beginning of the century.
49. In 1913, Sun Yat-sen, leader of the Guomindang and architect of the destruction of the
Qing dynasty, tried to regroup his revolutionary supporters to overthrow the increasingly
dictatorial regime ofYuan Shikai, president ofthe new republic. This "second revolution" was
quickly defeated.
50. Another name ofBo Wenwei, the first revolutionary governor ofAnhui province.
51. The capital at the time ofAnhui province, where Bo Liewu was governor.
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in matters of taking money from or giving it to others, he was extremely
circumspect and stringent. As for Mr Duxiu's second virtue, I would say that
he was wholly indifferent to death. I remember that after the defeat of the
second revolution, when he was fleeing from Anqing to Wuhu, he was
captured by troops ofthe Wuhu garrison. This military man [the commander
ofthe garrison] had originally stood alongside Bo Liewu under the banner of
opposition to Yuan Shikai, but for some reason he'd fallen out with Bo; now
he was venting his anger on Mr Duxiu. He'd already issued a notice announc-
ing that Mr Duxiu would be shot. Mr Duxiu coolly urged him, "Ifyou're
going to shoot me, then get on with it." The execution was averted at the
last moment through the strenuous efforts ofMr Duxiu's friends Liu Shuya,
Fan Hongyan, and Zhang Zigang,52 who intervened to secure his release.
Later, [in 1932,] after Mr Duxiu had been arrested in Shanghai by the Guo-
rnindang government, he fell soundly asleep while under police escort on the
way to Nanjing, and did not wake until the train arrived in Nanjing the
following morning, as if it were simply a day like any other. 53 This calm
composure and fearlessness in the face of mortal danger were typical of the
man. Unless one understands this moral essence ofMr Duxiu, one will fail
to understand his entire personality and the worth of his legacy to us in the
field ofChinese cultural history. Finally, I solemnly repeat: We must absolutely
avoid [distorting a person's achievements, by either] exaggerating or belittling
[them].
52. A group of influential people in Wuhu at that time.
53. Chen had been arrested on October 15, 1932, together with the entire Trotskyist leadership
then still at large, in Shanghai's International Settlement, whence he was extradited to the Chinese
authorities; this was his fourth (and last) arrest. It was widely believed at the time that he would
be sentenced to death by the court in Nanjing, where he was sent to stand trial. The Guomindang
organised a big propaganda campaign to call for his execution. At his trial, Chen calmly justified
working for the overthrow ofthe Guomindang Government, on the grounds that the government
had failed to defend China against Japanese aggression and had suppressed basic rights and
freedoms. "I rebelled not against the nation but against the Guomindang," he told the court.
Liberals and other non-Cornmunist radicals flocked to Chen's support. Probably as a result, he
was sentenced not to death but to thirteen years in prison.
...
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THE STRUGGLE WITH
CHEN DU-HSIU [CHEN DUXIU]54
Ming-yuen Wang55
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This assessment ifChen Duxiu is excerptedfrom a document ifthe International-
ist Group if Chinese Trotskyists published in The New International, the
journal ifMax Shachtman's Workers Party, a Trotskyist organisation in the
USA, in February 1948. The document deals mainly with the problem ojpolicy
in the Sino-Japanese War and the subsequent civil war between the Guomindang
and the Communist Party, but it begins with this review ifthe politics ifChen
Duxiu at his life's end. After thejapanese attack on the USfleet at Pearl Harbor
in December 1941 and the start ifthe Pacific War, the Trotskyists' Communist
League ifChina had split into a majority, the Douzheng ("Struggle") Group,
so called tifter the title ifits paper, led by Peng Shuzhi, and the minority Interna-
tionalist Group under Wang Fanxi and Zheng Chaolin. A document if the
majority Struggle Group had been published in the Socialist Workers Party's
Fourth International ifjuly-August 1947; it is rEferred to below as the Report.
The Report begins with a description of the struggle carried on between the
Chinese Trotskyist organization and Chen Du-hsiu. It attempts to describe
the relations which existed between the Chinese Old Man and the revolution-:
ists of the 1925-27 generation.56 The Report says of Chen Du-hsiu: "He
turned his back upon our League almost immediately after he left prison" and
"declared in a letter to one of our old comrades in Shanghai that he had
decided to combat damned Bolshevism to the very end ofhis life!"
Such a description is oversimplified, therefore incorrect. Chen Du-hsiu, "the
father ofChinese communism," the general secretary ofthe Chinese Commu-
nist Party from its very inception until August 1927, the No.1 leader of the
Chinese revolution of 1925-27, who became a Trotskyist after the debacle
of the revolution, became one of the founders and leaders of the Chinese
54. Source: M. Y. Wang, "Chinese Trotskyism in the War," The New International, February
1948, pp. 58-62.
55. I.e., Wang Fanxi.
56. The Report described the leaders ofthe Internationalist Group as "comrades who belong
to the 1925-27 generation".
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Trotskyist movement, served four years in a Kuomintang prison while
remaining a staunch Trotskyist - Chen Du-hsiu did break with Bolshevism
during the Second World War. But this break did not take place "immedi-
ately" and it was not final.
During the period from the beginning of the anti-Japanese war down to
the outbreak ofthe Second World War, he held the position that the Chinese
Trotskyists could do nothing else than support the anti-Japanese war uncondi-
tionally. In his opinion it was quite out ofthe question to speak ofrevolution
during the war or oftransforming the war into a revolution. But as usual with
him, Chen Du-hsiu did not present this position as a matter ofprinciple but
rather empirically and tactically. He justified his position in the following
manner: We must at present support the war; as for this revolution, let's speak
ofit later. You can see from this that Chen Du-hsiu's position was false; but
it was neither final nor systematic.
Chen's Break with the Movement
In 1939, one year after the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, in order to
acquaint himself with the position of the Chinese Old Man, Trotsky asked
Comrade Li Fu-jen [Li Furen] to make an inquiry of him. Chen Du-hsiu
wrote a statement in answer which was given to Trotsky by Li Fu-jen. After
reading Chen Du-hsiu's statement Trotsky wrote Comrade Li as follows: "I
am extremely glad to know that our friend remained our friend politically,
although there are some possible divergences existing between us; but right now
I cannot judge these possible divergences with necessary precision.... However,
I consider that what he expressed is essentially correct." (Trotsky's letter to
Li Fu-jen, retranslated from the Chinese, March 11, 1939.)57
Chen Du-hsiu's position moved further away from that of the Trotskyists
after the signing ofthe German-Soviet Pact [in August 1939] and the outbreak
ofwar in Europe. He held that we should support the democracies versus the
fascist and Russian "imperialisms." He was of the opinion that in order to
facilitate the victory of the democracies in the war, the Indians should for the
time being put a stop to their nationalist movement.
It goes without saying that this is the same as the position that was held by
Plekhanov, Guesde & Co. during the First World War and that was held by
the Second International, and by the Third International after the outbreak
57. See Appendix 2 for the full text ofTrotsky's letter.
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ofthe Gennan-Soviet war, during the last slaughter ofmankind. Needless to
say, such a position meant a complete break with Trotskyism.
But, as we have said and as Trotsky had correctly observed, Chen Du-hsiu
was not a theoretician ofPlekhanov's type but a revolutionist ala Lassalle.
Lacking profound theoretical training, his action was always directed by
impressions, his opinions were changeable and fallible; but at the same time
and for the same reason he was often able to make bold corrections of his
mistakes.
The over-thirty-years' history ofChen Du-hsiu's revolutionary activity was
replete with such conflicts and mistakes. One's defects sometimes become
one's merit. It was partially because of this "defect," we believe, that Chen
Du-hsiu was able to complete his evolution from a democrat to a communist
and from a communist in general to a Trotskyist, in the briefperiod ofseven
or eight years.
We may speculate whether, ifChen had not died, he would have devoted
the remaining years of his life to the cause of the Fourth International. We
cannot give a definite answer to this question. That is why we also said that
his break with Trotskyism could not be considered as final.
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Appendix 6
ON CHEN DUXIU'S "LAST VIEWS"58
Shuang Shan59
Between 1936 and 1938 and again in late 1939 or early 1940, the Trotskyist
Wang Fanxi had a vigorous exchange if views with Chen Duxiu on the issue
ofdemocracy. Sometime in 1936 Chen Duxiu, then in prison, smuggled out an
article on democracy to the Trotskyists in Shanghai, where Wang published it in
Huohua ("Spark") together with his own critical comments. Three orfour years
later, Wang again discussed this same question with Chen, by then in Sichuan,
in letters that he wrote to him from Shanghai. This volume contains Chen's
correspondence with Wang and others who wrote to Chen in similar vein .
. Chen's view, expressed in his last letters and articles, that Lenin hadfathered
Stalinism, and Chen's rejection if dictatorship if any sort,revolutionary or
counterrevolutionary, alienated his Trotskyist comrades, who believed (as orthodox
Leninists) in a dictatorship if the workers. Wang's replies to Chen in Spark and
the letters he wrote to him bifore Chen died have apparently been lost, but in an
article written in Macau in 1957, Wang summarised in seven points positions
derivedfrom those that he had developed in his last exchanges with Chen. Wang's
seven theses show that far from rtjecting Chen's criticism outright, he strove to
incorporate its insights into his own political thinking and to reconcile the idea if
checks and balances, political pluralism, and democratic rights with the need}Or
violent revolution and proletarian dictatorship.
1. Under present historical conditions, if the proletariat through its political
party aims to overthrow the political and economic rule of the bourgeoisie,
it must carry out a violent revolution and set up a dictatorship to expropriate
the expropriators. So in nine cases out of ten it is bound to destroy the
bourgeoisie's traditional means of rule - the parliamentary system. To com-
58. Source: Shuang Shan, "Cong Chen Duxiude 'zuihou yijian' shuoqi" ("On Chen Duxiu's
'Last Views'''), in Sixiang wenti ("Some ideological questions"), Hongkong: N. p., 1957, pp.
5-6.
59. I.e., Wang Fanxi.
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plete such a transfonnation "peacefully", through parliament, is practically if
not absolutely impossible.
2. A proletarian dictatorship set up in such a way neither must nor should
destroy the various democratic rights - including habeus corpus; freedom of
speech, the press, assembly, and association; the right to strike; etc., etc. -
already won by the people under the bourgeois democratic system.
3. The organs ofthe dictatorship elected by the entire toiling people should
be under the thorough-going supervision ofthe electors and recallable by them
at all times; and the power of the dictatorship should not be concentrated in
one body but should be spread across several structures so that there is a system
of checks and balances to prevent the emergence of an autocracy or mo-
nocracy.
4. Opposition parties should be allowed to exist under the dictatorship as
long as they support the revolution. Whether or not they meet this condition
should be decided by the workers and peasants in free ballot.
5. Opposition factions must be tolerated within the party of the proletariat.
Under no circumstances must organisational sanctions, secret service measures,
or incriminatory sanctions be used to deal with dissidents; under no circum-
stances must thought be made a crime.
6. Under no circumstances must proletarian dictatorship become the
dictatorship ofa single party. Workers' parties organised by part of the working
class and the intelligentsia must under no circumstances replace the political
power democratically elected by the toilers as a whole. There must be an end
to the present system in the Communist countries, where government is a
facade behind which secretaries ofthe party branches assume direct command.
The ruling party's strategic policies must first be discussed and approved by
an empowered parliament (or soviet) that includes opposition parties and
factions, and only then should they be implemented by government; and their
implementation must continue to be supervised by parliament.
7. Finally, ... since political democracy is actually a reflection of economic
democracy and no political democracy is possible under a system ofabsolutely
centralised economic control, ... to create the material base for socialist
democracy a system ofdivided power and self-management within the overall
planned economy is essential.
All these points are not in themselves enough to save a revolutionary power
from bureaucratic degeneration; but since they are not plucked from the void
but rooted in bloody experience, they should - if fonnulated with sufficient
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clarity - (a) help workers and peasants in countries that have had revolutions
to win their anti-bureaucratic struggle when the conditions for the democrati-
sation ofthe dictatorial state have further ripened; and (b) enable new revolu-
tionary states from the very outset to avoid bureaucratic poisoning.
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CHEN DUXIU, FOUNDER OF
CHINESE COMMUNISM6o
Wang Fanxi
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To many younger Chinese socialists, the name Chen Duxiu means litde, and
to most socialists outside China, it means nothing at all. Of China's main
Communist leaders, only Mao, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and a handful of
others have won fame in the outside world. How could Chen, a nonentity,
stand alongside these great leaders? But in truth, Chen was anything but a
nonentity in the history ofthe Chinese Revolution. Ifjudged not just by what
he achieved direcdy but by his influence over an entire historical period, he
ranks not only above Zhou and Liu, but even above Mao himself
In 1936, in conversation with Edgar Snow, Zhou and Mao frankly acknowl-
edged Chen's influence on them, and Snow reported their remarks in his
classic Red Star Over China. But Zhou and Mao apparendy had second
thoughts, for the Chinese translation of Snow's book was withdrawn from
circulation in the spring of 1938. Zhou had told Snow: "Before going to
France, I read translations ofthe Communist Manifesto; Kautsky's Class Struggle;
and The October Revolution. These books were published under the auspices
ofXin qingnian, which was published by Ch'en Tu-hsiu [Chen Duxiu]. I also
personally met Ch'en Tu-hsiu as well as Li Ta-chao [Li Dazhao] - who were.
to become founders of the Chinese Communist Party." Mao Zedong said:
"I went to Shanghai for the second time in 1919. There once more I saw
Ch'en Tu-hsiu. I had first met him in Peking [Beijing], when I was at Peking
National University, and he had influenced me perhaps more than anyone
else." So Mao was Chen's pupil, not just before the Party was founded, but
for a long time afterwards, too.
Chen Duxiu was born on October 8, 1879, thirty-five years after the
Opium War and fifteen years after the defeat of the Taiping Rebellion. Outer
pressure and inner dissension had already shaken the Qing dynasty to its
foundations. The corruption and incompetence of the imperial system and
60. This assessment of Chen first appeared in a slightly different form in Gregor Benton, ed.,
Wild Lilies: Poisonous Weeds. Dissident Voices from People's China, London: Pluto Press, 1982,
pp. 157-167.
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the growing Western threat had woken many Chinese intellectuals to the need
for reform. So when Chen Duxiu was born, China was already in the first
stages ofpolitical ferment and change.
But Chen was brought up in a stricdy traditional way. Born into an Anhui
gentry family, he lost his father in the first months ofhis life, and was raised and
educated by his grandfather and his elder brother. The latter were both classical
Confucianists, and they set out to train the young Duxiu for the imperial
examinations, which were the sole path to bureaucratic office under the Qing.
Chen had no liking for the Confucian classics and even less liking for the
bagu or eight-legged essay, a form of composition in which examination
candidates were required to excel. However, to please his grandfather and his
mother, he took the first exam at the age of seventeen and came top of the
list with a xiucai degree.61 The following year, in 1897, he went to Nanjing
to take part in the triennial examination for the degree ofjuren. As a result of
his experiences there, he lost interest once and for all in the imperial examina-
tions and, more importandy, began to question the soundness ofChina's basic
institutions. He vividly described his feelings in his unfinished autobiography.
One candidate, a fat man from Xuzhou, who paced up and down the exami-
nation pen naked but for a pair ofbroken sandals, chanting his favourite bagu,
made a particularly deep impression on Chen.
I could not take my eyes offhim. As I watched, I fell to thinking about the
whole strange business of the examination system, and then I began to think
about how much my country and its people would suffer once these brutes
achieved positions ofpower. Finally, I began to doubt the whole system of
selecting talent through examination. It was like a circus of monkeys and
bears, repeated every so many years. But was the examination system an
exception, or were not China's other institutions equally rotten? I ended up
agreeing with the criticisms raised in the newspaper Shiwu ["Contemporary
Events"], and I switched my allegiance from the examination system to the
reformist party ofKang Youwei62 and Liang Qichao. And so an hour or two
of pondering decided the course of my life for the next dozen years.
The Kang-Liang reform movement was considered very radical when Chen
Duxiu joined it. It called for the replacement of the absolute monarchy by a
61. The first degree, gained at county level, in the imperial examinations under the Ming and
Qing dynasties.
62. Kang Youwei (K'ang Yu-wei) (1858-1927) was leader of the reform movement that
cuhninated in the short-lived Hundred Days Reform of 1898 and was a prominent scholar of
the New Text School of the Confucian classics.
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constitutional monarchy, and it proposed a series ofreforms to change China.
But just a year later, in 1898, the reformists suffered a crushing defeat, and in
1900 the Qing rulers were humiliated by eight foreign powers during the
Yihetuan (or Boxer) upheavals. Chen's outlook on life and politics became
more and more radical under the impact of these events. In 1904, in Anhui,
he published Suhua baa ["Vernacular magazine"], a newspaper written in
vernacular Chinese. In 1908, he went to Shanghai, where he joined an
underground terrorist group and learned how to make bombs. By now, his
political views had already left Kang and Liang way behind, and he was
advocating the overthrow of the Qing dynasty by force.
Even before the fall ofthe Qing in 1911, Chen was arrested for his political
activities in Anhui. After his release, he was driven into exile in Japan. There
he collaborated with Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Guomindang and chief
architect of the Qing's overthrow, but he did not join Sun's organisation. On
his return to China during the 1911 Revolution, Chen became political
director of the revolutionary army in Anhui. But after the Nationalists
compromised with Yuan Shikai, representative of the ancien regime, he was
once again forced into exile in Japan, where he published a revolutionary
newspaper. Returning to China in 1915, he founded the journal Qingnian
("Youth") in Shanghai, renamed Xin qingnian the following year. Xin qingnian
played a major role in the further unfolding of the Chinese Revolution. In
1917, Xin qingnian's editorial board moved north to Beijing, where Chen was
invited to become Dean of Letters at Beijing National University, China's
highest and most progressive institution. Here were gathered many ofChina's
best scholars, including Li Dazhao,63 a founder and early martyr ofthe Chinese
Communist Party; Dr Hu Shi, the philosopher; Lu Xun,64 the essayist; Qian
Xuantong, the historian; and Zhou Zuoren,65 the essayist. With their help and
that ofsome students, Xin qingnian quickly gained in circulation and influence.
In any case, circumstances favoured its rapid growth. The war in Europe
had temporarily loosened the West's economic grip on China, so that a
national bourgeoisie was born, and, with it, a modern working class. At the
same time, revolution was brewing in Russia, and in 1917 the Bolsheviks took
63. Li Dazhao (Li Ta-chao) (1889-1927) was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist
Party, second only to Chen Duxiu. He was executed in Beijing in 1927.
64. Lu Xun (Lu Hsiin) (1881-1936), modem China's best-known novelist, essayist, and critic,
was known as "China's Gorky". His original name was Zhou Shuren.
65. Zhou Zuoren (Chou Tso-jen) (1885-1968), a main contributor to Chen Duxiu's Xin qingnian,
introducedJapanese and Eastern European literature into China. He was the brother ofLu Xun.
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power in a revolution that decisively influenced modem China's course. Many
ideological and social movements sprang up throughout the world, and
especially in Europe, at the end of the war. Thus encouraged, some Chinese
intellectuals began to search more earnestly than ever for new solutions to the
problems that China had faced ever since being dragged into the world's eddy
by Western businessmen and soldiers. At the same time, these social and
political developments gave the intellectuals a ready-made audience of tens
of thousands, and a firm social base on which to realise their ideals.
Xin qingnian did not begin as a directly political publication. In the early
days, it campaigned on two main fronts: against China's traditional ethics and
social practices; and against classical Chinese, which was still used for most
written communication. The campaign against traditional ethics was known
as the New Thought Movement, and the campaign against classical Chinese
was known as the Literary Revolution. On the first front, Xin qingnian,
especially Chen Duxiu, took Confucius as the main target. Confucianism had
dominated China for over two millennia, and was the ideological mainstay
of the whole reactionary system. For Chen and his comrades, China's back-
wardness was due above all to its ossification under Confucian teaching; they
believed that there could be no social progress until the Chinese people was
freed from the Confucian grip. The Literary Revolution was closely linked
to this struggle against Confucianism. Classical Chinese, based on the spoken
language ofmore than one thousand years ago, differed radically from modern
spoken Chinese. So until it was replaced by a written form based on modern
spoken Chinese, mass illiteracy would remain and progressive intellectuals
would never be able to waken the people. This was not the first time that
Chen had called for language reform. As early as 1904 he had published a
newspaper with articles in the vernacular. But it was only now that the
conditions for a literary revolution had fully ripened. Now, despite stiff
opposition from the literati, daily speech finally won out, and living Chinese
replaced dead Chinese as the official means of communication.
Yet Chen Duxiu's main contribution to the New Thought Movement and
the Literary Revolution lay less in his constructive achievement than in his
destructive energy: in his dauntless urge to discredit, criticise, and destroy
everything traditional. He was among the greatest iconoclasts in the history
ofhuman thought; and, like all iconoclasts and pioneers, he worked not with
a scalpel but with a bulldozer. For him, the main thing was to pull down the
dilapidated house of the past, and this he did to devastating effect. But for a
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long time he had only the vaguest idea ofwhat sort ofhouse to put in its place,
except that it must be in the Western style. So during the first four years of
Xin qingnian, Chen Duxiu should properly be called a Westerniser or a radical
bourgeois democrat. He admired almost everything Western, especially great
events and people from the past three centuries ofEuropean history; he cited
them enthusiastically in his writings, comparing them with events and people
from the Chinese past. Great names like Francis Bacon, J ean-Jacques Rous-
seau, Auguste Comte, Charles Darwin, Louis Pasteur, Victor Hugo, Emile
Zola, Kant, Hegel, Goethe, Dickens, and even Oscar Wilde he introduced
indiscriminately as models for Chinese youth to admire and emulate. But he
did not know these people well, nor did he have a sound grasp ofWestern
thought. He mastered no European language, so he acquired all his new
knowledge throughJapanese translations; and hisJapanese was not good either.
The result was that all he learned from the West were a few broad concepts
such as humanism, democracy, individualism, and scientific method. From
these, he singled out democracy and science as the two surgeons capable of
saving China.
The October Revolution of 1917 had an enormous effect on Chen's
thinking, but it was not until later that Chen definitively embraced Marxism
and concluded that China would never become modernised unless the
Chinese, like the Bolsheviks, carried out an economic as well as a political
revolution.
It was above all May Fourth that precipitated this change in Chen's thinking.
On May 4,1919, a student movement broke out in Beijing and spread to all
China's major cities. This movement was in protest against the decision ofthe
Paris Peace Conference to transfer German concessions in China toJapan, and
against the Beijing government for acting as Japan's tool. May Fourth hap-
pened under the direct influence of Chen's Xin qingnianjournal. It was Xin
qingnian's first victory, but also its first big test. May Fourth quickly split the
Xin qingnian leaders into two competing camps. For some time, a process of
differentiation had been going on among the journal's main supporters. Now,
this process quickened. Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao went further to the left
and plunged into revolutionary work, while Hu Shi and others moved further
to the right under the pretext of "retreating to the study".
As a leader ofMay Fourth and its chief inspirer, Chen Duxiu was the main
target for government repression at the end of it. In June, he was seized and
gaoled for three months. After his release, he left Beijing University for good,
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and began a critical review ofthe doctrines that he had earlier indiscriminately
adopted. In September 1920, he declared himself a Marxist.
N ow that he had committed himself wholly to the revolution, he began
to work toward the establishment ofa Communist Party in China. In August
1920, he set up a Socialist Youth Corps in Shanghai. At the same time, Marxist
Study Groups were organised in big cities throughout China. InJuly 1921,
the Chinese Communist Party held its First National Congress in Shanghai.
Chen was elected General Secretary, and the following year he represented
the Party at the Fourth Congress ofthe Communist International in Moscow.
He was reelected leader at the following four Party Congresses; he led the
Party during the Revolution of 1925-27.
The Revolution of 1925-27 has been called a tragedy by some historians,
and it certainly ended in tragic defeats. What was Chen's role in that tragedy?
There are various answers to this question, which has been the subject ofmuch
heated controversy. The view of the Communist International and (until
recendy) ofthe Chinese Communist Party was that Chen was an opportunist
and a bungler whose wrong policy led the revolution to defeat. According
to this view, the main if not the exclusive blame for the defeat was Chen
Duxiu's. But not everyone agrees with this assessment. Some ofChen's fellow-
revolutionaries and many scholars believe that Chen's mistake was to be too
faithful to the directives ofthe Comintem, which was then controlled by Stalin
and Bukharin, and that he was merely Stalin's scapegoat. My own experience
of the events of 1925-27, and my later reflections on them, led me too to this
conclusion.
Chen Duxiu was dismissed as Party leader at the August 7 (1927) Emergency
Conference ofthe Central Committee. He was succeeded by Qu Qiubai, who
under Moscow's orders switched to an adventurist line culminating in the
disastrous Guangzhou [Canton] Insurrection ofDecember 1927. In retirement,
Chen wrote several letters to the Party warning against putschism and demand-
ing a critical review ofpolicy, but this merely widened the gap between him
and the new leaders.
In late 1929, Chen could acquaint himselfwith the Russian Left Opposi-
tion's views on China through documents brought back to China by Commu-
nists who had studied in Moscow. Until then, Chen had no true understanding
of the differences between Trotsky and Stalin on the Chinese Revolution.
These documents opened up a new field ofvision for him, and helped dispel
doubts that had vexed him for years. He soon went over to the positions of
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the Left Opposition, and wrote to the Party leaders demanding that the issues
in the Chinese Revolution should be put up for discussion in the Party and
in the entire world Communist movement. He was promptly expelled as a
result; in response, he wrote his famous "Open Letter to all Comrades" of
December 10, 1929, and put his name to the statement "Our Political Views"
signed by eighty-one veteran Party members. Needless to say, all these people
were expelled from the Party. A few months later, in February 1930, Stalin
tried to "win Chen Duxiu back" by inviting him to Moscow. Chen turned
down the invitation, thus severing all ties with the Party he had founded nine
years earlier.
Chen then organised his followers into a Left Opposition and published the
newspaper Wuchanzhe ["Proletarian"]. In May 1931, this organisation merged
with three other Trotskyist groups to form the Chinese section ofthe Interna-
tional ofBolshevik-Leninists, ofwhich Chen was elected General Secretary.
But in October 1932, Chen was arrested and put before the Nanjing Military
Tribunal, where he faced the death sentence. In court, he behaved every inch
like a revolutionary leader; from the dock, he denounced the Guomindang's
regime ofterror. His arrest and trial led to a nationwide campaign to free him.
As a result, he was spared the death penalty and given a thirteen-year gaol
sentence instead.
Chen stayed in prison until shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese
War in 1937, when he was freed along with other political prisoners, but he
was still kept under strict watch, and this prevented him from doing revolu-
tionary work. After a briefstay in Wuhan, he was compelled to stay in a small
town near Chongqing in Sichuan province, where the Guomindang had its
wartime capital. His health had worsened in prison, and on May 27, 1942,
he died of heart sickness and phlebitis, aged sixty-four.
Chen spent his last years in great poverty, bad health, and isolation. Never-
theless, the Guomindang and the Communist Party persecuted him to the end.
In the summer of 1938, the Communist Party began a strident slander
campaign against him. This campaign was directed by Wang Ming, Stalin's
chief representative in China. Wang Ming accused Chen of"collaborating
with theJapanese imperialists". At the same time, the Guomindang prohibited
Chen from resuming his literary activities. All he could do during those hard
times was to ~hink and to exchange opinions by letter with a few old friends.
After his death, these letters and a few articles from the years 1940-42 were
compiled by one ofhis former pupils, He Zishen, and published in Shanghai
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in 1948. In 1949, Dr Hu Shi, once an old friend ofChen's but later a staunch
supporter ofChiang Kai-shek, reprinted this collection ofwritings in Taiwan,
and wrote an introduction to it in which he welcomed Chen's ideas as those
ofa "prodigal returned". As for the Chinese Communist Party, it regarded
Chen as a renegade, and even some Trotskyists thought the same, although
for different reasons. So what was Chen's new position, and did it represent
his final reconciliation with bourgeois thought?
The main themes of Chen's last letters and articles were as follows. First,
no revolutions would break out during the war, and only ifthe Allies defeated
the Axis would revolutionary crises happen. Socialists throughout the world
were therefore duty-bound to support the democratic Allies against the Fascist
Axis. Second, there is no essential difference between bourgeois and proletar-
ian democracy, but only a difference of degree. Proletarian democracy is
therefore an extension rather than a negation of bourgeois democracy, and
it is wrong to say that bourgeois democracy is historically superseded. Third,
capitalism is the root ofwar, which only world revolution can end. Fourth,
the struggle for national liberation is interlinked with proletarian revolution
in the advanced countries, and the forces behind these two struggles make
socialist revolution together. Fifth, the Soviet Union under Lenin was
qualitatively different from the Soviet Union under Stalin. The former was
socialist, the latter was not. (Chen died before he could elaborate on what kind
ofregime the Soviet Union under Stalin had become.) Sixth, although Lenin's
regime was not like Stalin's, Lenin was partly to blame for Stalin's crimes, since
it was he who had counterposed proletarian dictatorship to democracy in
general. Seventh, a true socialist revolution is one in which democracy -or,
more exactly, democratic rights - are respected and extended.
Chen's thinking had changed greatly during the early war years, but his
views, however muddled, still fell far short of a reconciliation with his old
enemy, the bourgeoisie. Instead, they represented a return by Chen in his old
age to the positions he had held as a young man. It is interesting to ask why
this happened, especially since in my experience it is not uncommon for
intellectuals in backward countries to revert in this way to the ideas of their
youth.
China's isolation was broken down by guns and ships. China's "modernisa-
tion" stemmed not from gradual change based on evolutions within its own
society, but from outside pressures. Development of this sort is inevitably by
leaps and bounds, and is condensed and telescoped. In China, the transition
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from democratic radicalism to the founding ofa modern socialist movement
took some twenty years. In Britain and France, the same process took several
centuries, and in Russia it took several scores ofyears.
Moreover, China's progress from democratic agitation to full-blown
Communism took place in one and the same person: Chen Duxiu. Chen was
China's Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, Plekhanov, and Lenin rolled into one. True,
he reached the stature of none of these great Russians, but he traversed the
entire gamut of their thinking, from the first awakening ofindividualism to
the struggle for socialist collectivism. Thus, Chen embodies what Russian
Marxists referred to as combined development. However, combined develop-
ment is both a privilege and a curse. It explains not only Chen's merits but
also his faults. Chen rapidly and boldly assimilated an impressive list of isms,
but in none did he reach real depth. In his teens, he became a "left-wing
Confucianist"; in his twenties, he was intoxicated by Western democracy; in
his thirties, he criticised Confucianism; and at 41, he became a Marxist.
Inevitably, he retained elements of older ideologies among the new ones, as
he raced from one ism to the next. And by the time that he embraced
Marxism, he had reached an age where new thinking rarely sinks deep into
the soul. So it is understandable that, in the last years ofhis life, Chen returned
in part to his intellectual first love, "pure" democracy.
Other factors, too, disposed Chen to look favourably on democracy. Above
all, he was appalled by the degeneration of the Stalinist regime in the Soviet
Union. It was the Moscow trials that initially led him to rethink the Leninist
view ofbourgeois democracy.
How, then, should one appraise Chen's life? Despite his political failures and
his intellectual limitations, Chen was not only modern China's bravest thinker
but one ofhistory's great revolutionaries, because ofboth his leading role in
the Chinese Revolution and his personal indomitability. He did not hesitate
to give up a brilliant career for the uncertain and hard life ofa revolutionary.
He heroically bore the loss ofhis family and his two sons (murdered by the
Guomindang in 1927 and 1928). He stuck to his beliefS under the threat of
imprisonment and death. And during the last years ofhis life, when he was
gravely ill and desperately poor, he refused to accept money offered him by the
Guomindang through one ofhis old friends. All this shows that Chen was a man
of revolutionary mettle; his memory remains that of a great revolutionary.
Another appraisal of Chen is that he was "an oppositionist for life to any
established authority", and Chen himselfliked this description ofhis career.
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Appendix 8
CHEN DUXIU AND THE TROTSKYISTS66
Zheng Chaolin
This appendix comprises the concluding section ifa special study by the veteran
Trotskyist Zheng Chaolin (arrested by the Shanghai political police in 1952 and
finally freed in 1979, aged 78) on Chen Duxiu's relationship to Trotskyism;
the study was commissioned by Party historians to supplement their planned
publication ifZheng's memoirs, which had been completed (but not published)
in 1945 and was unearthed from a government vault in 1979, shortly eifter
Zheng's releasefrom gaol. In 1986, eifter sittingfor several years on the manuscript
if the memoirs and the newly commissioned supplement, Chinese Communist
cifficials finally authorised their publication, in an edition restricted to privileged
categories if'?!ficials and researchers. On December 11, 1987, Zheng explained
in a postscript to the English translation ifhis memoirs the circumstances under
which he had composed the study on Chen Duxiu: ttl wrote the appendix 'Chen
Duxiu and the Trotskyists' at the invitation ifa certain research institute in
1980, shortly eifter I had regained myfreedom. At the time, public opinion tended
to make a distindion between Chen Duxiu and the Trotskyists. People said that
Chen Duxiu was agood man whose good name should be restored, but they made
no evaluation if the Trotskyists. So the aim if this long article is to show that
Chen Duxiu and the Trotskyists cannot be dealt with separately. ,,67
Was or was not Chen Duxiu a Trotskyist? This is one ofthe hardest questions
currently facing students of contemporary Chinese history and people who
wish to study and grasp the present political situation in China. Chen's role
in Chinese and world history can never be rubbed out. The old slanders against
him cannot be upheld.
Just think of the picture of Chen Duxiu painted by several generations of
political commentators! An opportunist who buried the Great Revolution,
66. Excerpted from Zheng Chaolin, "Chen Duxiu and the Trotskyists," pp. 197-202.
67. Quoted in Benton, China's Urban Revolutionaries, p. 250.
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a renegade, a national traitor, a paid agent ofthe Guomindang, a counterrevo-
lutionary, and so on. The founder ofthe Chinese Communist Party, elected
its top leader at five successive congresses, was that sort ofman? Some people
even go so far as to claim that the leader of the May Fourth Movement of
1919 was not Chen Duxiu but someone else.68
Things began to change only in 1979, which was Chen's hundredth birthday
and the sixtieth anniversary of May Fourth, after which the press began to
recognise Chen's role in leading it. AroundJuly 1 and October 169 ofthat year,
the press also started to recognise Chen's role in founding the Chinese
Communist Party. The Museum of the Revolution in Beijing displayed his
picture and the taboo on discussing the relationship between the Comintern
and the Chinese Communist Party was broken. Historians began to reach new
conclusions that were more in accordance with the facts. Articles began to
appear in the open and the internal press70 showing that when Chen Duxiu
said in 1923 that China's bourgeois revolution would be led by the bourgeoi-
sie, he was simply representing the Comintern's point ofview; and that when
in 1926 and 1927 the Chinese Communist Party was pursuing an opportunist
line, it was also following Comintern directives. Later, during the War of
Resistance to Japan, an article appeared in Xinhua ribao ["New China Daily"]
accusing Chen Duxiu and Luo Han ofcoming to an agreement through Tang
Youren with Japanese intelligence by which they would be paid $300 a
month: but now evidence has been produced to reveal this as a political
calumny. In the past, people used to say that Chen's three letters to the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party about the Chinese Eastern
Railway Incident proved that he had gone over to the counterrevolution, but
now others are saying that in this controversy the Central Committee was
wrong and Chen was right. As for the charge that he capitulated to the
Guomindang, became an agent, and took money from Chiang Kai-shek,
many, many people have now produced evidence to rebut it.
Finally, there is the question ofthe Trotskyists. The Comintern taboo has
already been broken; but the taboo on Trotskyism remains, and people carry
on repeating- as they have been doing for decades now - that the international
Trotskyists and the Chinese Trotskyists are counterrevolutionaries. So how
68. For many years, the pretence was maintained in China that the May Fourth Movement
was led by Li Dazhao and Lu Xun.
69. The anniversaries ofthe founding of the Party (in 1921) and of the People's Republic (in
1949).
70. The internal or neibu press is accessible only to privileged categories ofpeople.
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come Chen Duxiu, leader ofMay Fourth and founder ofthe Chinese Commu-
nist Party, got mixed up with this counterrevolutionary political organisation?
Some people say that he was influenced only intellectually by Trotsky, and
that he didn't join the Trotskyist organisation.
Some people say that he joined the Trotskyist organisation but broke with
it after the Guomindang arrested him.
Some people say that after his release from the Guomindang gaol he declared
that he was not a Trotskyist, i.e., that he broke with the Trotskyist organisa-
tion, and that after that there is no evidence that he had anything more to do
with the Trotskyists.
Some people say that when he joined the Trotskyist organisation the
Trotskyist question was still a contradiction among the people,71 and that by
the time the Trotskyists had become a bunch ofmurderers and foreign spies
he had already broken with them.
Some people say that he gave up his Trotskyist ideas a few years before he
died.
And so on.
Naturally, there are also people who know full well that the Trotskyists are
anything but counterrevolutionary and that Chen Duxiu's conversion to
Trotskyism and his membership ofthe Trotskyist organisation were an organic
outcome ofhis entire intellectual development. But they still don't dare say
so in public.
In my view, there is no longer any need for me today to defend Chen
Duxiu against the charge that he was an "opportunist", that he was to blame
for the defeat of the revolution, or that he was a "counterrevolutionary", a
"renegade", an "agent", a "running dog ofthe Guomindang", and a "national
traitor". I simply wish to explain the facts and meaning ofhis relationship to
the Trotskyists, and to say that any attempt to research his life and thought
that tries to bypass this relationship is as self-deceiving as the stupid thiefwho
in trying to steal a bell plugs his own ears in the hope that no one will hear
it ringing.
There is no way that Chen's membership and leadership of the Chinese
Trotskyist organisation can be denied, or of denying that while in gaol he
continued through secret channels to control that organisation. There are
documents and articles to show that this is true. His declaration after leaving
71. A Maoist expression, used in opposition to a "contradiction between the enemy and us [i.e.,
the revolutionary people]".
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gaol that he no longer had dealings with the Trotskyist organisation was mere
diplomatic verbiage. At that time he wanted to unite democratic personages
beyond the influence ofthe Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party
in the war against Japan, so he wanted to avoid getting entangled at the outset
in the Trotskyist question; in any case, by then the leadership ofthe Trotskyist
organisation had been taken over by Peng Shuzhi, so Chen was not inclined
to submit his statements and actions to its disciplinary constraints. But it is clear
from contemporary sources that he had by no means left the Chinese Trotsky-
ist organisation. His 1938 letter to Chen Qichang and others, which still exists,
is enough to show that he still considered the Trotskyist organisation his own,
that he looked upon Luo Shifan, Chen Qichang, Zhao Ji, and HanJun as his
own cadres, and that he criticised them only because he cared for them and
for the Trotskyist organisation, even though he was not then working to
revive Trotskyist organisation. In early 1939 or late 1938 the Trotskyist
organisation sent Chen Qichang by devious routes from Shanghai to Jiangjin
to meet Chen Duxiu, and to pass on Trotsky's advice to him to leave the
country. Chen wrote a personal letter to Trotsky the tone ofwhich showed
quite clearly that he considered the Trotskyist organisation his own: the sharp
criticisms he raised in it only showed that he still loved and cherished this
body. Let's quote some passages from his letter.
The membership of the Chinese Communist Party is far in excess of ours, but
they're just armed forces with intellectuals but without any working-class base
at all. We have fewer than fifty people in Shanghai and Hongkong, plus probably
more than one hundred stragglers in other parts of the country.
Needless to say, we do not fool ourselves that we will grow quickly in this war,
but ifwe had pursued more or less right tactics, we would not be in our present
feeble state. From the very start our group tended toward ultra-left positions....
A small closed-door ultra-left organisation ofthis sort obviously stands no chance
ofwinning members; and even if it did, it would be an obstacle to the further
development of the Chinese Revolution....
We should beware of perpetuating the illusion that we can only restart our
activities after the recovery of territories now occupied by the Japanese. Even
today, while Japan continues to occupy parts ofour country, we should prepare
forthwith to start work afresh, within the narrow space that remains open to us....
Ifultra-leftists who stay aloof from the masses and the real struggle ... continue
to brag and pretend to be big leaders, to organise leadership bodies that lack all
substance, and to found petty kingdoms for themselves behind closed doors and
relying on the name of the Fourth International, they will achieve nothing
beyond the tarnishing of the Fourth International's prestige in China.
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Ask yourself, are those the words ofsomeone who has placed himself outside
the Chinese Trotskyist organisation?
At the time ofthe Hitler-Stalin Pact, Chen Duxiu became so angry that he
said things in letters to his friends that went beyond the limit of what is
permissible, but it would be wrong to take that as proof that he had broken
with Trotskyism.
I have in my possession an article he wrote on May 13, 1942, a fortnight
or so before his death. The article, called "The Future ofOppressed Peoples",
shows that he remained a Trotskyist to his dying day. Here are some excerpts
from it.
So in my opinion, in a capitalist-imperialist world, no small or weak people can
hope for a future so long as it tries only behind closed doors, relying only on its
own small forces, to remove the reality of imperialist aggression. Its only hope
lies with oppressed toilers the world over. The national question will automati-
cally be resolved ifthe oppressed, backward peoples unite, overthrow imperialism
everywhere, and replace the old world of international capitalism based on
commodity deals with a new world of international socialism based on mutual
help and a division oflabour.
This passage shows that right up to his death Chen Duxiu continued to stand
on the side ofTrotsky's world revolution and rejected Stalin's idea ofsocialism
in one country.
The article also says:
Some people vilifY the Soviet Union of the early period, whereas we support
it; others flatter the Soviet Union of the later period, whereas we detest it.
There's a very big difference between these two periods. In the former period
the Soviet Union stood for world revolution; in the latter, for Russian national
self-interest. Ever since the Soviet leaders first betrayed their own cause after the
setback to the revolution in Western Europe and abandoned the policy ofputting
world revolution to the fore, replacing it instead with Russian national self-
interest, clear-thinking people in all countries have gradually progressed from
scepticism to disappointment; and though some still think that the hope for
mankind lies with the Soviet Union, in reality they can only view it as one
among a number of world powers. People who stubbornly insist on calling it
socialist only besmirch the name of socialism.
This passage too supports Trotsky and opposes Stalin. The difference is that
Trotsky still considered the "Soviet Union of the later period" to be a
"degenerated workers' state", whereas Chen Duxiu denounced it point-blank
as a one of the "world powers". It's a fact that the "Soviet Union ofthe later
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period" had already degenerated into "social-imperialism"; it had started to
degenerate from the time ofStalin onwards.
So Chen Duxiu remained a Trotskyist till his dying day, from both an
organisational and a theoretical point ofview.
Looking back, the main "injustices, frame-ups, and mistakes"n were the
show-trials of the 1930s, which practically wiped out a generation ofrevolu-
tionaries. Even today the victims ofthese trials are treated with contempt. First
they must be rehabilitated.
Needless to say, I am speaking not from a juridical point ofview. Only a
Soviet court, under the control of the Communist Party, can judicially
rehabilitate these victims - the so-called "Trotskyites", "Zinovievites", and
"Bukharinites". I am speaking only from the point ofview ofhistorical fact.
From the point ofview ofhistory, i.e., from the point ofview of the over-
whelming majority ofknowledgeable people in the world, these victims have
long since been rehabilitated. Just a short time ago the new Pope John Paul
II rehabilitated Galileo, but for the past several hundred years there can hardly
have been anyone still convinced by the charges against Galileo. Today
probably only a handful of people in the world still believe the Moscow
verdicts against the "Trotskyites".
A footnote in Mao Zedong's Selected Works quotes Stalin as follows:
In the past, seven or eight years ago, Trotskyism was one ofsuch political trends
in the working class, an anti-Leninist trend, it is true, and therefore profoundly
mistaken, but nevertheless a political trend.... Present-day Trotskyism is not a
political trend in the working class, but a gang without principle and without
ideas, of wreckers and diversionists, intelligence service agents, spies, murderers,
a gang ofsworn enemies of the working class, working in the pay of the intelli-
gence services of foreign states.73
Stalin said this in 1937, in the period of the Moscow show-trials. But on
what grounds did Stalin claim that the Trotskyists were "agents, spies, murder-
ers"? True, Vishkinsky, who was in charge of investigations, came up with
all sorts of"criminal evidence", but this "evidence" has already been systemati-
cally rebutted by the Dewey Committee. This Committee published two
volumes offindings to show that the charges were groundless, and it declared
72. A phrase often used in China in the wake ofthe Cultural Revolution to describe the "fascist
lawlessness" of the "Gang of Four".
73. Quoted in Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1964, vol. 1,
p. 177, £n. 31.
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Trotsky innocent. Dewey apart, other evidence has accumulated over the past
forty or more years that I would like to mention.
According to Stalin, Trotsky's two biggest crimes were to assassinate Kirov
and to spy for the Gestapo in order to help plot Germany's invasion of the
Soviet Union.
First the assassination of Kirov. Even at the time, Trotsky came up with
evidence to show that Stalin himselfkilled Kirov to frame the then opposition,
but this evidence did not have much impact. More than twenty years later,
Stalin's successor Khrushchev, at the Twenty Second Congress of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union, proved that Kirov had indeed been killed
by Stalin. Recently twenty letters by Stalin's daughter Svetlana were published
in China. In one ofthem Svetlana denies Khrushchev's allegation and says that
Kirov was killed not by Stalin but by Beria. Whatever the case, in today's
world, including in the Soviet Union, no one - or at least hardly anyone -
any longer believes that Kirov was killed by Zinoviev and Trotsky.
Stalin also killed Tukhachevsky, Blucher, and two other Red Army generals
on trumped-up charges ofhaving secret dealings with the Nazis and plotting
to betray the Soviet Union. But at the Twenty Second Congress, Khrushchev
declared these allegations too to be Stalin's fabrications. Stalin had first forged
them and then surreptitiously leaked them to President Benes ofCzechoslova-
kia. Benes, believing them to be true, secretly informed Stalin, who imposed
death sentences on the basis of them.
This is just one piece of"evidence" among many. After the Second World
War, when the Allies tried the Nazis for war crimes at Nuremberg, some well-
known people led by H. G. Wells wrote to the Tribunal asking it to produce
from among its vast files evidence ofTrotskyist collaboration with the Nazis.
It couldn't.
For the time being, I'll restrict myself to just these three points. There is a
mountain ofevidence to show that the charges levelled against the Trotskyists
at the Moscow show trials were groundless, and another mountain ofevidence
produced by the Dewey Committee. Today researchers can investigate whether
or not this evidence substantiates Stalin's charges against the Trotskyists.
As for the Trotskyist organisation in China, there is ample evidence to clear
its name. It has already been shown that Chen Duxiu and Luo Han did not
act via Tang Youren as paid agents for Japanese intelligence, but the strange
thing is that people still believe that the Chinese Trotskyists did. It has been
proved that Chen Duxiu was not a Guomindang agent or a running dog of
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Chiang Kai-shek, but people still think that the Chinese Trotskyists were. The
charges against Chen Duxiu could not stand up under scrutiny. But what is
the evidence against the organisation of the Chinese Trotskyists? Can it stand
up under scrutiny?
We commemorate Chen Duxiu, this outstanding figure ofmodem Chinese
and world politics. In commemorating him, we Trotskyists are more deeply
stirred than other people. We recall that for a while he was General Secretary
of our organisation. We consider this an honour.
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Appendix 9
PREFACE TO THE COLLECTED POEMS
OF CHEN DUXIU74
Xiao Ke
In August 1981, speaking at an academic symposium, the veteran Communist
General Xiao Ke praised Chen Duxiu's role in the Chinese Revolution and hinted
at the possibility of a rehabilitation not only of Chen himself but also of his
previously reviled Trotskyist comrades. In his talk, General Xiao Ke also summa-
rised various positive evaluations ofChen Duxiu by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.
Comrades RenJianshu, Li Yueshan, andJin Shupeng have asked me to write
a preface to their edition ofChen Duxiu's collected poems, and to write the
title of the book in calligraphy. I know little about poetry, but the fact that
the collection was by Chen Duxiu excited my interest.
Chen Duxiu was the early twentieth century's man of the hour. When I
was young, I read many of his essays in Duxiu wencun ("Duxiu's writings"),
in bound volumes ofXin qingnian ("New youth"), and in Xiangdao ("Guide
weekly"). But I don't recall reading any of his poems, so I was pleasantly
surprised to see this collection. I feel that in this nation where poems and songs
are so highly valued, it is essential that Chen's poems are edited and published.
I would like to argue at this point that Chen should be seriously studied.
After the defeat of the Great Revolution [of 1925-1927], Chen split from the
Party and I no longer trusted him politically, so my impression of him
gradually dimmed. But I continued to admire his essays and meritorious
exploits in the struggle to resist feudal remnants and superstition and to
promote science and democracy. I constantly followed the course ofhis life
and his situation in the years between the defeat of the Great Revolution and
his death [in 1942). On August 18, 1981, at an academic symposium to mark
the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, I
gave a speech a passage ofwhich I shall now quote:
74. Xiao Ke, "Chen Duxiu shiji xu" ("Preface to the collected poems of Chen Duxiu"), in
Xin wenxue shiliao, no. 1, 1994, pp. 32-33.
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In the past, the Chen Duxiu question was taboo; today it is semi-taboo, by which
I mean that although today no few people have touched on some aspects of that
question, their research is not yet all-sided, nor is it profound. Probably people
still have some apprehensions in this regard. Must this question be researched in
a comprehensive fashion? My answer is yes. Comrade Mao Zedong said, "Chen
Duxiu was the Commander-in-Chief of the May Fourth Movement," Chen
Duxiu and Li Dazhao and others "gathered together" progressive youth of that
period who had embraced Marxism and "founded the Communist Party... , which
was his merit". "When we come to write China's history, we must note his merit
in that regard." Comrade Zhou Enlai too said: "Chen Duxiu performed a
meritorious service in founding the Communist Party." In my opinion, we should
make an all-sided evaluation of this Commander-in-Chiefofa glorious age, this
distinguished founder ofthe Party, even though in his later period he committed
the error of rightist capitulationism and became a Trotsky-Chen liquidationist
after his expulsion from the Party. Comrade Mao Zedong also said, "In various
respects, Chen Duxiu resembled Russia's Plekhanov." I completely agree with
that assessment; unless we conscientiously research Chen Duxiu, our future
writing of Party history could become lop-sided. Not long ago, I watched [the
documentary film] Xianquzhede ge ("Pioneers' song"), which said nothing about
Chen Duxiu, Commander-in-Chiefofthe May Fourth Movement and the most
important figure in the founding ofthe Party. Only Li Dazhao appears in the lens
of this film. But it is a universally recognised fact of history that "Chen in the
south and Li in the north" [played the main role in founding the Party]. Although
it is true that Li Dazhao was a principal figure in the founding of the Party, the
prime place [in that process] belonged to Chen Duxiu. We should not blame the
comrades who wrote the script and directed the film for committing this kind of
error; it is a problem relevant to research into the history of our Party. In my
opinion, in the course of researching Chen Duxiu we cannot confine ourselves
merely to his days in the Party or before the founding ofthe Party, but must also
include the Trotsky-Chen liquidationist period. What were the differences
between China's Trotsky-Chen liquidationist faction and foreign Trotskyists?
How was their programme? What was their attitude to Chiang Kai-shek's Guo-
mindang regime? What was their attitude to the Communist Party? What was
their attitude to imperialism and in particular to Japanese imperialism? How did
they acquit themselves in the gaols of the Guomindang? What was [Chen's]
political attitude between his release from prison [in 1937] and his death? All these
issues need to be researched. As for our evaluation ofChen Duxiu, we should
follow Comrade Mao Zedong's guidance and learn too from Lenin's critical view
and standpoint. From 1903 until the period ofthe October Revolution [in 1917],
Lenin repeatedly criticised Plekhanov's ideological and political errors. Especially
during the period of the imperialist [First W orId] War, he criticised Plekhanov
as a "mediocrity", a "social chauvinist", and a "Marxist renegade". But after
Plekhanov's death, at ajoint conference ofthe All-Russia Executive ofthe Central
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Committee ofSoviets and the Moscow City Soviet with the Trade Unions, he
stood together with all the delegates in silent tribute to Plekhanov. Later, a
memorial meeting in Leningrad was attended by Lunacharsky and Zinoviev
representing the Moscow Party and Government. Not long afterwards, Lenin
ordered the publishing ofPlekhanov's complete works, established the Plekhanov
Institute, and called on everyone to study Plekhanov's philosophy. "Unless we
study Plekhanov's entire philosophical writings," he said, "we will never become
conscious, true communists." Lenin made a concrete analysis ofPlekhanov's
political activity and attitudes in each ofhis various periods. When Stalin at the
time of the War of National Defence [i.e., the Second World War] listed the
twenty most outstanding people in Russian history, Plekhanov came top ofhis
list. Just because they criticised him, they did not rob him of his position in
history, nor in commending his virtues did they conceal his vices. I do not say
that we should use the same concrete methods in relation to Chen Duxiu as the
Russian Party in relation to Plekhanov. I simply mean that we should approach
that problem by adopting Lenin's view and standpoint. (See "Dangshi huiyi
baogaoji" ("Reports made at the meeting on Party history"), pp. 39-69.)
In my opinion, in studying Chen Duxiu we should not just confine ourselves
to political questions but we should look also at other relevant issues. Com-
rades Ren, Li, and Jin, in editing Chen Duxiu's collected poems, have
provided us with material for such a study. Chen wrote his poems half a
century ago.75 The reader needs to know the age in and the difficulties under
which they were conceived, and the process ofideological development that
they reflect. "Poetry speaks oflofty ambitions." This statement is true too of
the poetry of Chen Duxiu, and is especially evident in the purposefulness of
the poetry of his late period, for example the long poemJin.fenlei ("Tears
alongside luxury and debauchery").76 The study ofChen Duxiu's poetry helps
in the understanding of other aspects of his career.
June 2, 1993
75. We know of140 poems written by Chen Duxiu over a span ofnearly forty years, from 1903
to 1942. Only one of these poems was written in the 1920s, when Chen devoted almost his
entire energy to revolutionary activity. He resumed his poetry-writing in the early 1930s, after
he had been put in prison. Chen's 140 poems were either published in journals or kept in
manuscript by his old friends.
76. This poem, which consists of56 stanzas, was written in Nanjing Prison in 1934. It satirised
the corruption, debauchery, tyranny, and capitulation to the Japanese invaders of the Chiang
Kai-shek regime, and expressed deep sympathy for those suffering under that regime. The phrase
liuchao jitifendi usually denotes Nanjing, which was Chiang Kai-shek's capital, but jirifCn also means
"gold" and "women", i.e., corruption and debauchery.
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